CWC: DESTRUCTION INFORMALS, DONOR COORDINATION

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000628 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CWC: DESTRUCTION INFORMALS, DONOR COORDINATION MEETING, AND IRAQI ASSISTANCE DISCUSSION (EC-58) REF: A. THE HAGUE 617 ¶B. THE HAGUE 627 Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is CWC-62 -09 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On October 12 before the formal opening of the 58th Session of the Executive Council (EC-58), the EC Chairman, Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco (Mexico),convened the customary informal consultations on chemical weapons (CW) destruction issues. In addition to the usual presentations by the Technical Secretariat (TS) and by Russia, the U.S., Libya, Japan and China, there was a new series of presentations on donor activity from the UK, the U.S., Canadian and German delegations. ¶2. (SBU) Also on October 12, Delreps participated in the Donor Coordination Meeting (hosted by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) during which delegations from Russia, the U.S., the UK and Germany briefed on the status of their cooperative efforts. On the same day, a trilateral discussion was held between the U.S., the UK and German delegations related to potential cooperation with the Government of Iraq on future assessment and destruction activities. ¶3. (SBU) Copies of the TS and donor presentations were sent to ISN/CB; a copy of the text of the Libya destruction informal statement was also sent to ISN/CB. The remainder of the country presentations were not distributed as hand-outs. Detailed notes on all the presentations and discussions follow. -------------- PRESENTATIONS BY THE TS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Horst Reeps, Director Verification Division, briefed on verification activities since the last informal session in July. He noted that as of September 30, 2009, 51.7% of Category 1 and 52% of Category 2 chemical weapons had been destroyed (not including Libya and Iraq). Currently there are 7 Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDFs) in operation: 4 in the United States (Tooele, Pine Bluff, Anniston and Umatilla) and 3 in the Russian Federation (Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Shchuchye). Libya's reloading of declared Category 2 precursors is planned for later this year. Between July 13 and October 11, there have been 5 inspections of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPFs),4 of CW Storage Facilities (CWSFs),3 of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW),and 3 of Old Chemical Weapons (OCW). Of the 208 Article VI inspections scheduled for 2009, 169 have been completed, with 50 inspections occurring between July 13 and October 11, including two Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and analysis. ¶5. (SBU) Stephen Wade, Head Declarations Branch, presented data on CW and Article VI information submitted to the TS between July 14 and October 7, ¶2009. The TS received amendments to initial declarations from China, Japan, Iraq and the U.S.; 90-day reports on CW issues from Libya, the U.S., Russia, Japan and China; and new OCW discoveries and destruction in Italy, Canada, France and the UK. Libya submitted a request for an extension of intermediate and final deadlines for the destruction of Category 1 CW. ¶6. (SBU) Dominique Anelli, Head Chemical Demilitarization Branch, briefed on progress in CW destruction. Only items not previously covered by Reeps or Wade are highlighted here. Currently 88.6% of the 70 declared CWPFs have been converted or destroyed, with 4 left to be destroyed, 3 to be converted (Rabta 1 and 2 in Libya and Novocheboksarsk in the Russian Federation) and 23 under verification. Operations at CWDFs include: - United States: Tooele, H/HD destruction; Anniston, HD/HT mortars, projectiles, OTCs destruction; Umatilla, HD destruction; Pine Bluff, on-going HD/HT destruction. Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System plans to resume operations in early November 2009. - Russian Federation: Maradykovsky, thermal treatment and cutting of mutilated munitions bodies and incineration of hydrolysate reaction mass, destruction of sarin aerial bombs on train 2, final engineering review of new processing building for destruction of aerial munitions filled with mustard-lewisite mixture; Leonidovka, draining of hydrolysate reaction mass from aerial munitions, final engineering reviews for the processing line for the destruction of 9-EK-3264 modules and for the new processing building for the destruction of aerial munitions; Shchuchye, destruction of 122 mm rocket warheads filled with GB using both processing lines in building 1A. - Thirteen States Parties have declared OCW with seven OCW sites in seven States Parties under