CWC: PATH FORWARD ON REPORTING RECOVERED CHEMICAL

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000738 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL CWC IZ SUBJECT: CWC: PATH FORWARD ON REPORTING RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN IRAQ, CLARIFYING AMBIGUITY ON IRAQI DESTRUCTION PLANS, AND GENERAL COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION ACTIONS Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is CWC-71-09 ¶1. This is an action request -- see paras 17, 20, 26, 29, 34, and 35. -------------- INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶2. (SBU) This cable reports on a series of meetings between the U.S. Delegation and the Iraqi Delegation held on November 29 - December 3 on the margins of the 14th Session of the Conference of States Parties in The Hague. The Iraqi delegation provided significant new information on several long-standing issues, including: reporting on Recovered Chemical Weapons (RCW) in Iraq, highlighting ambiguity of the contents of the Muthanna bunkers and related destruction plans, and preferred methods of communication and coordination. A brief summary of pertinent background information is provided immediately below. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Prior to February 12, 2009 (the date of Iraq's entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention), the United States recovered and destroyed 4,530 munitions, which was reported to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat reviewed the records of destruction and made a report that was addressed at the 58th Session of the OPCW Executive Council in October. ¶4. (SBU) Since February 12, 2009, 83 additional recovered chemical weapons from four incidents have been destroyed by Coalition Forces. The information regarding these recoveries was passed from the U.S. Department of Defense to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, with the purpose to be further coordinated within the Iraqi government and reported to the Technical Secretariat consistent with treaty obligations. To our knowledge, no such reports have been received by the Technical Secretariat. ¶5. (SBU) This issue was discussed at length with Iraqi representatives during a bilateral meeting held in Washington, DC, in October. A failure of communication was pinpointed as occurring between the Ministry of Defense recipient of the recovered chemical weapons reports and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (INMD). Additionally, communications between officials in Baghdad and representatives in The Hague have been tenuous. (Del note: The designated Ministry of Defense representative from Iraq had his travel to the October meeting in Washington and the meetings this week in The Hague cancelled by his leadership.) ¶6. (SBU) During the October meeting, the Iraqi delegation provided a presentation on the status of their General Plan for Destruction. The presentation included the progress made in destroying facilities in Al Muthanna (except the bunkers),Fallujah II, and Fallujah III, as well as Iraqi plans for the conversion of Al Rashad. The Iraqi delegation indicated that they would be providing this information to the Technical Secretariat and would update their plans accordingly. ¶7. (SBU) With regard to the Muthanna bunkers, the United States provided a brief synopsis of the contents of Bunker 13 and Bunker 41. The information included a statement that the contents of the bunkers are not a proliferation risk. It was reported that the contents of both bunkers are severely deteriorated. Information from knowledgeable former UNSCOM personnel indicates that the contents of Bunker 41 may not be declarable as chemical weapons, such as emptied 155 howitzer shells that may have already been destroyed to treaty standards by mutilation. Bunker 13 contents, while clearly chemical weapons when stored (i.e., sarin filled rockets and sodium cyanide precursor),were subject to a fire and are likely degraded. Additionally, there is an unexploded 2,000 pound bomb inside the bunker, which will have to be taken into account in any plans for intrusive assessment of its contents. ¶8. (SBU) The Government of Iraq has requested assistance from the United States to complete its destruction obligations and has been actively soliciting other countries to provide donor assistance. Several countries have expressed interest (e.g., Germany, Lithuania) however; no concrete plans are in place. The United States provided a concept paper on what might be required to perform an assessment as a reference for use by the Iraqi delegation. The Germans have also provided a concept briefing that included the use of robotics in the performance of an assessment, but appear to be reconsidering this in light of information provided by the U.S. on the bunker contents. While the Iraqi delegation remains aggressively aimed at donor coordination, the momentum should perhaps be tempered as the current sentiment in OPCW leadership appears to lean toward a less traditional and potentially more flexible manner for Iraq to meet its treaty obligations. ¶9. (SBU) Recent meetings with the Director-General and the Head of Verification have indicated that he leadership of the Organization may be looking for a more creative approach to balancing the risks and benefits of destruction activity -- while remaining mindful of the ultimate goal of the Convention: elimination of all