DASD FOR EAST ASIA SCHIFFER'S MAY 25 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001257 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/J DOD FOR OSD/APSA - GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/ARAKEL IAN PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR MNUC KN KS JA SUBJECT: DASD FOR EAST ASIA SCHIFFER'S MAY 25 MEETING WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa and visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer discussed Japan's next generation fighter program (F-X). While the May 25 DPRK nuclear test highlights the need for closer bilateral cooperation between the United States and Japan, as well as trilateral cooperation including South Korea, Takamizawa stressed that both governments should be mindful of Japanese public perceptions of inadequate information sharing leading up to the test. MOD Defense Policy Bureau Deputy DG Ryutaro Matsumoto questioned whether updates to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would influence the realignment roadmap. Noting that some members of the Japanese Diet are scrutinizing the plans for relocating U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and are calling for clarification on details, Matsumoto asked whether the U.S. Government remains firm on its position that the location of the Futenma Replacement Facility should not deviate from the agreed plan. Matsumoto also called for more bilateral discussion on issues pertaining to roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC),especially on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile defense. End Summary. -------------- -------------- HAMADA REQUESTS BILATERAL WITH SECDEF AT SHANGRI-LA -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 25, visiting DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer called on Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa and met separately with Deputy Director General Ryutaro Matsumoto. Previewing the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral defense ministerial on the margins of the May 29 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Takamizawa said Defense Minister Hamada would like to meet bilaterally with Secretary Gates to discuss Japan's next generation fighter program (F-X) and U.S Air Force posture in Japan. -------------- "NEW DEVELOPMENTS": FUJISAKI-INOUYE MEETING -------------- ¶3. (C) Takamizawa stated that "new developments" have prompted Minister Hamada to revisit the issue of F-22 Raptors with Secretary Gates in Singapore, even though the Secretary had delivered a clear message to Hamada during their meeting in Washington that foreign sales of the F-22 are prohibited by law, and that F-35 may provide best capability match for Japan's needs. When asked to elaborate on the "new developments," Takamizawa noted that Japanese Ambassador to the United States Ichiro Fujisaki had met with Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and received an "interesting" response on the possibility of F-22 exports to Japan from Senator Inouye. Inouye has sent a letter to Secretary Gates conveying his views on the matter. Takamizawa added that Minister Hamada would understand if Secretary Gates felt the Shangri-La Dialogue was not a good time to discuss the issue, but the issue is very important to the Japanese government. ¶4. (C) DASD Schiffer pointed out that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson and he had informed Japanese Embassy Political Minister Akiba that DOD would not interfere with the Japanese Embassy's dealings with members of Congress. He cautioned, however, against any interaction that could lead to misunderstanding between Chairman Obey and other members, and strongly recommended approaching Obey as the initial step in Japan's congressional consultations. Second, seeking clarification on the Obey Amendment to better inform Japanese decision makers prior to selecting the next-generation fighter aircraft is fine, but, from DOD's perspective, any perception that F-22 acquisition is the actual intent behind the Embassy's interaction with Congress could lead to resistance in Washington. Schiffer added that a much larger issue in terms of the F-X program is the need for serious bilateral discussion on the security challenges ahead and the type of force structure both countries need as an alliance. This, he underscored, is why Secretary Gates had mentioned the F-35 as a good F-X option during the ministerial in Washington. He urged the Japanese government not to be fixated on the F-22. -------------- GLOBAL POSTURE -- A NEED TO LOOK MORE BROADLY -------------- ¶5. (C) Takamizawa asserted that Hamada wants to discuss global posture in light of changes in the international security environment, and how the two countries should plan to deal with such changes. Both sides should consider formulating a "checklist" of issues and challenges. The Japanese government had convened an inter-agency meeting on the DPRK the previous week, proposing a comprehensive security discussion with the United States and the ROK on North Korea beyond six-party talks consultations, to include broader discussions on Korean Peninsula issues. The Japanese side would like to discuss contingency planning issues during the trilateral defense