verification. Four States Parties have declared ACW (China, Italy, Poland and Panama). China has 33 ACW sites. ¶7. (U) No questions or comments were raised to the TS presentations. -------------- U.S. PRESENTATION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Dr. Arthur Hopkins (Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs),briefed that the United States had, as of September 23, 2009, destroyed 65.4% of Category 1 CW, including 85.3% of chemical rockets, 96.6% of nerve agent and 100% of binary weapons. ¶9. (SBU) As examples of U.S. commitment to the obligations of environmental protection and facility safety under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),Dr. Hopkins described the flourishing natural environment at the former CWDF at Johnston Atoll and the absence of any lost work days at the current CWDFs in the last 18 months. ¶10. (SBU) The U.S. brief triggered the only comment from the floor. The Iranian delegation, noting the U.S. facilities to be completed after the extended destruction deadline, indicated that the U.S. "premature announcement of non-compliance" in no way lessened its obligation to complete destruction by 2012, and that failure to do so strikes "a deadly blow to the OPCW". Iran insisted the U.S. must take immediate measures to complete destruction by 2012. -------------- RUSSIAN PRESENTATION -------------- ¶11. (S) Viktor Kholstov of Russia's Ministry of Industry and Trade presented Russia's report orally with no slides or handouts. He stated that Russia's main effort currently is to reach its 45% deadline on 21 December 2009, and that Russia had destroyed 41.5% (16,596 MT) as of October 12, 2009. Maradykovsky has destroyed 4,685 MT to date, with the train for aerial munitions with sarin fill destroying 38 MT of agent since July. Destruction of aerial munitions filled with mustard-lewisite mix will begin in the fourth quarter of 2009. ¶12. (S) Leonidovka has destroyed 3652 MT of VX to date. Destruction of 9-EK-3264 VX modules began in April, with 280 MT of agent neutralized in 16,528 modules. However, the TS has verified the destruction of only 181 MT and 10,200 modules. In the fourth quarter of 2009, Leonidovka will launch a second train for the destruction of sarin aerial munitions. (Del note: In a bilateral discussion, the Russian delegation clarified that Russia initially deformed the modules with a single hole punch, but the TS insisted on two holes, which Russia is now doing. Russia will go back and punch a second hole in the approximately 6,000 modules with just one hole and claim destruction credit for them at that point. End note.) ¶13. (S) Shchuchye, as of October 12, 2009, had destroyed 766 MT of sarin (255,000 munitions). Kholstov noted that construction is ongoing at Pochep and Kizner, but he provided no specific completion dates. -------------- LIBYAN PRESENTATION -------------- 14 (SBU) Mr. M. Tamtam Abulkasam, National Committee for the CWC, focused on Libya's request for an extension of the final deadline for destruction of its Category 1 CW to May 15, 2011. The Libyan delegation maintained that the relocation of its Rabta CWDF construction site led to considerable local and environmental group opposition to the destruction effort, in turn causing the civil contractor to withdraw from the site. Libya reportedly launched an awareness campaign to overcome public opposition and convince the "friends of the environment" that demilitarization operations are safe and considerate of the environment. These issues were resolved by late September, too late to allow for meeting the established intermediate and final destruction deadline. Abulkasam also outlined a construction schedule for the destruction facility: completion of facility infrastructure by April 30, 2010; testing and commissioning of basic equipment by June 30, 2010; completion of the plant by September 30, 2010; and plant commissioning and systems testing by October 15, 2010. Abulkasam emphasized that Libya will arrange for as many TS visits to the destruction site and storage area as necessary. ¶15. (SBU) The Libyan delegation further noted the requirement to retain the sandbag wall at Rabta to protect single-purpose, sensitive equipment, and it has therefore changed the sandbag wall designation from specialized to standard equipment. -------------- ACW: CHINESE AND JAPANESE PRESENTATIONS QACW: CHINESE AND JAPANESE PRESENTATIONS -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jun's presentation was highly critical of the Japanese progress in recovering and destroying ACW in China, noting casualties to Chinese workers as a result of leaking ACW. Zhang highlighted the inadequacy of funds from Japan, the unsatisfactory pace of work at the Nanjing mobile destruction facility, the lack of urgency and sincerity with 2012 approaching and