DEMIL: LITTLE MOVEMENT LIEKLY BEFORE ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000221 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV MASS AL SUBJECT: DEMIL: LITTLE MOVEMENT LIEKLY BEFORE ELECTIONS WITHOUT PRESSURE REF: A) TIRANA 7 B) TIRANA 146 C) TIRANA 96 Classified By: Ambassador John L. Withers II for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary. One week before the April 4 NATO Summit, the Ministry of Defense ordered the temporary suspension of all demilitarization activity. The stated reason was to avoid any accident that might mar events around Albania's NATO accession (as the Gerdec tragedy did only two weeks before Albania's invitation to join NATO in 2008). However, viewed alongside delays in almost all other areas of demil, it is clear the current government lacks motivation for - and indeed is nervous about - progress on demil before this summer's national elections. Post believes a call from Washington to Defense Minister Oketa to urge progress on demil - specifically on the Polican demilitarization facility, where substantial U.S. money has gone unused for almost eight months - could be useful in unlocking paralysis in the MOD. Any message to the GOA should stress that continued lack of progress on demil will jeopardize continued U.S. funding and support for demil activities. End Summary. CONTINUED DELAYS -------------- ¶2. (C) Of greatest concern is the continued delay at Polican. A U.S.-funded line to dismantle 82mm mortars (the largest stock in Albania's inventory) was originally scheduled to begin with supervision from U.S. contractor Armor Group on August 1, 2008. However, bureaucratic delays and disagreements (who pays for what, the level of contractor involvement in initial preparations, complaints from community residents, etc.) delayed commencement of Polican - as well as the other major industrial demil facility, Mjekes - beyond the end of 2008. After strong U.S. pressure during a visit by Defense Minister Oketa to Washington in December, Oketa committed to beginning industrial demil at Mjekes and Polican in early 2009. ¶3. (C) While successfully beginning work at Mjekes in February, a fatal accident at Polican in January increased jitters over demil at Polican (ref a). (Note: As opposed to Polican, Mjekes is currently run by Albanians without foreign support. End Note.) MOD mid-level staff have continually found new issues that must be solved before work at Polican can begin, including such minor concerns as reducing the noise made by the incinerator. After several discussions 
with Albanian officers, EUCOM EOD Specialist LTC Mike Buckley has expressed his opinion that MOD mid-level officers (especially General Staff J-4) do not want work to begin at Polican at all if possible. This would be a great disappointment, as significant U.S. money has been dedicated to this project - around USD 4 million to date. ¶4. (C) In addition, during an inspection of Mjekes in March, the CHOD felt the plan to take care of residue from demil (propellant, fuses and explosives) was inadequate and ordered the suspension of demil at Mjekes until a plan was established (It is worth noting that such a plan has always been required of Polican even before work there begins). ¶5. (C) Other delays have also given the impression of an MOD staff that is reluctant to move forward on demilitarization. While Oketa drafted a National Demil Plan in June 2008, MoD staff (particularly General Staff J-4) have dragged their feet on its implementation by claiming the plan has never been signed by the Minister, and is thus not official (ref b). Each time the Minister has requested the Plan so he can sign it, J-4 officers continually claimed that they are correcting minor details in the plan and will send it to the Minister once it is ready. We believe MOD staff has no desire or intention of obtaining a singed National Demil Plan. ¶6. (C) Further, U.S. contractor Armor Group has agreed to import a portable incinerator to destroy small arms and light weapons, but for over four months, J-4 staff has objected to its use and has complained that small arms are not a priority. As a result, Armor Group has been unwilling to import the machine until the Minister has issued a signed order for the machine's use. While the Minister has verbally agreed to this, J-4 staff has stalled on paperwork necessary for such an order. Lastly, while the Minister and CHOD have insisted that open detonation of the most dangerous munitions would commence at eight designated sites on April 1, the TIRANA 00000221 002 OF 002 Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) have done little to nothing to prepare these sites, and commencement of open detonation has been postponed indefinitely. LACK OF MOTIVATION -------------- ¶7. (C) The February 11 indictments in the Gerdec tragedy (ref c) have increased fear throughout the Ministry of Defense. While Minister Oketa himself is motivated to deal with the problem of demilitarization, he wields little political clout, even within his own Ministry. He is young (40),has no previous military experience, is not closely tied to Prime Minister Berisha, is rarely outspoken, and has not played the rough politics necessary to increase his political stature. As a result, there is speculation that even if the majority party wins a second mandate in the June 28, 2009 national elections, it is unlikely that Oketa will remain as Minister of Defense. Moreover, last week, Berisha promised significant minister positions to all political parties who join his election coalition, which would also rule out Oketa, who is from the same party as Berisha. ¶8. (C) MOD staff is aware of all of this and takes advantage of these facts, ignoring deadlines and stalling on requests in the hopes they will be forgotten, which they often are. Oketa has rarely been willing to hold his own staff's feet to the fire to meet deadlines or carry out orders. However, pressure applied at the right time (such as in December) can be useful. This was also seen when dealing with the issue of leftover RDX and propellant at Mjekes. When LTC Buckley brought the danger of these explosives - as well as continued stalling of Oketa's staff on this issue - to Oketa's attention (followed by a similar message from the Ambassador to Prime Minister Berisha),the very next day Oketa fired the chief of the General Staff J-4. Since then LTC Buckley has been working with the MOD staff to put together an effective plan to destroy these explosives. ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶9. (C) For these reasons, we believe a call from Washington at either the DAS level or higher, or at the appropriate level from PM/WRA, to Minister Oketa could be useful in urging Oketa to make progress on demil before this summer. Oketa should understand that significant U.S. capital, both in terms of manpower and finances, have been dedicated to this problem, including millions of dollars for the line at Polican and the assignment of an active EOD officer from EUCOM (an extremely scarce commodity in high demand) to Tirana. But U.S. "stake-holders" are becoming concerned at the lack of return on these "investments." We understand the political risks as we move forward with demil, but we believe there are greater risks in stalling - the greatest risk being that of a catastrophic explosion that could have been prevented with timely progress on demil. ¶10. (C) In conjunction, these points could also be used in any meetings the Albanian CHOD may have during his April 13-17 visit to Washington and New Jersey. ¶11. (C) We believe a call to Berisha may not be as effective and could be counter-productive. Berisha is solely focused on his re-election campaign and seems to believe progress on demil causes greater risk to his political future than does ignoring the problem. Attention on the problem may increase his efforts to stall progress until after the elections. That said, when the Ambassador next meets the Prime Minister, he will note these issues to Berisha and test his reaction. WITHERS