chemical weapons. -------------- MEETINGS HELD IN THE HAGUE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) On November 29, Delreps Gene Klimson, Don Clagett, Sarah Rodjom, Lynn Hoggins, and Jennifer Smith met with Iraqi delegates Dr. Mohammed Al Sharaa (Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate), Mohaned Kareem Al-Helli (Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate),Jwan Khioka (Ministry of Foreign Affairs),Beshar Ibrahim Al-Nuaimee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Muhannad Al-Miahi (Iraqi Delegation to the OPCW). The intention of the meeting was to reach a common understanding of the contents of the Muthanna bunkers and the status of reporting on RCW in Iraq amongst the two delegations at a technical level prior to senior- level meetings later that week. Qlevel meetings later that week. ¶11. (SBU) On November 30, a second bilateral meeting was held. Andrew Weber (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, and Chemical, and Biological Weapons, Department of Defense) led the U.S. delegation which included Delreps Rodjom, Hoggins, and Smith. The Iraqi delegation was led by Ambassador Siamand Banaa and included delegates Khioka, Al Sharaa, and Al-Miahi. The purpose of this meeting was a senior-level discussion on issues related to Iraq's plans for destruction activity and the current understanding of the bunker contents. ¶12. (SBU) On December 1, the bilateral discussions were extended to include members from the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Horst Reeps (Director, Verification Division) and Dominique Anelli (Head, Chemical Demilitarization Branch). The U.S. delegation was led by Dr. Robert Mikulak (ISN/CB Director and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the CSP) and included Delreps David Weekman, Clagett, Rodjom, Hoggins, and Smith. The Iraqi delegation included Banaa, Al-Miahi, Al Sharaa, Khioka, and Al-Nuaimee. The purpose of this meeting was to provide the current understanding of the Muthanna bunker contents with officials from the Technical Secretariat and solicit their impressions of feasible destruction plan options. ¶13. (SBU) On December 3, the Iraqi delegation convened a meeting of delegations that had expressed interest in supporting Iraq destruction activity, and included delegates from Germany, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, and the United States. Iraqi delegates included Banaa, Al-Miahi, Al Sharaa, Khioka, and Al-Nuaimee. German delegates included Ambassador Werner Burkart and Holger Ruthe (National Authority, Berlin). British delegates included John Foggo and Craig Wallbank (both from the National Authority, London),and Dr. James McGilly (DSTL Chemical and Biological Sciences, Porton Down). Ambassador Vaidotas Verba attended as the Lithuanian delegate and in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference of States Parties. Mikulak and Smith represented the U.S. delegation. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss challenges faced by Iraq in the preparation for their destruction activity and to encourage continued coordination amongst potential international donors. -------------- RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN IRAQ -------------- ¶14. (SBU) During the November 29 meeting, Al Sharaa stated that he had received three batches of reports from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense regarding the 83 RCW found and destroyed by U.S forces since February 2009. He stated that he was prepared to report this information to the Technical Secretariat; however, he required more evidence that these were CW munitions and required clarification on several points. ¶15. (S) Al Sharaa stated that the information provided for the first and second recoveries referred to M110 155 projectiles and contended that these were not part of the Iraqi CW program. He inquired if this was a result of flawed reporting or information. The group reviewed back-up documentation to include images of the munitions and determined that these appeared to be such munitions. Delreps stated that they would review the materials and report any changes in information and that a full package of RCW reports and supplemental data would be provided during the Qsupplemental data would be provided during the week. (Del note: Delrep provided Al Sharaa with a hard copy and an electronic copy of the identical set of RCW materials that were previously sent from Department of Defense to Ministry of Defense.) ¶16. (S) Al Sharaa discussed this issue with Mikulak and stated that the inclusion of the M110 155 projectiles in the Iraqi RCW reports to the Technical Secretariat might prove problematic for the U.S. as Al Sharaa posited that they would be in Iraq only by one of two means - either the U.S. provided them to Iraq under the previous regime or the U.S. provided them to Iran. Al Sharaa stated that he would refrain from reporting the RCW until the U.S. had considered this matter fully and informed him of the preferred reporting action. ¶17. (S) Action requested: Del requests that original RCW reports and relevant supporting documentation be reviewed to determine the accuracy of the reports, specifically why were these judged to be CW rounds and if there is a possibility of other payloads being used with these projectiles. Del also requests guidance on how and by whom further communications should be carried out with the