LESSONS LEARNED FROM H1N1 OUTBREAK IN JAPAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001253 DEPT FOR OES/IHB AMBASSADOR LOFTIS DEPT FOR EAP/J, EAP/EX, CA USDA PASS TO APHIS, FAS FOR BURDETT HHS PASS TO CDC HHS FOR OGHA DEPT PASS TO AID/GH/HIDN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFLU AEMR AESC CASC EAGR KFLO TBIO KSAF KPAO PREL PINR, AMGT, MG, JA SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM H1N1 OUTBREAK IN JAPAN REF: A) STATE 54435; B) TOKYO 1171 and previous TOKYO 00001253 001.2 OF 002 Sensitive but Unclassified. Please handle accordingly. ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Effective coordination among multiple agencies at Post, our five consulates general, and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) helped the Mission to prepare for the spread of H1N1 in Japan, inform official and non-official Americans in Japan of developments, and report to Washington on Japan's response to the outbreak. Embassy tripwires were a helpful guide for Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC),but Post took action based on the specific characteristics of the H1N1 outbreak. The EAC linked in Consulate and USFJ officers by teleconference. Post relied on USG and GOJ information sources and Department guidance in disseminating information, including via two warden messages. Clarifying GOJ procedures regarding quarantined Amcits helped us to better respond to Americans' inquiries; however, users at Post reported some difficulties with the Consular Task Force (CTF) application. The Embassy helped USFJ to arrange virus sample testing at a GOJ lab; a step that saved USFJ both time and resources and showcased cooperation between the Japanese government and the U.S. military in Japan. Washington messages helped to keep open markets for pork and sustain the GOJ's positive and constructive approach on pork imports and sales. New cases of H1N1 continue to be reported in Japan. End Summary. Mission Japan H1N1 Coordination Efforts -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Mission Japan's H1N1 Task Force, led by the Econ Section's ESTH Unit and including Embassy offices and five consulates general, worked in close coordination with Washington agencies, USFJ, and the GOJ to keep official and non-official Americans in Japan informed of developments, prepare for the spread of the disease, and report on Japan's response to the outbreak. Personnel from the different offices and agencies in Mission Japan had daily contact with officials at Foreign Affairs, Health, Agriculture, Transportation, and other Ministries to engage and report on Japan's rapidly-changing border screening and quarantine procedures. The �0A;Mission's five consulates general reported to the Embassy on actions taken by local governments, airports, private companies, hospitals, and educational institutions throughout Japan. Post's Economic Section coordinated the Mission's regular front-channel H1N1 updates to Washington. Post Management -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) reviewed Embassy tripwires originally set for a possible outbreak of Avian Influenza or SARS in considering actions to respond to the H1N1 outbreak. While the tripwires were a useful guide, the EAC considered actions in light of the fact that the outbreak originated in North America, rather than in Asia. The EAC met prior to a five-day holiday weekend to identify specific triggers for further action should the situation change during the Embassy's closure. To ensure staff and families had information over the long weekend, Post sent a notice to all staff and arranged for round-the-clock broadcast of the Department's pandemic influenza video on the residential compound television channel. Once H1N1 had appeared in Japan, the EAC met via teleconference with officers from the Mission's five constituent posts and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to coordinate action and preparations for the spread of H1N1 in Japan. American Citizens and Consular -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Post's Consular Section relied closely on TOKYO 00001253 002.2 OF 002 frequently-updated USG and GOJ Internet sources to convey timely information on the H1N1 outbreak to Americans in Japan. Post disseminated information in accordance with Washington guidance and the "no-double standard" policy, including links to official information sources via Post's ACS webpage, ACS newsletters, and two warden messages that followed the useful template produced by CA/OCS/ACS. ¶5. (SBU) Although many Americans arriving in Japan were delayed by Japanese airport screening procedures, and a number were quarantined, Post received few phone calls regarding the procedures or the GOJ's H1N1 response. The limited number of inquiries suggests U.S. and Japanese media coverage of quarantine procedures, along with Post's efforts to disseminate information, went a long way towards informing the traveling public. Among the Americans who did contact Post about screening procedures, many sought assurances from the Embassy that Japan's relatively strict procedures were being applied fairly and in accordance with law. ¶6. (SBU) Although Post had already been in direct contact with relevant GOJ offices, Post needed to ask the GOJ to clarify procedures for notifying the Embassy of Americans, including U.S. service members on SOFA status, detained in quarantine procedures and for allowing Americans held in quarantine access to telephones. Embassy efforts to reach out to quarantined Americans and their families and friends helped to ease the situation. Regular contact with representatives of U.S. and other international airlines provided helpful insights into airport screening delays and the impact of the H1N1 outbreak on travelers to and from Japan. ¶7. (SBU) Users at Post reported the Consular Task Force (CTF) application was awkward to use and did not allow Post to designate the specific locations of cases. As each location in the CTF application required coordination with the Department, the rapidly-evolving situation led us to use other tools to track our cases. The utility of the CTF application would be enhanced if posts were able to designate their own locations in the application. Coordination with U.S. Military -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to update U.S. military bases in Japan on GOJ border procedures in order to mirror GOJ efforts with arriving air and sea passengers. When a suspected H1N1 case was reported at Yokota Air Base May 1, the Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to test the virus sample at Japan's National Institute for Infectious Diseases. The test results confirmed the following day that the virus was not H1N1, allowing USFJ to release quarantined passengers and enabling Japan to swiftly reassure the public that the U.S. military had not brought the H1N1 virus into Japan. While Post and USFJ worked with the GOJ to establish procedures for utilizing local laboratory capacity during the H1N1 outbreak, Post will continue to coordinate with the GOJ to clarify the process to help in dealing with any future events. USG Messages Supported GOJ's Stance on Pork Trade -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Public comments by senior USG officials praising the GOJ's scientific approach to the trade in pork meat was extremely important in supporting Japanese policy makers' decisions. Japan is the largest export market for U.S. pork, buying $1.5 billion annually. ZUMWALT