ministerial with the United States and Korea on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue. To do so, all three sides should prepare talking points, agenda items, and specific ideas, and coordinate them prior to the meeting, Takamizawa said. -------------- -------------- DPRK TEST UNDERSCORES NEED FOR TRILATERAL MINISTERIAL -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Schiffer responded that the May 25 nuclear test by the DPRK highlighted the need for all three countries to stand together united, and that the trilateral defense ministerial presents a good opportunity to demonstrate solidarity. The U.S. Government will coordinate closely on the talking points, agenda, and joint press statement. He asked whether MOD has been receiving adequate information pertinent to the test from the United States, and whether anything additional is required. Takamizawa responded the Japanese side has been getting what little information is available from U.S. counterparts through existing channels, but noted a need for better secure communication channels. The question, he noted, is how both sides could analyze the information consistently with each other. Information received from the U.S. Government leading up to the test has been extremely useful, but the Japanese government was surprised at how quickly the test came, Takamizawa noted. -------------- CONCERNS ABOUT JAPAN NOT GETTING INFORMATION -------------- ¶7. (C) Takamizawa stressed, however, the current political atmosphere poses some challenges with respect to bilateral coordination between the United States and Japan in responding to the DPRK's nuclear test. The Diet will call a session the following morning and scrutinize whether the United States provided timely information to Japan. This, he pointed out, is a politically sensitive subject. Any perception that Japan had not received information on the test from the United States could undermine the credibility of the Alliance. The political "center of gravity" in Japan has shifted, leading the public to scrutinize bilateral coordination more strictly than during the 2006 missile launch and nuclear test. Takamizawa asserted that this is something both governments need to discuss, as it is important to convey to the public the message that even if the United States and Japan cooperate fully, there are limits to what can be achieved -- citing abductees as an example. (COMMENT: Takamizawa was alluding to the perceived delay in receiving information from New York on the DPRK's notification prior to its April 5 TD-2 missile launch. END COMMENT.) -------------- -------------- QDR'S IMPACT ON REALIGNMENT / VM OR DG-LEVEL TALKS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) In a separate meeting, DDG Matsumoto queried whether the current revision of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would impact the realignment roadmap, stressing that both governments would need to consult closely if that were the case. He highlighted the Diet's May 13 approval of the Guam International Agreement, asserting that both sides should consider elevating bilateral talks on GIA implementation to the Vice Ministerial or DG-level. Schiffer responded that the U.S. Government is fully committed to the realignment roadmap, and that he would be surprised if there were to be any changes resulting from the QDR. The QDR process is at a very early stage, requiring another six months of analysis before the QDR is ready for publication. He stressed the QDR will address some strategic issues, but nothing that would call into question any of the basic aspects of the realignment roadmap. On the issue of a comprehensive joint mechanism for Guam relocation, Schiffer noted that ASD Gregson is very interested in the undertaking and appreciates the Japanese government's ideas for moving forward in a way that meets both governments' needs. -------------- -------------- DIET PROBES DISCREPANCY OF NUMBERS IN REALIGNMENT PLAN -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Matsumoto said some Diet members have questioned the breakdown on USD 2.8 billion costs for relocating U.S. Marines to Guam, as well as other details, including whether the figure of 8000 Marines is a hard figure or a rough estimate. They also demanded the Japanese government to share detailed plans on the proposed move. MOD will work hard to secure the requisite budget for JFY 2010, but some Diet members will focus on whether the United States and Japanese governments have implemented the roadmap on schedule and will continue to scrutinize cost figures. Many are already drawing attention to the lack of a master plan for consolidation south of Kadena. Matsumoto added that the two governments were to have announced the plan by March 2007, but this has been delayed. To make progress on realignment, the Japanese government needs to secure the JFY 2010 budget for both Guam and Okinawa, but to do so it needs to know which Marine units will relocate to Guam, Matsumoto stressed. Schiffer responded that the U.S. Government also faces scrutiny from Congress, and that planning is made difficult by the fact that as the U.S. forces' requirements change, our force laydown requirements also may change. The GIA, however, is a solid plan and roadmap for moving