Iraqi delegation and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate on this matter. (Del note: Delrep sent electronic mail to the interagency to request clarification and direction on December 3. For context, note that the original communications from the U.S. Department of Defense to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense with relevant data attached was transmitted on an unsecure network (i.e., Yahoo email account.) ¶18. (SBU) Al Sharaa also stated that the location listed for the third recovery, Samra Village, was problematic and unknown to him. The substantiating documentation clarifies the location of the finds as Tikrit, Iraq, and was provided to Al Sharaa. ¶19. (C) For future communications on RCW in Iraq, Al Sharaa requested that courtesy copies be sent to the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate at the same time as they are sent to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. He stated that these may be sent directly to Al Sharaa or through the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. He indicated that communications between and amongst ministries in Iraq remains a challenge. This sentiment of increased direct communication, or the "triangle of communication", between Baghdad, Washington, and The Hague was emphasized by Banaa throughout discussions as well. (Del note: This is a departure from earlier requests by the Government of Iraq. Previously they expressed a preference for these communications to remain military to military and further that the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate could not act upon reports received outside their interministerial channels, requiring receipt of the data from Ministry of Defense directly.) ¶20. (SBU) Action requested: For future RCW reporting, the Del requests a courtesy copy of the communications. Del also requests clarification that future reporting will include both the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate and the Iraqi Delegation to the OPCW. -------------- -- DESTRUCTION PLANS: AMBIGUITY ON BUNKER CONTENTS -------------- -- ¶21. (SBU) Throughout the meetings, considerable discussion ensued pertaining to the contents of the Qdiscussion ensued pertaining to the contents of the bunkers at Muthanna. On October 8-9, 2009 the Iraqi delegation, consisting of Banaa, Khioka, and Al Sharaa met with U.S. representatives in Washington, D.C. During this visit a brief synopsis of the contents and conditions of Bunker 13 and Bunker 41 was provided (see Background section above). A conclusion drawn from this document was that neither bunker represented a proliferation risk. The Iraqi delegation reviewed this document and offered their rebuttal during the discussions held November 29-December 1. ¶22. (C) On November 29, Al-Helli and Al Sharaa described what they deemed to be contrary information or discrepancies regarding Bunker 13 contents. Al Sharaa stated that the 2,000 pound unexploded ordinance described in the report had been removed and exploded. (Al-Helli privately stated that this had occurred in 1992.) Delrep stated that the U.S. is not aware of any evidence or information to support this claim. ¶23. (C) At the same meeting, Al Sharaa stated that another discrepancy in the report was related to the presence of sarin rockets. The conclusion in the report was that a fire had potentially destroyed CW materials in Bunker 13 in 1991. However, Al Sharaa stated that after the fire, UNSCOM had relocated sarin rockets that were at a filling station and stored them in Bunker 13. Hoggins informed that the synopsis document was based on UNSCOM reports and eyewitness accounts and posited that the analysis was sound. ¶24. (C) At the December 1 meeting, the Technical Secretariat was invited to join the conversation on the bunker contents. The United States and the Iraqis expressed their understanding of the bunker content and its history. The United States maintained on the basis of UNSCOM reporting and eye witness testimony that the rockets and sodium cyanide in the bunker had been burned after an air raid. The Iraqis maintained that the bunker had a fire due to the attack, but that sarin filled rockets were placed in the bunker after it cooled. Reeps and Anelli said they had no knowledge about when the rockets were put in the bunker, but that it would not have been by UNSCOM. He and Anelli had not personally been in the bunker. Reeps said he believed that UNSCOM put the sodium cyanide in the bunker. The issue of whether a bomb was still in the bunker was noted but not further discussed. ¶25. (C) To reach a common understanding of the contents of Bunker 13, the United States and Iraqi delegations decided that a meeting between technical experts (particularly those who had assembled the synopsis document and those with personal knowledge of the contents) would be held in The Hague in January. The representatives from the Technical Secretariat would attend. It was emphasized that politically this must take place prior to the next Executive Council session in February. The Hague was identified as the preferred venue; however, Amman was suggested as an alternate location should visa issues arise. January was raised as potentially problematic based on the Iraqi elections and ability to receive travel approvals during this period. The U.S. delegation agreed to look into the option of U.S. financial support for Iraqi participation. (Del note: