GICNT: 2009 GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000500 SECSTATE FOR INFO GLOBAL INITIATIVE PARTNER NATIONS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC RS SUBJECT: GICNT: 2009 GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM PLENARY MEETING REPORT, PART 2 OF 3 REF: STATE 53043 Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Drew Mann for reasons 1.4, b and d START PART TWO OF THREE PARTICIPATION -------------- ¶18. (U) The following 59 countries, as well as the IAEA, EU, and INTERPOL, sent high-level representation to the June 16-17, 2009 GICNT Plenary Meeting in The Hague: Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, IAEA (Observer status),EU (Observer status),INTERPOL (Observer status). ¶19. (U) Acting Assistant Secretary Dr. Eliot Kang headed the 26-member U.S. delegation, which included officials from State, DOD/OSD, DOD/DTRA, FBI, NCTC, DOE/NNSA, UNVIE, and DHS/DNDO. ¶20. (U) Joint Co-Chair Statement at 2009 Plenary Meeting BEGIN JOINT CO-CHAIR STATEMENT TEXT: The Hague, Netherlands June 16, 2009 Partners of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism met in The Hague, Netherlands, to discuss &enhancing international partnerships by sharing best practices.8 All acknowledged that the potential for a terrorist act involving nuclear or radiological materials is a major threat that the international community continues to face, and that this voluntary Initiative fills an important niche in bringing all levels of government, international organizations, and private sector entities together to confront this challenge. To date, partners have conducted over thirty Global Initiative workshops, conferences, and exercises aimed to build capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism. They discussed their commitment to continue and to increase their effectiveness as a partnership. For 2009-2010, partners will facilitate capacity-building in the functional areas described in the Global Initiative Statement of Principles, including developing and improving accounting, control, and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials; and enhancing security of civilian nuclear facilities; as well as strengthening operational detection and forensics capabilities. Today the Global Initiative now comprises 75 partner nations, and is growing. Of these, more than 60 sent senior representation to the Plenary in The Hague. Partners welcomed INTERPOL as a new official observer to the Global Initiative; it had issued a statement of support and will be involved in activities relevant to its mandate. Global Initiative partners agreed to continue outreach efforts to further expand participation in key regions around the world. Through the 2009 meeting partner countries strengthened the GICNT by promoting greater involvement of civil society and in particular the relevant business sector. In their April 1, 2009 Joint Statement, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to enhance cooperation to counter such threats as nuclear terrorism and to strengthen international efforts through initiatives like this one, jointly launched in 2006. END JOINT CO-CHAIR STATEMENT TEXT. SUMMARIES OF BREAKOUT SESSIONS, DAY 2 -------------- Q -------------- Exercise Working Group -------------- ¶21. (U) Twenty-eight partner nations actively participated in the Exercise Working Group. The United States and the Netherlands jointly facilitated this session, which covered three general topics: 1) the Exercise Planning Group (EPG) and its value in building capacity, 2) building blocks for exercises (covering the incentive program and developing conditions for success and core competencies),and 3) completed and proposed exercises. Participants expressed continued skepticism concerning the value of the EPG and its ability to instruct and provide lasting quality upgrades in partner nations, organic or regional capacity. Partners were enthusiastic regarding the incentive program and the discussion of core competencies, suggesting this is the way forward for sharing best practices and regional capability development. Finally, the Exercise Planning Working Group offered ideas and recommendations to improve the Plenary sessions. In general, the group recommended that the Co-Chairs identify several key issues and address those issues in working groups prior to the Plenary Meeting, have the working groups present their findings at the Plenary, and the Plenary should then affirm those findings and define a way forward. Public/Private/Civil Society Working Group -------------- ¶22. (U) More than 28 experts participated in the Public/Private/Civil Society Working Group, which focused on the importance of public-private communication and collaboration to combat nuclear terrorism. Speakers from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, World Institute of Nuclear Security, European Union, Dutch National Threat Alert System, URENCO, and United Kingdom Nuclear Skills Academy discussed their respective projects and practices. Partners noted the need to improve communication and information sharing between sectors; recognized the benefits of cross-sector training; discussed the new role of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) for sharing best practices among civilian nuclear facility operators; and reviewed the UK Nuclear Skills Academy,s national training standards that prevent duplication and thus result in increased safety. The Dutch facilitated this Working Group and used an electronic polling technique that allowed participants to provide anonymous input and draw out innovative perspectives on public-private nuclear security issues. Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP) Working Group -------------- -------------- ¶23. (U) Seventeen partner nations participated in the GIIP working group, which focused on evaluating the current status of the online resource and discussing ideas for its future development. The Working Group made several recommendations related to the functionality and organization of the GIIP. Partner nations provided feedback as to the general usability of the site, including the need for an improved online registration tool. The group expressed a desire to see the site be developed further as a platform for enabling more active collaboration between subject matter experts, including topical online discussions and collaborative production of documents, to share in support of planning, executing and evaluating GICNT activities. Partner nations recommended that the growing database of information be better organized and the layout of the site be modified to emphasize how all available information supports the Eight Principles. Department of State representatives concluded that the Department will need to be actively involved in the development of the GIIP as the enhanced implementation of the Qdevelopment of the GIIP as the enhanced implementation of the GICNT materializes. Equipment and Technology Working Group -------------- ¶24. (U) More than 50 experts attended the Equipment and Technology Working Group. Dutch and Russian representatives co-facilitated this session, which featured presentations on conducting risk analysis, identifying strategic commodities, best practices in nuclear detection, nuclear forensics (This portion included a table-top exercise),and preventing illicit trafficking on Russian Federation borders. ¶25. (U) The working group made two recommendations that the Plenary accepted. The first encouraged GICNT partners to report robustly to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program (ITDB) and to share ITDB information broadly within their governments, e.g. among law enforcement, intelligence and customs officials. The second was that the 2010 Plenary receive a briefing on using national nuclear forensics libraries. This will promote cooperation between governments investigating illicit uses of nuclear material. (COMMENT: The IAEA and G-8,s International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG) have established task group to brief the 2010 plenary and complete a technical review of the national libraries concept. GICNT partners were encouraged to participate in this technical review. END COMMENT.) ¶26. (U) Each working group produced a summary document. Copies are available on the GIIP or by email request to globalinitiative@state.gov. PARTNERS, VIEWS ON SHARING BEST PRACTICES -------------- ¶27. (SBU) France and Germany both indicated their readiness to share expertise. In their individual remarks, several other partners visited this theme: -the Czech Republic, on behalf of the European Union, mentioned their efforts to raise awareness within the business community, prevent intangible transfers of technology, a joint research center, and cooperation with the 1540 Committee. -Croatia stressed the importance of the Global Initiative Information Portal for sharing information and best practices and noted that transparency is essential as we move forward to enhance implementation. -Norway noted the &seven-country effort8 assisting Kazakhstan with detection. -Pakistan called itself a &front-line non-NATO ally.8 It reported that it had completed a five-year nuclear security plan and vulnerability assessment and was providing nuclear security-related education to its government officials. ¶28. (U) Automated Inventory Control and Management System (AICMS) In his opening remarks, Dr. Kang noted AICMS replaced a paper-based inventory system, was mutually developed by the Russian Federation and the United States, and could be of use to other GICNT partner nations. The AICMS system promotes nuclear accountability without disclosing any sensitive information. A display on AICMS was available for all to visit during the plenary, with DoD and Russian MOD representatives available to answer questions. Representatives from interested nations included United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Pakistan, China and Portugal. ( AND OTHERS REQUESTED HELP -------------- ¶29. (SBU) Several countries recognized the GICNT as a forum to provide various forms of assistance. Afghanistan expressed a desire to receive nuclear detection equipment. Serbia asked for help in implementing Principle 4 (Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices using them). ¶30. (U) Morocco said it would introduce a resolution on GICNT at the UN General Assembly and asked for partners to help getting it adopted by consensus. ¶31. (U) Australia spoke of efforts to reach out to the Southeast Asia region. New Zealand said it would continue outreach to Pacific Island countries. END PART TWO OF THREE LEVIN