DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/09

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SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/09

INDEX:

(1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N.
Korean nuclear issue (Jiji)

(2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to
reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance (Asahi)

(3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North
Korea in stages (Mainichi)

(4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to
return to Six-Party Talks at early date (Mainichi)

(5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its
missile launches (Mainichi)

(6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three
non-nuclear principles (Sankei)

(7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking (Asahi)

(8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing
three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in
coalition government (Sankei)

(9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election
(Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind;
pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ (Nikkei)

(10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on
issue-by-issue basis (Nikkei)

(11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms
to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly
inflexible (Mainichi)

(12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator
(Sankei)

(13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows
"enough is enough" (Sankei)

ARTICLES:

(1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N.
Korean nuclear issue

JIJI (Online) (Full)
July 17, 2009 (13:43)

Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with the Foreign Ministry's Asian
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki, North
American Affairs Bureau Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto, and
Foreign Policy Bureau Director General Koro Bessho this morning at
the Foreign Ministry. They are believed to have consulted on the
U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrence in response to North
Korea's recent nuclear test and missile launch.

During the meeting, the two sides agreed that North Korea's nuclear
development programs and its missile launches are a threat to

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(regional) SECURITY and unacceptable. They confirmed that Japan, the
United States, and South Korea would continue their trilateral
cooperation to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue.

In addition, concerning the six-party talks on North Korea's
denuclearization, the Japanese government is believed to have
proposed reviewing an arrangement made to provide North Korea with
fuel oil in return for disabling its nuclear facilities.

After the meeting, Campbell paid a courtesy call on Foreign Minister
Hirofumi Nakasone. Campbell, after winding up a series of meetings,
told reporters: "We discussed all issues. We hope they will return
to the six-party talks."

(2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to
reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance

ASAHI ONLINE
July 17, 2009

Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell responded
to an interview with an Asahi Shimbun reporter at the U.S. Embassy
in Akasaka, Tokyo, today. In reference to Japan's proposal that
Japan and the U.S. reconfirm the significance of the bilateral
alliance on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the conclusion
of the Japan-U.S. SECURITY Treaty next year, Campbell indicated the
U.S. government's agreement with the Japanese view, remarking: "That
seems to be a good idea."

Japan is about to enter a politically unstable period as a change of
government is taking on a touch of becoming a real possibility. In
order to avoid the alliance from becoming less significant, Japan
thinks it necessary to reconfirm the significance of the alliance.

Japan and the U.S. reviewed their bilateral alliance in the 1990s,
when the alliance as a setup in dealing with Soviet Union became
meaningless following the collapse of the Cold-War structure. The
two countries issued a Japan-U.S. joint declaration on SECURITY in
1996 and renewed the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation
in 1997.

Campbell cited these three points for reconfirmation: (1) the
contribution of playing a key role in maintaining peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the examination of the
present state; and (3) prospects for new challenges the alliance
must deal with from now, such as global warming.

The two countries are studying the possibility of President Barack
Obama issuing some type of document, such as a declaration, when he
visits Japan to attend the next session of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum to be held next year.

Regarding U.S. relations with Japan, in which a general election
will be called soon, Campbell stated:

"It is important for the U.S. to exchange views not only with
officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry but also
with wide-ranging political parties and politicians. The U.S. is
confident that it will be able to establish a solid relationship
with Japan regardless of what type of government may be established
in Japan."


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(3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North
Korea in stages

MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Comments by Lee Jong Won, professor of international politics at
Rikkyo University, as summarized by Masanori Hattori

Normally, countries aspiring to become a nuclear power take the
shortest route to possession of nuclear arms, but this is not the
case with North Korea. It has been going back and forth between
strengthening deterrence through the development of nuclear arms and
using nuclear arms as a card in diplomatic negotiations. Its true
motive is probably both the possession of nuclear arms and using
this as a card to improve U.S.-DPRK relations. However, in reality,
it does not have the capability to achieve both at the same time, so
it has been zigzagging.

