DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 13 TOKYO 001632 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/09 INDEX: (1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N. Korean nuclear issue (Jiji) (2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance (Asahi) (3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North Korea in stages (Mainichi) (4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks at early date (Mainichi) (5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its missile launches (Mainichi) (6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three non-nuclear principles (Sankei) (7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking (Asahi) (8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in coalition government (Sankei) (9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election (Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind; pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ (Nikkei) (10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on issue-by-issue basis (Nikkei) (11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly inflexible (Mainichi) (12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator (Sankei) (13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows "enough is enough" (Sankei) ARTICLES: (1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N. Korean nuclear issue JIJI (Online) (Full) July 17, 2009 (13:43) Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki, North American Affairs Bureau Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto, and Foreign Policy Bureau Director General Koro Bessho this morning at the Foreign Ministry. They are believed to have consulted on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrence in response to North Korea's recent nuclear test and missile launch. During the meeting, the two sides agreed that North Korea's nuclear development programs and its missile launches are a threat to TOKYO 00001632 002 OF 013 (regional) security and unacceptable. They confirmed that Japan, the United States, and South Korea would continue their trilateral cooperation to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, concerning the six-party talks on North Korea's denuclearization, the Japanese government is believed to have proposed reviewing an arrangement made to provide North Korea with fuel oil in return for disabling its nuclear facilities. After the meeting, Campbell paid a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone. Campbell, after winding up a series of meetings, told reporters: "We discussed all issues. We hope they will return to the six-party talks." (2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance ASAHI ONLINE July 17, 2009 Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell responded to an interview with an Asahi Shimbun reporter at the U.S. Embassy in Akasaka, Tokyo, today. In reference to Japan's proposal that Japan and the U.S. reconfirm the significance of the bilateral alliance on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty next year, Campbell indicated the U.S. government's agreement with the Japanese view, remarking: "That seems to be a good idea." Japan is about to enter a politically unstable period as a change of government is taking on a touch of becoming a real possibility. In order to avoid the alliance from becoming less significant, Japan thinks it necessary to reconfirm the significance of the alliance. Japan and the U.S. reviewed their bilateral alliance in the 1990s, when the alliance as a setup in dealing with Soviet Union became meaningless following the collapse of the Cold-War structure. The two countries issued a Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security in 1996 and renewed the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in 1997. Campbell cited these three points for reconfirmation: (1) the contribution of playing a key role in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the examination of the present state; and (3) prospects for new challenges the alliance must deal with from now, such as global warming. The two countries are studying the possibility of President Barack Obama issuing some type of document, such as a declaration, when he visits Japan to attend the next session of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to be held next year. Regarding U.S. relations with Japan, in which a general election will be called soon, Campbell stated: "It is important for the U.S. to exchange views not only with officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry but also with wide-ranging political parties and politicians. The U.S. is confident that it will be able to establish a solid relationship with Japan regardless of what type of government may be established in Japan." TOKYO 00001632 003 OF 013 (3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North Korea in stages MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full) July 17, 2009 Comments by Lee Jong Won, professor of international politics at Rikkyo University, as summarized by Masanori Hattori Normally, countries aspiring to become a nuclear power take the shortest route to possession of nuclear arms, but this is not the case with North Korea. It has been going back and forth between strengthening deterrence through the development of nuclear arms and using nuclear arms as a card in diplomatic negotiations. Its true motive is probably both the possession of nuclear arms and using this as a card to improve U.S.