NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH AFTER ELECTION

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000446 NOFORN SIPDIS S/SRAP - KAREN HANRAHAN; SCA/A - ARIELLA VIEHE; EUR/RPM - AARON COPE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH AFTER ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS TIED TO POST-2010 DECISION REF: A. STATE 74362 ¶B. THE HAGUE 419 Classified By: Acting Political-Economic Counselor Shawn K. Gray for re asons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch consideration of military contributions following the Afghan August elections are intertwined with their decision on post-2010 commitments (ref B). Senior leaders remain dedicated to an active contribution posture after the elections and confirm their commitment to sustain pledges and programs, although the extent of the Dutch military presence in Uruzgan after 2010 remains uncertain. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S/NF) POLMIL officer shared ref A demarche points with key contacts at Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Development Cooperation. Prime Minister Balkenende gave President Obama a clear indication during their July 14 meeting that the Dutch will build on where they have experience in Afghanistan but that it will be a tough road ahead domestically to sell it to the public. The implication here is that the Dutch will attempt to retain certain assets in Uruzgan, to include the Provisional Reconstruction Team with force protection and enablers, but the Prime Minister did not specify this. The government is under substantial public pressure to end the Dutch military presence in Uruzgan and to focus instead on development. Pieter de Gooijer, MFA Director General for Political Affairs, told Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy on July 16 that the Netherlands has already made the political decision to end Task Force Uruzgan in 2010. He further observed that he could not imagine the Dutch not participating in a follow-on mission, adding that the Dutch would shift to diplomacy and development. He envisaged the Dutch military having a "credible, convincing contribution post-2010, but with reduced numbers." ¶3. (S/NF) Erik de Feijter from the MFA's Task Force Uruzgan told POLMILOFF on July 22 that the Dutch are very concerned about who may be chosen to replace Governor Hamdam if Karzai wins reelection. While fairly certain that Hamdam will be replaced they do not have any credible information on a successor. However, the extensive electioneering by former Governor Jan Mohammed Khan (JMK) on behalf of Karzai fuels speculation of JMK being re-appointed. According to de Feijter, an appointment of JMK as the next Governor would "surely eliminate any possibility" of the Dutch remaining in Uruzgan beyond their current commitments and make it a very difficult transition. ¶4. (C) A formal Dutch response to the demarche will be delayed pending return of senior officials from summer holidays. However, de Feijter confirmed a continued Dutch commitment beyond the election, as illustrated by the joint signing on July 22 of a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on development co-operation in Southern Afghanistan." The MOU is a joint undertaking with Germany to provide 23.3 million euro (USD 33 million) for three major infrastructure projects in Uruzgan and Kandahar through 2011. De Feijter also provided the following list as an example of Dutch commitments beyond 2010: -- Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: 25 million euro (USD 36 million) a year through 2013 Q(USD 36 million) a year through 2013 -- Law and Order Trust Fund: 10 million euro (USD 14 million) a year through 2011 -- Afghan National Army Trust Fund: 10 million euro (USD 14 million) a year (intent is to commit annually with no termination date set) -- National Agricultural Curriculum Development: Currently 5 million euro (USD 7 million) for inception phase through 2010 followed by main phase through 2013 GALLAGHER