no ACW destruction to date. He reiterated the frequency of injuries to Chinese nationals from Japanese ACW. ¶17. (SBU) The Japanese delegation did not react to the Chinese criticisms. Mr. Morio Ito (Director- General for ACW Issues) gave Japan's presentation covering the scope of ACW recoveries made to date to "protect the Chinese people". Ito updated the current progress of construction and recovery efforts at the largest abandonment site, Haerba- Ling, and at the mobile destruction facility in Nanjing. Current efforts include infrastructure development at the two sites (access roads, ground preparation, etc.),equipment procurement, ground- penetrating radar surveys, and agreements on detailed operating procedures. Ito reported the visit of a TS inspection team to three temporary ACW storage locations. He closed his brief by expressing Japan's gratitude to China and the TS for their support to the ACW program. -------------- DONOR PRESENTATIONS -------------- ¶18. (SBU) EC Chairman Lomonaco then opened the floor to all delegations. As pre-arranged, the UK, the U.S., Germany and Canada briefed on their assistance to Russia's CW destruction efforts. ¶19. (SBU) The UK started off with an overview of the EUR 80 million in projects it has managed for multiple donors at Shchuchye -- EUR 20 million of which was contributed by the UK. ¶20. (SBU) The United States followed up with a run down of the $1.1 billion it is investing in four CW destruction projects: $30 million to construct a Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Lab; $20 million to install site security enhancements at two CWSFs; $46 million to demilitarize two former CWPFs, and $1.0392 billion for the design and construction of the Shchuchye CWDF. ¶21. (SBU) Canada stated that it has contributed 100 million Canadian dollars (C$) to the following projects at Shchuchye: the railway from the storage depot and inspection stations, communications equipment, and destruction process equipment for the second main destruction building. For Kizner, Canada has contributed C$100 million for four destruction process lines, two metal parts furnaces and catalytic reactors. ¶22. (SBU) Germany provided an overview of the EUR 340 million it has allocated to three CWDFs since 1993: EUR 56 million for equipment and buildings at Gorny, EUR 150 million for equipment at Kambarka and EUR 140 million for equipment and buildings at Pochep. ¶23. (SBU) Russia took the floor at the end of the donor presentations to thank the donors for all their contributions, concluding that Russia hoped all the projects would run on schedule and be fully implemented. -------------- DONOR COORDINATION MEETING -------------- ¶24. (U) Dutch Ambassador Pieter de Savornin Lohman chaired the semi-annual Donors Coordination meeting on October 12 to discuss CW destruction assistance in Russia. Due in large part to the completion of most assistance efforts and the attention being placed on the concurrent straw poll for the selection of the next Director-General (DG),the usual updates and progress reports were limited to presentations by Russia, the U.S., the UK and Germany. Dr. Hopkins gave a brief overview on U.S. efforts at Shchuchye characterizing U.S. assistance as moving from what has been direct assistance to an operational role now that Shchuchye is up and running. He further highlighted the value of the trilateral partnership and how such collaboration has led to reduced management costs toward operations. Dr. Hopkins also indicated that the U.S. is finalizing the remaining work to be done at building 350 at the CWPF in Novocheboksarsk and, upon completion, the building will be destroyed (razed). ¶25. (U) Ms. Elena Rodyushkina of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade provided a general overview of the status of their destruction efforts as well as efforts by donors. This included a brief update on Shchuchye, Pochep and Kizner. On Shchuchye, Russia gave high marks to the U.S. and the UK for expediting the completion and start up of the Shchuchye CWDF noting the financial contributions made by both. Rodyushkina then noted overdue shipments from the UK on work related to the access railroad. Germany and Switzerland also received high marks for their efforts at Pochep, with the Germans funding Building 11 which is expected to begin trial runs during the first half of next year, and the Swiss completing installations of power supply/electrical parts. Russian reps also noted assistance from Canada and Italy at Kizner. ¶26. (U) The German delegation provided a brief but detailed summary of their assistance efforts at Pochep since the last Donor's meeting in April ¶2009. Construction at Building 11 (Pochep) has advanced significantly and is almost complete. Installation work by German contractors and Russian subcontractors is