forward. The U.S. Government intends to uphold its part of the agreement. -------------- -------------- CHALLENGE TO WORK WITH OKINAWA GOVERNOR ON FUTENMA -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) On the issue of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF),Matsumoto probed whether it remained the U.S. Government's position that it would not accept "even one inch" of deviation from the agreed runway plan. He explained that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is completed, with the survey as the next step. He expects the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to have different ideas from the Japanese government on the location of the runway, i.e., moving it further offshore. Local elections in November 2010 will likely mean that the incumbent Governor will continue to insist on the movement of the runway. The Japanese government clearly needs cooperation from the Governor as he has the power to authorize land reclamation. Finally, general elections in the fall could potentially have an adverse impact on the realignment roadmap if the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) were to come to power. The DPJ, Matsumoto noted, states as its policy to move the FRF off Okinawa. While it is unclear whether such policy has a party-wide consensus, both governments need to pay heed. ¶11. (C) Schiffer cautioned against deviating from the agreed plan, stressing that both sides had to make serious concessions to reach agreement. While the plan might not be perfect, it is pointless to quibble over a few meters given the clear benefit to the people of Okinawa to see actual reduction in the U.S. footprint. It would be unfortunate, Schiffer said, to see years of negotiations fall apart over a few meters. The plan has many loose threads, which, if tugged at, could make all the efforts put in by both governments obsolete. As far as a new Japanese administration, the U.S. government intends to deal with it the same as it would the current administration and work to maintain agreed bilateral initiatives. He noted that he had similar discussions during the U.S. Presidential campaign, and pointed out that U.S. national interests do not change with a change in administration. He expects that Japan will be the same way. ¶12. (C) MOD Senior Coordinator for Realignment Hiroshi Marui underscored that considerable work remained ahead for GIA implementation. Even with the 2009 budget, MOD needs to work closely with the Embassy and USFJ on several challenges, including 1) sending Japanese money to the U.S. Government before Congress approves U.S. funding and 2) ensuring that Japanese contractors get equal footing. Schiffer said he hopes both sides can set up a process for their respective budget cycles to have a mutually reinforcing effect. He expressed confidence that both sides can make it work and that the U.S. Government would work closely with Congress. -------------- --- MORE RMC-TYPE TALKS NEEDED, ESPECIALLY ISR, BMD -------------- --- ¶13. (C) Matsumoto suggested that both governments had spent a lot of time discussing realignment over three years of DDG-level talks, but not enough time has been spent on roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC). As the two governments work respectively on the QDR and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG),they need to engage more on RMC issues. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and information sharing on ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be important issues for Japan as it updates its NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Plan. Japan is particularly concerned about territorial claims affecting "western and southern islands," as well as the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs. Schiffer welcomed bilateral discussions on QDR and NDPG, adding that both governments can make a strong statement if the two documents were to echo each other in significant areas. ISR and BMD are two significant areas for cooperation, where both countries can complement each others' strengths. The two governments also should consult on broader regional security architecture with the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center, with the ROK, Australia, and others as key players. ¶14. (C) Embassy Pol-Mil Chief agreed that ISR is a significant area for bilateral cooperation, adding that both sides should also be cognizant of information security, especially cyber security. It may be useful to include such discussion in the broader RMC discussions. DASD Schiffer said the QDR process includes a review on the need for a new sub-unified command on cyber security. He asked whether there is need or utility for consolidating the bilateral consultative mechanism, as multiple dialogues take place in a number of different channels. Matsumoto said the Japanese side has already proposed Vice Ministerial or DG-level talks. He noted that, personally, he feels Vice Ministers and DGs are busy, ultimately leaving DDG-level officials to engage in most of the consultations. He pointed out, however, that as long as Takamizawa remains DG at MOD's Defense Policy Bureau, it is possible to maintain a DG-level framework. ¶15. (U) DASD Schiffer has cleared this message. ZUMWALT