A key to understanding the United States' stance toward North Korea
from now on is the report issued by the think tank Center for a New
American SECURITY (CNAS),where the new Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell once served as the
C.E.O. This report points out that regime change and the use of
force are "illusions" and stresses the need for "strategic
management" - preventing the following in the short-term: (1)
transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to other countries;
(2) anxiety in the allies Japan and the ROK and regional nuclear
proliferation; and (3) local conflicts - while working on
denuclearization through multilateral frameworks and diplomacy in
the long-term.

The DPRK claims that it is a nuclear power, but the United States
does not accept this. In reality, North Korea is not a nuclear power
that possesses deployable nuclear weapons. What is needed now is a
road map for comprehensive negotiations in stages to stop North
Korea from becoming a nuclear power and make it commit to
denuclearization.

The U.S. has not been able to present a concrete and practicable
plan for the improvement of bilateral relations in its negotiations
so far, probably due to distrust of the DPRK and resistance at home.
The following road map should be executed under the
"action-for-action" principle to achieve: (1) conclusion of a peace
agreement ending the Korean War; (2) improvement of U.S.-DPRK
relations in stages (through talks and exchange of visits between
senior officials, normalization of economic and trade relations, and
ultimately normalization of diplomatic relations) and
discontinuation of nuclear tests and the discarding of nuclear
facilities; (3) verification of extracted plutonium; and (4)
elimination of the DPRK's threat through the abandonment of nuclear
arms and so forth.

It is premature to conclude that North Korea has shifted in the
direction of possessing nuclear arms irreversibly. The DPRK is a
weak country surrounded by big regional powers like Japan and China.
One aspect of its behavior is that it is resorting to intimidation
out of a sense of isolation. The DPRK is different from Iran, a
major power in the Middle East, on this point. It is still possible
to realize policy change, not regime change, in North Korea by
recognizing such "weakness" and using this as an incentive for
improvement of relations.

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If the option of diplomatic negotiations is abandoned, the only
other options are regime change, war, or an arms race. However, it
is obvious that these will all destabilize the region. The use of
force on the Korean peninsula will expose the ROK and U.S. Forces
Korea to danger. China does not desire this, so this is not
practical.

There will probably be criticism that negotiation in stages based on
this road map is merely "putting off the problem." However, it is
also possible that internal changes may occur in North Korea in the
process of reducing its nuclear capability. During the Cold War in
Europe, the Helsinki Declaration (of 1975) on the coexistence of the
East and West became a turning point that started exchanges between
the two camps. The new wind from the outside eventually brought
about internal changes in East Europe. Progress made in stages is
not insignificant.

(4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to
return to Six-Party Talks at early date

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Takashi Sudo

Yukiya Amano, Japan's ambassador to the Permanent Mission to the
International Organizations in Vienna who will become the next
director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
held a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July

16. With regard to North Korea's nuclear issue, Amano said: "We hope
that the Six-Party Talks will resume as soon as possible, that there
will be progress in the denuclearization process, and that the IAEA
will begin its operations," urging the DPRK to return to the
Six-Party Talks at an early date.

Commenting on Iran's nuclear issue, Amano stated: "Iran claims that
(its nuclear activities) are for peaceful purposes, but it has
little international credibility. We would like to obtain its
cooperation on the implementation of UN SECURITY COUNCIL
resolutions," stressing that he hopes for Iran's voluntary
cooperation.

Regarding the concept of a nuclear fuel bank for the stable supply
of fuel for nuclear power generation, which is being discussed at
the IAEA, Amano indicated a cautious stance: "It is not advisable to
proceed too hastily."

(5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its
missile launches

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)
July 17, 2009

The Defense Ministry Joint STAFF Office on July 16 announced that an
Air-Defense Force (ASDF) aircraft scrambled against an unidentified
aircraft that was presumably a North Korean aircraft heading toward
Japan in early April, a time when that nation launched missiles,
which went over Japan. This is Japan's first scramble against North
Korean aircraft in 10 years since a suspicious vessel case that
occurred off Noto Peninsula. At the time, two SDF Aegis ships were
deployed in the Sea of Japan. The unidentified aircraft was

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presumably collecting intelligence and engaging in warning and
surveillance activity.