-DPRK relations. However, in reality, it does not have the capability to achieve both at the same time, so it has been zigzagging. A key to understanding the United States' stance toward North Korea from now on is the report issued by the think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS),where the new Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell once served as the C.E.O. This report points out that regime change and the use of force are "illusions" and stresses the need for "strategic management" - preventing the following in the short-term: (1) transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to other countries; (2) anxiety in the allies Japan and the ROK and regional nuclear proliferation; and (3) local conflicts - while working on denuclearization through multilateral frameworks and diplomacy in the long-term. The DPRK claims that it is a nuclear power, but the United States does not accept this. In reality, North Korea is not a nuclear power that possesses deployable nuclear weapons. What is needed now is a road map for comprehensive negotiations in stages to stop North Korea from becoming a nuclear power and make it commit to denuclearization. The U.S. has not been able to present a concrete and practicable plan for the improvement of bilateral relations in its negotiations so far, probably due to distrust of the DPRK and resistance at home. The following road map should be executed under the "action-for-action" principle to achieve: (1) conclusion of a peace agreement ending the Korean War; (2) improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations in stages (through talks and exchange of visits between senior officials, normalization of economic and trade relations, and ultimately normalization of diplomatic relations) and discontinuation of nuclear tests and the discarding of nuclear facilities; (3) verification of extracted plutonium; and (4) elimination of the DPRK's threat through the abandonment of nuclear arms and so forth. It is premature to conclude that North Korea has shifted in the direction of possessing nuclear arms irreversibly. The DPRK is a weak country surrounded by big regional powers like Japan and China. One aspect of its behavior is that it is resorting to intimidation out of a sense of isolation. The DPRK is different from Iran, a major power in the Middle East, on this point. It is still possible to realize policy change, not regime change, in North Korea by recognizing such "weakness" and using this as an incentive for improvement of relations. TOKYO 00001632 004 OF 013 If the option of diplomatic negotiations is abandoned, the only other options are regime change, war, or an arms race. However, it is obvious that these will all destabilize the region. The use of force on the Korean peninsula will expose the ROK and U.S. Forces Korea to danger. China does not desire this, so this is not practical. There will probably be criticism that negotiation in stages based on this road map is merely "putting off the problem." However, it is also possible that internal changes may occur in North Korea in the process of reducing its nuclear capability. During the Cold War in Europe, the Helsinki Declaration (of 1975) on the coexistence of the East and West became a turning point that started exchanges between the two camps. The new wind from the outside eventually brought about internal changes in East Europe. Progress made in stages is not insignificant. (4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks at early date MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) July 17, 2009 Takashi Sudo Yukiya Amano, Japan's ambassador to the Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna who will become the next director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), held a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July ¶16. With regard to North Korea's nuclear issue, Amano said: "We hope that the Six-Party Talks will resume as soon as possible, that there will be progress in the denuclearization process, and that the IAEA will begin its operations," urging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks at an early date. Commenting on Iran's nuclear issue, Amano stated: "Iran claims that (its nuclear activities) are for peaceful purposes, but it has little international credibility. We would like to obtain its cooperation on the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions," stressing that he hopes for Iran's voluntary cooperation. Regarding the concept of a nuclear fuel bank for the stable supply of fuel for nuclear power generation, which is being discussed at the IAEA, Amano indicated a cautious stance: "It is not advisable to proceed too hastily." (5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its missile launches MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) July 17, 2009 The Defense Ministry Joint Staff Office on July 16 announced that an Air-Defense Force (ASDF) aircraft scrambled against an unidentified aircraft that was presumably a North Korean aircraft heading toward Japan in early April, a time when that nation launched missiles, which went over Japan. This is Japan's first scramble against North Korean aircraft in 10 years since a suspicious vessel case that occurred off Noto Peninsula. At the time, two SDF Aegis ships were deployed in the Sea of Japan. The