Al-Miahi privately urged that the election not be used as restrictive date, contending that it Qnot be used as restrictive date, contending that it is very possible that the elections will be postponed to March.) ¶26. (SBU) Action requested: Identify experts for a discussion on the Muthanna bunker contents to be held in The Hague in mid-January. Determine funding sources for travel and accommodations to support Iraqi expert participation. Del should work with Iraqi delegation to identify experts and confirm their availability. ¶27. (SBU) Regarding Bunker 41, during the December 1 meeting, Iraqi delegates, U.S. delegates, and representatives from the Technical Secretariat agreed with the analysis contained in the synopsis document. The Technical Secretariat agreed with the United States assertion that the emptied 155mm mustard shells had been mutilated by explosive charge in the burster well and that the shells had subsequently been filled with decontaminant solution. All agreed that if there are no discrepancies in the analysis, the course of action pertaining to Bunker 41, the preferred path forward would be to revise the initial Iraqi declaration to the OPCW accordingly. ¶28. (SBU) The Technical Secretariat stated that photographic evidence including imagery of destroyed shells and UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports could support this revised declaration. Banaa described that access to this information was a specific challenge. Mikulak stated that the U.S. access to this information was also limited as this is a sealed archive. ¶29. (SBU) Action requested: Consolidate documentation related to Bunker 41 contents and confirm releaseability to support a revised declaration. Provide relevant documentation to the Iraqi delegation in The Hague and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate as soon as available. ¶30. (S) During the December 1 meeting, Banaa asserted that in addition to the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC archives, that the United States had a separate archive of records related to Iraq's chemical program that were taken in April 2003 and that these records are currently held in Doha. Delreps stated that they were not aware of such an archive. -------------- ENTOMBMENT: A VIABLE OPTION? -------------- ¶31. (C) While the Iraqi and U.S. delegations discussed the contents of the bunkers, potential destruction options also dominated conversation. Based on the U.S. analysis of the contents of the bunkers, both delegations discussed the merits of an alternative approach, whereby the steps of assessment and inventory are avoided based on the potential risk of such activity, and instead the bunkers are encased or entombed in a manner acceptable to the OPCW. In the November 30 meeting, Weber suggested this approach to the Iraqi delegation and stated that he had also previously mentioned this possibility to the Director-General in a private meeting earlier in the week with positive impressions that the Director-General favors a practical and flexible approach to the situation. ¶32. (C) At the November 30 meeting, Al Sharaa opined that Technical Secretariat approval of this alternative approach or compromise solution of encasing the bunker is the first step. He noted that the Government of Iraq may be concerned with environmental issues. However, he stated that perhaps the UN Security Council would be responsible for the environmental concerns as he asserted that UNSCOM was responsible for the Qasserted that UNSCOM was responsible for the activity. Banaa and Al Sharaa stated that they believed this approach would be possible and requested U.S. assistance in such activity. ¶33. (C) On December 1, this matter was broached with members of the Technical Secretariat. The U.S. and Iraqi delegations stated their understanding that sand was poured into the bunker through a top hole of Bunker 13 and asked the Technical Secretariat its opinion of whether entombment may be a viable option. Reeps said he personally thought it was the most safe and cost effective solution to what otherwise would be a risky and costly "archeological dig". He went on to say that he could not speak for the Technical Secretariat and he would need an opinion from the Legal Advisor before he could make an official recommendation. He said also that this procedure would need the approval of the Executive Council. Thus, key States Parties players would need to be consulted. Ambassador Banaa supported the entombment approach but reiterated the need to see documentation and photos to support discussions in Baghdad. ¶34. (C) Action requested: Review existing studies and analyses on entombment strategy to determine suitability. Consider what support, if any, the United States might provide for such destruction activity. ¶35. (C) Action requested: Develop tailored criteria for use of this alternative destruction strategy in Iraq, being mindful to protect against setting an unfavorable precedent for future use by non-member states. (Del note: Ongoing consultations on unforeseen circumstances in the Convention will be closely monitored to ensure that any guidelines developed as a result do not inhibit the ability to take this approach in Iraq. This venue could be considered to develop Executive Council support for the entombment action, or at a minimum, to test potential resistance.) -------------- -- RELATED ONGOING DESTRUCTION PLANNING ACTIVITIES -------------- -- ¶36. (SBU) Al Sharaa indicated that within the Government of Iraq, progress had been made in establishing the legal architecture for destruction activity. He stated that the Government of Iraq has agreed to invest in the destruction activity and that this would be managed through the Ministry of Science and Technology. Upon an agreed path forward for destruction plans, this ministry would be responsible for funding and managing the effort. ¶37. (SBU) Al Sharaa also stated that although definitive destruction plans for bunkers 13 and 41 would depend on resolution of the bunker contents issue, he was working with the Technical Secretariat on destruction plans for the Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPF) in Al Muthanna, Falluja II and Falluja III. He is also working on the conversion request and plan for the CWPF Al Rashad and he would likely begin the request and plan for conversion for Falluja I. (Del note: Al Sharaa provided Delrep with a compact disk containing information submitted to the Technical Secretariat.) -------------- DONOR COORDINATION -------------- 38.(SBU) Banaa convened a meeting among delegations Q38.(SBU) Banaa convened a meeting among delegations that had expressed interest in assisting the Government of Iraq with the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, particularly their destruction plans. (See para 13 for participants). Al Sharaa provided a summary of the main issues Iraq faces: a shortage in capability, a shortage of information, and likelihood that the bunkers contain hazardous materials posing serious risk. He distributed a list of areas for requested assistance to the group. (Del note: This list appears to match an earlier version distributed during the 58th Session of the Executive Council. Electronic copy sent to ISN-CB on December 8.) ¶39. (SBU) Mikulak stated that the United States recognizes Iraq's commitment to the CWC and values the actions taken thus far. He concurred with Al Sharaa's assessment of the challenges faced by the Government of Iraq and said that the United States also has a shortage of information, noting that continued discussions regarding the contents of the bunkers are required to assess the situation and determine a path forward. Mikulak clarified that only Bunker 13 is understood to contain hazardous material. Mikulak stated that the United States and the United Kingdom recently conducted training for Iraqi National Authorities. ¶40. (SBU) Foggo stated that the intention of the United Kingdom is to continue to assist Iraq. He noted that the National Authority training in Liverpool was characterized as successful with enthusiastic participation by the Iraqi participants. McGilly stated that the United Kingdom may have additional training courses for Iraqi participation, mentioning a course on Chemical Weapons hazards. ¶41. (SBU) Smith briefly described the United States efforts in training a Chemical Defense Command, which is a small Iraqi military unit responsible for the destruction of recovered chemical weapons. She noted that feedback from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has been very positive regarding Iraq's progress on these efforts. (Del note: Delrep passed a copy of the recent Tabletop exercise summary from U.S. Embassy Baghdad to the Iraqi delegation.) ¶42. (SBU) Burkart and Ruthe stated that the German delegation would send a technical lead, Dr. Andreas Pfaffernoschke, to the next Executive Council session and that the information provided today would be passed back to him in advance. Burkart encouraged continued coordination of activity and emphasized the importance of including the Technical Secretariat in these conversations. ¶43. (SBU) Verba commented on the importance of Iraq's integration into the OPCW and stated that, as Chairman of the Conference, he will continue to be very active in this activity during the intersessional period. He stated that the focus should be the full and effective implementation of all Articles, noting that Iraq can also benefit under the privileges of the Convention. He stated that that while the focus may continue to be on the draft detailed destruction plan and follow-on inspection activity, he also encouraged a concentration on programs and activities related to Qconcentration on programs and activities related to Article VII, Article X, and Article XI. Verba opined that a broader meeting on the integration of Iraq into the OPCW, where neighboring countries and other interested delegations might be invited, could be a positive advancement of their efforts. He stated that he has heard support for this idea in his consultations with other States Parties, noting that there is a clear niche within which more can be done. ¶44. (SBU) Banaa expressed his gratitude for the contributions of those present and closed with a reiteration of the challenge that he feels poses this biggest hurdle: lack of comprehensive data available. He requested assistance in obtaining access to the U.N. Security Council archive and any other archive of related information. He stated, "before we embark on destruction, we have to have verification of the full set of facts." ¶45. (SBU) The group concluded that a follow-on meeting on the Monday preceding the next Executive Council session in February would be beneficial in continuing to work toward a common understanding of destruction requirements and plans. ¶46. (U) BEIK SENDS. LEVIN