According to the Joint STAFF Office, the unidentified aircraft
approaching Japan's territorial airspace and flying beyond the air
defense identification zone (ADIZ),an act that requires prior
notification to Japan, was confirmed by radar several times over
several days before the missile launches on April 5. ASDF aircraft
took off from JASDF Komatsu Airbase in Ishikawa Prefecture for eight
times in total to scramble against the unidentified aircraft.

Since the unidentified aircraft headed back over the Sea of Japan,
the ASDF was unable to see it or take photos of it. However, it was
confirmed from radar records that the aircraft took off from and
landed on a North Korean base.

(6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three
non-nuclear principles

SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has
indicated his intention to hold talks with the United States
regarding the three non-nuclear principles (of not producing, not
possessing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons
into Japan),including a review of the principle of not permitting
the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

Triggered by remarks by a former vice-foreign minister and others, a
heated debate is underway on a "secret nuclear pact." It can be said
that Hatoyama's call for "thorough discussions," based on new
realities, carries great significance.

We hope that his statement will prompt the ruling and opposition
parties to earnestly discuss the nuclear threat from North Korea and
the modalities of the expansion of the deterrent (nuclear umbrella).
Whether or not all the three nonnuclear principles are fit for
reality must be examined regularly.

Reportedly, Japan and the United States have made a secret deal to
exempt port calls and passage through Japanese territorial waters by
nuclear-armed U.S. warships from prior consultations. Throughout the
Cold War era, Japan entrusted its SECURITY to the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. It can be said that behind the past governments' decision
not to disclose the existence of the pact concerning the
introduction of nuclear weapons, political wisdom has dictated
striking a balance between nuclear deterrence and the ideal of
nuclear abolition.

But ever since the United States adopted in 1992 the policy of not
having its warships carry nuclear weapons with the exception of
strategic nuclear-powered submarines, the pact has been a dead
letter, losing its effectiveness.

Despite that, arguments by some media and opposition parties have
always revolved around the existence or nonexistence of the secret
pact in connection with the (1974) LaRoque remarks and the (1981)
Reischauer statement. The government, too, has avoided discussing
the essentials of the three principles by just denying the existence
of the pact.


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The bottom line is that the nuclear umbrella provided as part of the
Japan-U.S. SECURITY setup has been Japan's ultimate SECURITY means.

The emergence of new threats, such as North Korea's nuclear and
missile tests, has resulted in uncertainty in Japan and South Korea
and shaken their trust in the ultimate deterrent. There is even a
view to discuss such approaches as sharing nuclear weapons between
Japan and the United States and possessing nuclear weapons
independently as a means to strengthen the deterrent.

In view of this new situation, it is natural to review the principle
of not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. The Sankei
Shimbun, too, has long called for a review of this principle because
the nuclear deterrent does not work when port calls and passage
through Japanese territorial waters are rejected.

Hatoyama said, "A conclusion must be reached after conducting
thorough discussions between Japan and the United States with an eye
on the future." We hope the conviction behind this statement will
not waver. In addition to talks with the United States, we want to
see the ruling and opposition camps begin essential discussions at
the Diet. Such actions will lead to an enhanced Japan-U.S.
alliance.

(7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking

ASAHI (Page 4) (Full)
July 17, 2009

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has decided to establish a
system to formulate policies in cooperation with nonprofit
organizations (NPO),with an eye on a change of government. By
promoting the use of vitality in the private sector, the DPJ is
aiming to put an end to the current bureaucracy-led policymaking
system and to build a society that emphasizes lateral social
relations.

More than 300 persons linked to NPOs participated in "a meeting
between citizen power and the DPJ" held at DPJ headquarters on July

14. Policy Research COUNCIL Chairman Masayuki Naoshima said in the
meeting: "We would like to steadily implement (policies) in
cooperation with NPOs as the main provider of public interests."

The DPJ has been promoting exchanges of views with citizens at a
discussion panel the party set up. Once the DPJ takes over the reins
of government, it intends to set up sector-specific committees with
NPOs and deepen their relations. In a meeting of the panel on July
14, a representative from an organization said: "We would like to be
involved in every process of government, including the planning and
implementing of official development assistance (ODA) projects."