unidentified aircraft was TOKYO 00001632 005 OF 013 presumably collecting intelligence and engaging in warning and surveillance activity. According to the Joint Staff Office, the unidentified aircraft approaching Japan's territorial airspace and flying beyond the air defense identification zone (ADIZ),an act that requires prior notification to Japan, was confirmed by radar several times over several days before the missile launches on April 5. ASDF aircraft took off from JASDF Komatsu Airbase in Ishikawa Prefecture for eight times in total to scramble against the unidentified aircraft. Since the unidentified aircraft headed back over the Sea of Japan, the ASDF was unable to see it or take photos of it. However, it was confirmed from radar records that the aircraft took off from and landed on a North Korean base. (6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three non-nuclear principles SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) July 17, 2009 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has indicated his intention to hold talks with the United States regarding the three non-nuclear principles (of not producing, not possessing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan),including a review of the principle of not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Triggered by remarks by a former vice-foreign minister and others, a heated debate is underway on a "secret nuclear pact." It can be said that Hatoyama's call for "thorough discussions," based on new realities, carries great significance. We hope that his statement will prompt the ruling and opposition parties to earnestly discuss the nuclear threat from North Korea and the modalities of the expansion of the deterrent (nuclear umbrella). Whether or not all the three nonnuclear principles are fit for reality must be examined regularly. Reportedly, Japan and the United States have made a secret deal to exempt port calls and passage through Japanese territorial waters by nuclear-armed U.S. warships from prior consultations. Throughout the Cold War era, Japan entrusted its security to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It can be said that behind the past governments' decision not to disclose the existence of the pact concerning the introduction of nuclear weapons, political wisdom has dictated striking a balance between nuclear deterrence and the ideal of nuclear abolition. But ever since the United States adopted in 1992 the policy of not having its warships carry nuclear weapons with the exception of strategic nuclear-powered submarines, the pact has been a dead letter, losing its effectiveness. Despite that, arguments by some media and opposition parties have always revolved around the existence or nonexistence of the secret pact in connection with the (1974) LaRoque remarks and the (1981) Reischauer statement. The government, too, has avoided discussing the essentials of the three principles by just denying the existence of the pact. TOKYO 00001632 006 OF 013 The bottom line is that the nuclear umbrella provided as part of the Japan-U.S. security setup has been Japan's ultimate security means. The emergence of new threats, such as North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, has resulted in uncertainty in Japan and South Korea and shaken their trust in the ultimate deterrent. There is even a view to discuss such approaches as sharing nuclear weapons between Japan and the United States and possessing nuclear weapons independently as a means to strengthen the deterrent. In view of this new situation, it is natural to review the principle of not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. The Sankei Shimbun, too, has long called for a review of this principle because the nuclear deterrent does not work when port calls and passage through Japanese territorial waters are rejected. Hatoyama said, "A conclusion must be reached after conducting thorough discussions between Japan and the United States with an eye on the future." We hope the conviction behind this statement will not waver. In addition to talks with the United States, we want to see the ruling and opposition camps begin essential discussions at the Diet. Such actions will lead to an enhanced Japan-U.S. alliance. (7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) July 17, 2009 The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has decided to establish a system to formulate policies in cooperation with nonprofit organizations (NPO),with an eye on a change of government. By promoting the use of vitality in the private sector, the DPJ is aiming to put an end to the current bureaucracy-led policymaking system and to build a society that emphasizes lateral social relations. More than 300 persons linked to NPOs participated in "a meeting between citizen power and the DPJ" held at DPJ headquarters on July ¶14. Policy Research Council Chairman Masayuki Naoshima said in the meeting: "We would like to steadily implement (policies) in cooperation with NPOs as the main provider of public interests." The DPJ has been promoting exchanges of views with citizens at a discussion panel the party set up. Once the DPJ takes over the reins of government, it intends to set up sector-specific committees with NPOs and deepen their relations. In a meeting of the panel on July 14, a representative from an organization said: "We would like to be involved in every process of government, including