CWC: TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000768 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV BAGHDAD FOR REID AND HOLCOMBE SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ SUBJECT: CWC: TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS MEETING ON IRAQI BUNKERS, JANUARY 12-13, 2010 REF: THE HAGUE 738 Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is CWC-78-09 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On December 22, Delreps met with senior Technical Secretariat (TS) officials to discuss plans for the trilateral meeting with Iraqi and U.S. experts January 12-13, 2010, on the status of the Iraqi chemical weapons bunkers (reftel). Senior TS staff had met with the Director-General (DG) and the Legal Advisor the day before, and emphasized the need for substantial justification, including photographs, of the Iraqi weapons bunkers before a legal determination can be made on possible encapsulation of the bunkers in lieu of destruction. The Technical Secretariat wants to separate the cases of the two remaining bunkers and, at minimum, help Iraq amend its initial declaration by removing Bunker 41 which no longer contains chemical weapons. -------------- -------------- MORE ASSESSMENT/PROOF NEEDED OF BUNKERS' CONTENTS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Delreps Beik and Smith met with Horst Reeps, TS Director of Verification, and Dominique Anelli, Head of Chemical Demilitarization, on December 22 to get a read-out on the TS meeting the day before on whether encapsulating Iraq's remaining chemical bunker would meet the legal requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Director-General held the meeting with senior staff before leaving for the Christmas holidays. Reeps stated that the DG's concern is that Iraq not be treated differently from any other State Party to the Convention, despite the differences in its history and the condition of its remaining chemical weapons. The TS believes that Bunker 41 can be separated out and removed by amendment from Iraq's initial declaration as there appear to be no remaining weapons in that bunker. Anelli noted that the DG and Legal Advisor needed "more assessment" of Bunker 13 and very clear justification before determining whether encapsulation of the bunker with cement would meet the legal requirements of the Convention. ¶3. (C) Both Reeps and Anelli emphasized the need for photographs as the best evidence of what remains in the bunkers. Reeps noted that U.S. troops took photos in 2003, and that the Iraq Survey Group also had photos that would be useful. He asked what exactly the U.S. experts were bringing in January; Delrep said she would forward the question to Washington, but noted that the experts coming had developed the DOD paper presented to the Iraqi delegation in Washington in October. Anelli stated that if no new information and evidence of the contents is forthcoming, the January meeting is not worth the time and expense for the experts to come to The Hague. ¶4. (C) Delrep asked whether the initial TS visit to Iraq would take place in the near future. Reeps responded that he himself has now been tapped to lead the team, and more TS officials had recently undergone UN security training in Amman. He said the UN would plan to accompany the team with armed guards, probably private contractors, and was concerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the Qconcerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the Ministry office and INMD are outside the Green Zone. Reeps noted that the OPCW is waiting for an invitation from the Iraqi government, and that the "Kurdish Ambassador here" (a clear reference to Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa) had different views from his government on the best site for the meeting. Reeps did not believe the visit would be possible before the March elections. -------------- PLANS FOR THE JANUARY 12-13 EXPERTS MEETING -------------- ¶5. (C) Delrep informed Reeps of the list of U.S. experts coming for the January trilateral meeting and the names of the Iraqi experts that she had received from their Embassy. Reeps said he would chair the meeting, with TS participants including Anelli, Senior Demil Officers Yaugen Ryzhykau and Gabriela Coman-Enescu, and an observer from the Legal Advisor's office. He proposed starting the meetings at 9:15 on January 12 "with very few breaks" and the agenda to go "bunker by bunker." The TS is under orders from the DG to report everything on Iraq on a daily basis and would propose a summary status at the end of each session, to be drafted by the TS and approved by the group. The DG will include status information on Iraq in his report to the Executive Council (EC 59) in February. -------------- ASSISTING IRAQ TO MAKE ITS CASE -------------- ¶6. (C) Reeps expressed his intention to conclude the meeting with how to proceed and the next steps for all concerned, particularly Iraq, which will need to amend its initial declaration if this meeting agrees on the assessment basis and the separation of the status of the two bunkers. Although the time is relatively short, it would be ideal for Iraq to present amendments to its initial declaration at EC 59 in February -- ideally for both Bunkers 41 and 13, but at least for Bunker 41. This would be a year after Iraq's accession to the Convention and its initial declaration, and it would be preferable for Iraq to present its case first before Council members dissect the amendment documents. Delrep noted that TS endorsement of any plans for entombment of Bunker 13 would be critical to convince the Council of its viability; if it appears to be a U.S. or Iraqi proposal, Council members will be suspicious that Iraq is shirking its responsibilities. Reeps and Anelli emphatically agreed. ¶7. (C) Reeps advised that the group of countries wanting to assist Iraq be activated, and included in the information exchange and political planning early, to help make Iraq's case to the Council. He said Germany could be helpful in this regard. Delrep noted the meeting that took place during the CSP among countries interested in assisting Iraq as a good starting point. ¶8. (U) BEIK SENDS. MANN