In the party head talks in May, DPJ President Hatoyama emphasized:
"We will shed light on areas that have been pushed aside so far,
such as volunteer and NPO activities." The DPJ intends to include in
its manifesto for the upcoming House of Representatives election
measures to increase donation deductions and designated NPO
corporations.

Under the designated NPO corporation system introduced in 2001, the
number of organizations recognized as corporations is still small,
so the DPJ intends to take measures to strengthen the foundations of
NPO operations. The party intends to speed up authorization and

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other necessary procedures, and enhance the credibility of such NPO
corporations by promoting information disclosure.

The DPJ cites cost cuts as one of the main reasons for its
willingness to approach NPOs. Focusing on this motive, Chiaki
Matsubara, secretary of the NPO group C's, said: "It is improper for
the government, with the aim of reducing costs, to approach NPOs as
if they were subcontractors." It probably will become necessary for
NPOs to consider how to ensure their autonomous nature in
implementing activities.

(8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing
three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in
coalition government

SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has created
a stir with his remark that review of the three no-nuclear
principles will be discussed with the United States after his party
takes over the administration. Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno of
the Social Democratic Party (SDP),with which the DPJ hopes to form
a coalition after assuming power, stated at a news conference on
July 16: "There are various conditions for joining the coalition
government. I don't think it is appropriate to negate an issue near
and dear to us just like that," warning in strong terms that this
may affect negotiations to form a coalition after the House of
Representatives election.

The SDP upholds strict adherence to the three no-nuclear principles
in its manifesto (campaign pledges) issued on July 16. This has
served to underscore the gap between the two parties on foreign and
security policy matters.

Shigeno voiced this criticism: "The three no-nuclear principles
constitute a basic NATIONAL policy for Japan, the only atomic-bombed
country. This is a serious problem." He added the remonstration
that, "If he intends to become the prime minister in the near
future, he should realize that the prime minister's statements carry
much weight." SDP deputy leader Seiji Mataichi also criticized
Hatoyama: "(Mr Hatoyama) makes too many statements that cause
misunderstanding. If he had said 'we will abide by the three
no-nuclear principles,' there would be no problem."

Many DPJ members are careful about provoking the SDP on policy
issues because "even if we control a majority in the Lower House
after the election, we cannot maintain a majority in the House of
Councillors without the cooperation of the SDP and other parties."
(senior DPJ official) One senior party official expressed his
displeasure with Hatoyama's statement on July 16: "He makes too many
unnecessary remarks before the election. Even if that is really how
he feels, he should just keep quiet."

(9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election
(Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind;
pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ

NIKKEI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly)
July 16, 2009

Taking a side glance at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),which

TOKYO 00001632 008 OF 013


has been in disarray, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in its
prime. DPJ junior lawmakers, who are taking to the streets in their
home constituencies, are feeling a favorable wind for them as they
felt in recent local elections.

The DPJ has 112 House of Representatives seats. Election Campaign
Committee Chairman Hirotaka Akamatsu openly expressed the
possibility that the DPJ will secure "249 seats if I may humbly
predict" in the next Lower House election. The 249 seats exceed a
majority of the Lower House.

As the possibility of the DPJ taking over the reins of government
moves closer to reality, the party's internal strife has slipped
into the shadows. The DPJ has been watching the political brouhaha
coolly, but risky factors lurk behind the driving force of the DPJ.


At a standing officers COUNCIL meeting on July 7, a lawmaker who is
close to Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa questioned: "What does it
mean in three years' time?" The lawmaker posed this question because
he had found out that the DPJ's manifesto for the next general
election stipulated that an income compensation system for
individual farming households would be implemented in fiscal 2012.
This is the very showcase policy that forced the ruling camp to lose
a majority in the House of Councillors in the 2007 election.

Secretary General Katsuya Okada explained to the lawmaker, saying:
"We should prioritize our policies. There is a limited amount of
fiscal resources." However, the lawmaker rebutted:

"My electoral district is in a prefecture in which there are many
farmers. We should tell voters we will implement it when we take the
reins of government. If we say in three years' time, they think the
DPJ lacks drive."

Although Okada got control of the situation, he is increasingly
drawing criticism within the DPJ.