the planning and implementing of official development assistance (ODA) projects." In the party head talks in May, DPJ President Hatoyama emphasized: "We will shed light on areas that have been pushed aside so far, such as volunteer and NPO activities." The DPJ intends to include in its manifesto for the upcoming House of Representatives election measures to increase donation deductions and designated NPO corporations. Under the designated NPO corporation system introduced in 2001, the number of organizations recognized as corporations is still small, so the DPJ intends to take measures to strengthen the foundations of NPO operations. The party intends to speed up authorization and TOKYO 00001632 007 OF 013 other necessary procedures, and enhance the credibility of such NPO corporations by promoting information disclosure. The DPJ cites cost cuts as one of the main reasons for its willingness to approach NPOs. Focusing on this motive, Chiaki Matsubara, secretary of the NPO group C's, said: "It is improper for the government, with the aim of reducing costs, to approach NPOs as if they were subcontractors." It probably will become necessary for NPOs to consider how to ensure their autonomous nature in implementing activities. (8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in coalition government SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) July 17, 2009 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has created a stir with his remark that review of the three no-nuclear principles will be discussed with the United States after his party takes over the administration. Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno of the Social Democratic Party (SDP),with which the DPJ hopes to form a coalition after assuming power, stated at a news conference on July 16: "There are various conditions for joining the coalition government. I don't think it is appropriate to negate an issue near and dear to us just like that," warning in strong terms that this may affect negotiations to form a coalition after the House of Representatives election. The SDP upholds strict adherence to the three no-nuclear principles in its manifesto (campaign pledges) issued on July 16. This has served to underscore the gap between the two parties on foreign and security policy matters. Shigeno voiced this criticism: "The three no-nuclear principles constitute a basic national policy for Japan, the only atomic-bombed country. This is a serious problem." He added the remonstration that, "If he intends to become the prime minister in the near future, he should realize that the prime minister's statements carry much weight." SDP deputy leader Seiji Mataichi also criticized Hatoyama: "(Mr Hatoyama) makes too many statements that cause misunderstanding. If he had said 'we will abide by the three no-nuclear principles,' there would be no problem." Many DPJ members are careful about provoking the SDP on policy issues because "even if we control a majority in the Lower House after the election, we cannot maintain a majority in the House of Councillors without the cooperation of the SDP and other parties." (senior DPJ official) One senior party official expressed his displeasure with Hatoyama's statement on July 16: "He makes too many unnecessary remarks before the election. Even if that is really how he feels, he should just keep quiet." (9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election (Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind; pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ NIKKEI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly) July 16, 2009 Taking a side glance at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),which TOKYO 00001632 008 OF 013 has been in disarray, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in its prime. DPJ junior lawmakers, who are taking to the streets in their home constituencies, are feeling a favorable wind for them as they felt in recent local elections. The DPJ has 112 House of Representatives seats. Election Campaign Committee Chairman Hirotaka Akamatsu openly expressed the possibility that the DPJ will secure "249 seats if I may humbly predict" in the next Lower House election. The 249 seats exceed a majority of the Lower House. As the possibility of the DPJ taking over the reins of government moves closer to reality, the party's internal strife has slipped into the shadows. The DPJ has been watching the political brouhaha coolly, but risky factors lurk behind the driving force of the DPJ. At a standing officers council meeting on July 7, a lawmaker who is close to Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa questioned: "What does it mean in three years' time?" The lawmaker posed this question because he had found out that the DPJ's manifesto for the next general election stipulated that an income compensation system for individual farming households would be implemented in fiscal 2012. This is the very showcase policy that forced the ruling camp to lose a majority in the House of Councillors in the 2007 election. Secretary General Katsuya Okada explained to the lawmaker, saying: "We should prioritize our policies. There is a limited amount of fiscal resources." However, the lawmaker rebutted: "My electoral district is in a prefecture in which there are many farmers. We should tell voters we will implement it when we take the reins of government. If we say in three years' time, they