ongoing but almost complete. ¶27. (U) Canada reported completion of its projects at Shchuchye, with the final delivery of equipment occurring in September 2009. Canada is working with the Russians on Kizner. Sweden completed support through the UK project and provided 25,000 Euros to Green Cross this year. France had nothing to report. Finland had no new data to report. The Netherlands contribution to the UK has been spent. The EU funds that were donated also have been expended. ¶28. (U) In a final note of interest, the UK delegation reminded delegations of the 13th Annual International CW Demilitarization Conference in Prague, Czech Republic in May 2010. The next donors' meeting is scheduled for April 19, 2010, preceding the Executive Council's 60th Session. -------------- IRAQI ASSISTANCE COORDINATION -------------- ¶29. (SBU) On October 12, officials from the U.S., Q29. (SBU) On October 12, officials from the U.S., the UK and Germany met to discuss coordination of plans for assistance to the Government of Iraq. ¶30. (SBU) Dr. Andreas Pfaffernoschke (Head of Division, Disarmament Cooperation/Global Partnership Project Implementation, German Federal Foreign Office) described the results of an early October meeting with Iraqi officials in Amman, Jordan. He stated that he had provided the Iraqi delegation with a concept for potential German assistance, but that there was no guarantee of funding and this was in the notional stages of development. The proposal for an assessment included a two-step process, taking air measurements from within the bunkers followed by mapping the contents if possible. It was described as an iterative process whereby each step would identify the feasibility of the next step being performed. The proposal also included the provision of equipment by Germany and training to be conducted in Germany, with efforts carried out in Iraq by local personnel. The proposal also included involvement of TS observers. ¶31. (C) Pfaffernoschke provided his impressions of Iraq's ability to perform this assessment and stated that he believed the government to be immature in terms of formation and clear decision authority with a severe lack of coordination between and amongst relevant ministry offices. He stated that he believed the Iraqi officials to lack sufficient information on the status of their assets (i.e., storage bunkers) targeted for assessment and destruction operations. (Del note: Ministry of Defense official Brigadier General Ali Kadhim Mohaisen Al-Saeedi was permitted by his leadership to attend the coordination meeting with the German delegation in Jordan, however he was not granted permission to attend a similar coordination event with U.S. officials in Washington, DC days later. End note.) ¶32. (SBU) James Harrison (Deputy Head of Counter- Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and Security Cooperation Division, UK Ministry of Defence) stated that the UK is considering assistance and may offer relevant training activities for Iraqi officials. He briefly discussed the National Authority training plans and queried whether this may be an appropriate venue for follow-up on assessment preparations. However, the group opined that the ministries represented at the National Authority training event differ from the ministries involved in the destruction operations. ¶33. (SBU) Delrep Lynn Hoggins provided a short description and handout with information on the present status of the bunkers at Muthanna. Delrep Deborah Ozga described a U.S. concept paper on performing an assessment that was discussed with Iraqi officials in Washington the previous week. She clarified that this was not a funded proposal, but was merely an informational aid for the Iraqis to use in reviewing their options. The group discussed whether there is a valid requirement to perform an assessment based on the present status of the assets and stated that considerations should include verification of actual treaty requirements, proliferation risk, and environmental hazard risk. ¶34. (SBU) All participants expressed that further coordination is called for amongst potential donors, the Iraq delegation and relevant officials, and the Technical Secretariat. Qand the Technical Secretariat. ¶35. (SBU) DEL COMMENT: The destruction informal presentations did not elicit substantial questions or comments on the U.S. program, with the exception of a lone comment by the Iranian delegation; however, this topic figured prominently in formal sessions of the EC and consultations on the margins. Additionally, attention to donor activity and further coordination was more apparent in this session and this trend will likely continue as States Parties consider new opportunities for cooperation and assistance at the invitation of the Iraq Delegation. END COMMENT. ¶36. (U) BEIK SENDS. LEVIN