With regard to scrapping the provisional gasoline tax rate,
President Yukio Hatoyama calls for immediate abolition, while Okada
asserts that the rate should be scrapped in two years' time. Okada
eventually agreed to completely scrap the gasoline tax rate
immediately after the DPJ assumes political helm.

In exchange for the immediate abolition of the provisional tax
rates, the payment of child allowance would be halved for two years.
A total amount of 20.5 trillion yen of necessary expenditures for
four years from fiscal 2010 would be reduced to 16.8 trillion yen.

Although the DPJ, which is concerned about being criticized as
engaged in old-fashioned pork-barreling, plays up its realistic
approaches, the party plans to appropriate seven trillion yen in
fiscal 2010 for such measures as removing part of highway tolls and
free high-school education. A senior Policy Research Committee
member said: "With an eye on the Upper House election in the summer
of 2010, we want voters to feel the change of government."

If the DPJ, which does not hold a majority of the Upper House, wins
a single-party majority in the Lower House in the next general
election, it will not be able to enact any bills without the
cooperation of the Social Democratic Party and New People's New
Party.

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"Mr. Ozawa? I think the position of secretary general is most
suitable for him," said one member of the group (of about 50
members) led by Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa has made
efforts to support new-face candidates as official responsible for
election strategy. It is said that the number of members in the
Ozawa group will be about 100 after the Lower House election.

A senior DPJ member, who has distanced himself from Ozawa, is
worried, noting: "If nothing is done, the DPJ will actually be
controlled by Ozawa."

The DPJ has gained support of the public by denying LDP-style
politics. Some DPJ members are now aware of LDP-style practices that
have appeared in their party. Will a favorable political wind
continue to blow for the DPJ? Voters will make a judgment.

(10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on
issue-by-issue basis

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abstracted)
July 17, 2009

In a press conference yesterday, Japanese Communist Party (JCP)
Chairman Kazuo Shii announced the party's basic platform for the
upcoming House of Representatives election. The platform stresses
its willingness to become a constructive opposition party and to
offer cooperation on policies acceptable for the party on an
issue-by-issue basis if a government led by the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) is launched after the Lower House election. Bearing in
mind the fact that the DPJ won a tremendous victory in the latest
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and that the JCP lost its
seats, the JCP revised it conventional stance of criticizing the DPJ
as having the same qualities as the ruling parties.

Shii said:

"With the voters' judgment in the Tokyo election, a new political
phase has emerged. There is a growing possibility that a government
led by the DPJ will be inaugurated. We think it is necessary to take
an appropriate attitude to fit the new situation."

In the Tokyo election, the JCP decreased its seats from 13 to 8.
Shii added:

"We will propose measures on each issue in a positive manner and
offer cooperation in implementing agreed measures on an
issue-by-issue basis. We will play the role of a promoter but also
play the role of a breakwater when the government goes in the wrong
direction."

The basic platform emphasizes: "We are determined to elicit a
decisive judgment in the next general election to have the Liberal
Democratic Party and the New Komeito hand over the reins of
government and not to allow them to form a grand coalition." In
reference to relations with a DPJ government, the platform proposes
that the party would explore ways for cooperation on each agenda
item, such as a revision of the Worker Dispatch Law, and also notes
that if specific measures to raise the consumption tax or revise the
Constitution are put forward, the party will try to obstruct them.

The JCP fielded candidates in all 300 single-seat constitutions in

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past Lower House elections in principle, but it will put up 152
candidates in the upcoming election. It will place emphasis on the
proportional representation segment. The number of constituencies in
which LDP and DPJ candidates engage in a one-on-one fight is
expected to increase in the election. The LDP is concerned that the
votes for the JCP might go to the DPJ.

(11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms
to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly
inflexible

MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Comments by Koichiro Tanaka, director of JIME Center, Institute of
Energy Economics, Japan, as summarized by Ken Uzuka

Looking back at the UN SECURITY Council's economic sanctions in the
past two and a half years, the reality is that Iran has expanded its
uranium enrichment, built heavy- water reactors, and proceeded
steadily with its nuclear development program.