think the DPJ lacks drive." Although Okada got control of the situation, he is increasingly drawing criticism within the DPJ. With regard to scrapping the provisional gasoline tax rate, President Yukio Hatoyama calls for immediate abolition, while Okada asserts that the rate should be scrapped in two years' time. Okada eventually agreed to completely scrap the gasoline tax rate immediately after the DPJ assumes political helm. In exchange for the immediate abolition of the provisional tax rates, the payment of child allowance would be halved for two years. A total amount of 20.5 trillion yen of necessary expenditures for four years from fiscal 2010 would be reduced to 16.8 trillion yen. Although the DPJ, which is concerned about being criticized as engaged in old-fashioned pork-barreling, plays up its realistic approaches, the party plans to appropriate seven trillion yen in fiscal 2010 for such measures as removing part of highway tolls and free high-school education. A senior Policy Research Committee member said: "With an eye on the Upper House election in the summer of 2010, we want voters to feel the change of government." If the DPJ, which does not hold a majority of the Upper House, wins a single-party majority in the Lower House in the next general election, it will not be able to enact any bills without the cooperation of the Social Democratic Party and New People's New Party. TOKYO 00001632 009 OF 013 "Mr. Ozawa? I think the position of secretary general is most suitable for him," said one member of the group (of about 50 members) led by Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa has made efforts to support new-face candidates as official responsible for election strategy. It is said that the number of members in the Ozawa group will be about 100 after the Lower House election. A senior DPJ member, who has distanced himself from Ozawa, is worried, noting: "If nothing is done, the DPJ will actually be controlled by Ozawa." The DPJ has gained support of the public by denying LDP-style politics. Some DPJ members are now aware of LDP-style practices that have appeared in their party. Will a favorable political wind continue to blow for the DPJ? Voters will make a judgment. (10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on issue-by-issue basis NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abstracted) July 17, 2009 In a press conference yesterday, Japanese Communist Party (JCP) Chairman Kazuo Shii announced the party's basic platform for the upcoming House of Representatives election. The platform stresses its willingness to become a constructive opposition party and to offer cooperation on policies acceptable for the party on an issue-by-issue basis if a government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is launched after the Lower House election. Bearing in mind the fact that the DPJ won a tremendous victory in the latest Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and that the JCP lost its seats, the JCP revised it conventional stance of criticizing the DPJ as having the same qualities as the ruling parties. Shii said: "With the voters' judgment in the Tokyo election, a new political phase has emerged. There is a growing possibility that a government led by the DPJ will be inaugurated. We think it is necessary to take an appropriate attitude to fit the new situation." In the Tokyo election, the JCP decreased its seats from 13 to 8. Shii added: "We will propose measures on each issue in a positive manner and offer cooperation in implementing agreed measures on an issue-by-issue basis. We will play the role of a promoter but also play the role of a breakwater when the government goes in the wrong direction." The basic platform emphasizes: "We are determined to elicit a decisive judgment in the next general election to have the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito hand over the reins of government and not to allow them to form a grand coalition." In reference to relations with a DPJ government, the platform proposes that the party would explore ways for cooperation on each agenda item, such as a revision of the Worker Dispatch Law, and also notes that if specific measures to raise the consumption tax or revise the Constitution are put forward, the party will try to obstruct them. The JCP fielded candidates in all 300 single-seat constitutions in TOKYO 00001632 010 OF 013 past Lower House elections in principle, but it will put up 152 candidates in the upcoming election. It will place emphasis on the proportional representation segment. The number of constituencies in which LDP and DPJ candidates engage in a one-on-one fight is expected to increase in the election. The LDP is concerned that the votes for the JCP might go to the DPJ. (11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly inflexible MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full) July 17, 2009 Comments by Koichiro Tanaka, director of JIME Center, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, as summarized by Ken Uzuka Looking back at the UN Security Council's economic sanctions in the past two and a half years, the reality is that Iran has expanded its uranium enrichment, built heavy- water reactors, and proceeded steadily with its nuclear development program. The Iranian government claims that due to the 9 percent annual increase in electric energy consumption, it wants to build some 20 commercial nuclear reactors in the future. The international community is not concerned about the civilian use of nuclear reactors but fears that the production of plutonium and uranium enrichment at the heavy-water reactors may lead to the development of nuclear weapons. The Iranians give the explanation that the heavy-water reactors will be used to obtain isotopes for medical and other purposes, and uranium enrichment is meant to obtain fuel for light-water reactors. If the Iranian facilities accept inspections under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of fissile materials, it is practically impossible for these facilities and equipment to be converted for military use. The U.S. and Israel suspect that Iran has secret nuclear facilities and undeclared fissile materials and might suddenly withdraw from the NPT and plunge into the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, Iran has consistently denied any intentions to produce nuclear arms. Unless the U.S. or Israel launches a military attack, it will probably not take precipitous action. Even if the purpose of Iran's nuclear development is for energy, its secondary objective is to maintain ambiguity on nuclear arms while indicating it possesses the capability to develop such weapons. Such "strategic ambiguity" has a deterrence effect. This is a completely different approach from North Korea, which has been showing off its development of nuclear arms for intimidation. The U.S. once suspected Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),forced it to declare everything, and eventually waged war in 2003. Iran believes that the U.S. toppled Iraq in full awareness that Iraq did not have WMDs from inspections by the United Nations and other bodies. As long as Iran perceives the U.S. and Israel as a security threat, it will not be possible to ask it to declare everything. Even after the turmoil following the presidential election, Iran will probably pursue its nuclear development. Meanwhile, President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad suspects that the U.S. and the European TOKYO 00001632 011 OF 013 countries were behind the political upheaval, and obviously, he will be even more inflexible in future nuclear negotiations. The six-nation framework consisting of the five permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) members and Germany is not expected to be effective, and negotiations will consist mainly of direct talks between the U.S. and Iran. U.S. President Barack Obama will have to defer dialogue since the legitimacy of the second Ahmadi-Nejad administration is questionable. Even if President Obama disregards doubts about the legitimacy of the election results, he will face pressure from Congress. A cooling off period of one to two months is probably necessary. We would like to first watch the inauguration of President Ahmadi-Nejad for his second term in July and what he will do at the UN General Assembly in September. Another key point is what the U.S. is going to do about the "state of national emergency with respect to Iran" expiring in November. The state of emergency was first declared after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in 1979. Unless the United States compromises, Iran will regard this as the "continuation of a hostile act," and this will make dialogue even more difficult. (12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) July 17, 2009 Yoshihisa Komori, Washington Former Navy Secretary Jim Webb, an influential Senator close to the Obama administration, stated in a July 15 congressional hearing on territorial disputes that the United States has already recognized Japan's sovereignty over the archipelago of Senkaku isles. The U.S. government in recent years seemed to have avoided declaring that far. In the hearing, however, an expert stated that the United States returned Okinawa and the Senkaku isles to Japan after the war and it is therefore natural to say the United States has recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Senkakus. Democrat Senator Webb is close to President Obama and is an influential policy promoter in the Senate for the Obama administration. The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing that day on maritime territorial disputes in Asia. Webb, who chairs the subcommittee, presided over the hearing. In his opening remarks, Webb critically took up China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. He stated: "Despite Japan's control over the Senkaku Islands since the end of World War II-and the recognition by others, including the United States, of Japan's sovereignty over these islands-China still claims publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus." The U.S. government basically takes a neutral stance on territorial disputes between other countries. The Obama administration's predecessors in recent years admitted that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Even so, the impression is strong that they had avoided declaring sovereignty over the Senkakus. Richard Cronin, a researcher at the Stimson Center, is familiar with China's moves in Southeast Asia. Cronin testified before the TOKYO 00001632 012 OF 013 subcommittee and supported Webb's view, stating: "The State Department has so far taken a basic principle of nonintervention in territorial disputes in general. That is probably why the State Department has avoided saying anything definite about the Senkaku Islands