The Iranian government claims that due to the 9 percent annual
increase in electric energy consumption, it wants to build some 20
commercial nuclear reactors in the future. The international
community is not concerned about the civilian use of nuclear
reactors but fears that the production of plutonium and uranium
enrichment at the heavy-water reactors may lead to the development
of nuclear weapons. The Iranians give the explanation that the
heavy-water reactors will be used to obtain isotopes for medical and
other purposes, and uranium enrichment is meant to obtain fuel for
light-water reactors. If the Iranian facilities accept inspections
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of
fissile materials, it is practically impossible for these facilities
and equipment to be converted for military use.

The U.S. and Israel suspect that Iran has secret nuclear facilities
and undeclared fissile materials and might suddenly withdraw from
the NPT and plunge into the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However,
Iran has consistently denied any intentions to produce nuclear arms.
Unless the U.S. or Israel launches a military attack, it will
probably not take precipitous action.

Even if the purpose of Iran's nuclear development is for energy, its
secondary objective is to maintain ambiguity on nuclear arms while
indicating it possesses the capability to develop such weapons. Such
"strategic ambiguity" has a deterrence effect. This is a completely
different approach from North Korea, which has been showing off its
development of nuclear arms for intimidation.

The U.S. once suspected Iraq of possessing weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs),forced it to declare everything, and eventually
waged war in 2003. Iran believes that the U.S. toppled Iraq in full
awareness that Iraq did not have WMDs from inspections by the United
Nations and other bodies. As long as Iran perceives the U.S. and
Israel as a SECURITY threat, it will not be possible to ask it to
declare everything.

Even after the turmoil following the presidential election, Iran
will probably pursue its nuclear development. Meanwhile, President
Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad suspects that the U.S. and the European

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countries were behind the political upheaval, and obviously, he will
be even more inflexible in future nuclear negotiations. The
six-nation framework consisting of the five permanent UN SECURITY
Council (UNSC) members and Germany is not expected to be effective,
and negotiations will consist mainly of direct talks between the
U.S. and Iran. U.S. President Barack Obama will have to defer
dialogue since the legitimacy of the second Ahmadi-Nejad
administration is questionable. Even if President Obama disregards
doubts about the legitimacy of the election results, he will face
pressure from Congress. A cooling off period of one to two months is
probably necessary.

We would like to first watch the inauguration of President
Ahmadi-Nejad for his second term in July and what he will do at the
UN General Assembly in September. Another key point is what the U.S.
is going to do about the "state of NATIONAL emergency with respect
to Iran" expiring in November. The state of emergency was first
declared after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in 1979. Unless
the United States compromises, Iran will regard this as the
"continuation of a hostile act," and this will make dialogue even
more difficult.

(12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator

SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
July 17, 2009

Yoshihisa Komori, Washington

Former Navy Secretary Jim Webb, an influential Senator close to the
Obama administration, stated in a July 15 congressional hearing on
territorial disputes that the United States has already recognized
Japan's sovereignty over the archipelago of Senkaku isles. The U.S.
government in recent years seemed to have avoided declaring that
far. In the hearing, however, an expert stated that the United
States returned Okinawa and the Senkaku isles to Japan after the war
and it is therefore natural to say the United States has recognized
Japan's sovereignty over the Senkakus.

Democrat Senator Webb is close to President Obama and is an
influential policy promoter in the Senate for the Obama
administration.

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs held a hearing that day on maritime territorial disputes in
Asia. Webb, who chairs the subcommittee, presided over the hearing.
In his opening remarks, Webb critically took up China's sovereignty
claims in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. He stated:
"Despite Japan's control over the Senkaku Islands since the end of
World War II-and the recognition by others, including the United
States, of Japan's sovereignty over these islands-China still claims
publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus."

The U.S. government basically takes a neutral stance on territorial
disputes between other countries. The Obama administration's
predecessors in recent years admitted that the Japan-U.S. SECURITY
Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Even so, the impression is
strong that they had avoided declaring sovereignty over the
Senkakus.

Richard Cronin, a researcher at the Stimson Center, is familiar with
China's moves in Southeast Asia. Cronin testified before the

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subcommittee and supported Webb's view, stating: "The State
Department has so far taken a basic principle of nonintervention in
territorial disputes in general. That is probably why the State
Department has avoided saying anything definite about the Senkaku
Islands as well. However, we can say the Senkaku Islands are
special, because the U.S. government returned the Senkaku Islands as
well as Okinawa."