as well. However, we can say the Senkaku Islands are special, because the U.S. government returned the Senkaku Islands as well as Okinawa." Peter Dutton, who is a professor at the Naval War College and familiar with China's ocean policy, also testified before the subcommittee and stressed that China's territorial claim over the Senkaku isles is weak-grounded, stating: "Territorial rights are based on effective rule and monopolistic control over that region. When it comes to the Senkaku Islands, however, China does not satisfy these two conditions, so its sovereignty claim is weak." (13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows "enough is enough" SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged slightly) July 17, 2009 By Iwao Nakatani, Director of the Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting The G-8 summit meeting held in Italy (L'Aquila Summit) is now over. The major features of the meeting this time were that the world has realized that it is impossible for the G-8 to settle global problems on its own and that the G-14 and the G-20 that include emerging countries have significantly increased their identity. The world has definitely taken a step forward from the age of one-nation hegemonism centered on the U.S. and the age centered on industrialized countries to a multi-polar world, where emerging countries exercise greater influence. The problem is whether expanding the summit to a G-14 or G-20 level will settle difficult problems challenging the world. It appears that if the G-20, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of world GDP can come up with effective settlement measures in concert, international crises can certainly be solved. If that is the case, we can pin hopes on the world in the 21st century. However, the situation is not that easy. First, it is highly inefficient to decide matters, based on a council-like system. Since various countries' interests are at odds over many issues, it would become even more difficult to settle key issues. For instance, industrialized countries and developing countries are at odds over a numerical target to cut carbon dioxide by 2050. The G-8 summit failed to set a specific target. Thorny issue of state egoism It is the state that decides on policies in the modern world, where nationalism is a dominant ideology. Each country deals with domestic problems through its own decision-making process. However, when it comes to cross-border issues, such as the global environment issue, the poverty issue, approaches to the collapse of the bubble economy and the handling of such issues as energy and high food prices, countries must rely on the formation of consensus at such settings as the G-14 or the G-20. TOKYO 00001632 013 OF 013 Or, such international agencies as the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank will have to deal with those problems. However, there are no international talks that guarantee consensus building. Consensuses formed at such settings are not often legally binding. International agencies, such as the UN, do not have sufficient decision-making ability. The fundamental reason for that is priority is given to state egoism. Jacques Attali in his recent work titled "Une Breve Histoire de L'avenir" (The Japanese title is 21-seiki no rekishi = the history of the 21st century) predicts the future of the world. He is very pessimistic about the immediate future of the world, predicting that global capitalism will continue to run amok for the next several decades, making such global issues as water and energy shortages, high food prices and the destruction of the global environment more serious. He says that this could trigger great migrations of thousands of people beyond national borders and international disputes. The worst scenario is that a country that has fallen into a hopeless situation might use a nuclear weapon. In that event, humans would suffer a devastating blow. Jacques Attali's prediction Is it possible to thwart a situation like this? Attali views it is impossible to do so for the time being. That is because, he says, as long as state egoism and endless desire of individuals behind it is accepted, overall harmony would be treated as a secondary matter. Unless individuals realize that constraining their desire and contributing to the happiness of other people is in fact the only way for them to become happy, humans cannot but plunge into the era of a "super-conflict." "Constraining their desire is the very way humans should be" has long been the basis of the Eastern religions, starting with Buddhism. However, the Western sense of values that introduced market principles, which approve individuals' desire, has dominated the world in the history we have followed. Needless to say, this has significantly improved the global standard of living. However, if excessive capitalism is to lead the world to disruption in the world of the 21st century, the only way to rescue the world from the ruin would be for humans to learn ways to constrain their desire and implement such. I do not know to what extent Attali's prediction is correct. However, I have no doubt that a clue to settling problems can be found in the philosophically fundamental theme of how to constrain human desire. Perhaps the writer is not the only one who expects Japan to be able to contribute in this regard, as it used to have a cultural tradition of "enough is 'as good as a feast.' POST