Peter Dutton, who is a professor at the Naval War College and
familiar with China's ocean policy, also testified before the
subcommittee and stressed that China's territorial claim over the
Senkaku isles is weak-grounded, stating: "Territorial rights are
based on effective rule and monopolistic control over that region.
When it comes to the Senkaku Islands, however, China does not
satisfy these two conditions, so its sovereignty claim is weak."

(13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows
"enough is enough"

SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged slightly)
July 17, 2009

By Iwao Nakatani, Director of the Mitsubishi UFJ Research &
Consulting

The G-8 summit meeting held in Italy (L'Aquila Summit) is now over.
The major features of the meeting this time were that the world has
realized that it is impossible for the G-8 to settle global problems
on its own and that the G-14 and the G-20 that include emerging
countries have significantly increased their identity.

The world has definitely taken a step forward from the age of
one-nation hegemonism centered on the U.S. and the age centered on
industrialized countries to a multi-polar world, where emerging
countries exercise greater influence.

The problem is whether expanding the summit to a G-14 or G-20 level
will settle difficult problems challenging the world. It appears
that if the G-20, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of world GDP
can come up with effective settlement measures in concert,
international crises can certainly be solved. If that is the case,
we can pin hopes on the world in the 21st century.

However, the situation is not that easy. First, it is highly
inefficient to decide matters, based on a council-like system. Since
various countries' interests are at odds over many issues, it would
become even more difficult to settle key issues. For instance,
industrialized countries and developing countries are at odds over a
numerical target to cut carbon dioxide by 2050. The G-8 summit
failed to set a specific target.

Thorny issue of state egoism

It is the state that decides on policies in the modern world, where
nationalism is a dominant ideology. Each country deals with domestic
problems through its own decision-making process. However, when it
comes to cross-border issues, such as the global environment issue,
the poverty issue, approaches to the collapse of the bubble economy
and the handling of such issues as energy and high food prices,
countries must rely on the formation of consensus at such settings
as the G-14 or the G-20.


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Or, such international agencies as the UN, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank will have to deal with those
problems.

However, there are no international talks that guarantee consensus
building. Consensuses formed at such settings are not often legally
binding. International agencies, such as the UN, do not have
sufficient decision-making ability. The fundamental reason for that
is priority is given to state egoism.

Jacques Attali in his recent work titled "Une Breve Histoire de
L'avenir" (The Japanese title is 21-seiki no rekishi = the history
of the 21st century) predicts the future of the world. He is very
pessimistic about the immediate future of the world, predicting that
global capitalism will continue to run amok for the next several
decades, making such global issues as water and energy shortages,
high food prices and the destruction of the global environment more
serious. He says that this could trigger great migrations of
thousands of people beyond NATIONAL borders and international
disputes. The worst scenario is that a country that has fallen into
a hopeless situation might use a nuclear weapon. In that event,
humans would suffer a devastating blow.

Jacques Attali's prediction

Is it possible to thwart a situation like this? Attali views it is
impossible to do so for the time being. That is because, he says, as
long as state egoism and endless desire of individuals behind it is
accepted, overall harmony would be treated as a secondary matter.
Unless individuals realize that constraining their desire and
contributing to the happiness of other people is in fact the only
way for them to become happy, humans cannot but plunge into the era
of a "super-conflict."

"Constraining their desire is the very way humans should be" has
long been the basis of the Eastern religions, starting with
Buddhism. However, the Western sense of values that introduced
market principles, which approve individuals' desire, has dominated
the world in the history we have followed. Needless to say, this has
significantly improved the global standard of living. However, if
excessive capitalism is to lead the world to disruption in the world
of the 21st century, the only way to rescue the world from the ruin
would be for humans to learn ways to constrain their desire and
implement such.

I do not know to what extent Attali's prediction is correct.
However, I have no doubt that a clue to settling problems can be
found in the philosophically fundamental theme of how to constrain
human desire. Perhaps the writer is not the only one who expects
Japan to be able to contribute in this regard, as it used to have a
cultural tradition of "enough is 'as good as a feast.'

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