CWC: IRAQ ISSUES DURING OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000443 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR BAGHDAD FOR HOLCOMBE SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IQ SUBJECT: CWC: IRAQ ISSUES DURING OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, JULY 14-17, 2009 (EC-57) REF: A. THE HAGUE 415 ¶B. THE HAGUE 411 Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is CWC-43-09. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a series of bilateral meetings surrounding Executive Council 57 (EC-57) the week of July 13, members of the U.S. delegation met with Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa, new Iraqi delegate to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Muhanned Al-Miahi, Iraqi Foreign Ministry official Jwan Khioka, senior OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) officials, and British representatives to discuss a range of issues. Topics included security for TS officials traveling to Iraq, possible assistance to Iraq, and the chemical weapons (CW) recovered by the U.S. and UK in Iraq before it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It was clear from conversations with the Iraqi officials that communications gaps between Baghdad and The Hague remain significant and likely will continue to slow progress in Iraq's implementation of the CWC. End Summary. -------------- SECURITY FOR TS PERSONNEL IN IRAQ -------------- ¶2. (C) Following their earlier meeting with OPCW Deputy Director-General (DDG) John Freeman (UK) on July 10 (ref A),Delreps Beik and Smith called on Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa on July 13 to request a meeting with the Iraqi delegation during EC-57. They were introduced to Muhanned Al-Miahi, Iraqi third secretary and newly-designated delegate to the OPCW. Abbas Al-Khafaji, who had previously worked OPCW issues in The Hague, has been moved to another portfolio. Ambassador Banaa said Director- General Pfirter had phoned him about security for the TS team to go to Iraq; Banaa had sent the request back directly both to the Foreign Ministry and the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Banaa noted the importance of good security under the Iraqi authorities, especially given the UN's history in Iraq following the bombing of the UN office and the death of UN Special Representative Sergio Vieira De Mello in 2003. He advised that information about the dates and specific movements of the TS team be restricted, with no publicity on the visit until after it was completed. ¶3. (SBU) U.S. Delreps, led by EC Representative Mikulak, met bilaterally with the Iraqi delegation on July 16. Jwan Khioka and Muhanned Al-Miahi attended for Iraq without Ambassador Banaa. In addition to assistance (see below),the question of security for the OPCW visits was raised. Delreps stated that security is the responsibility of the Iraqi government, and should be handled in Baghdad, not The Hague. They noted that the OPCW has a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN that includes security provisions; the TS would consult the UN for advice and assistance, as necessary. Given the UN's MOU with the U.S. for security assistance in Iraq, Delreps suggested that that document might form the basis for any arrangements Qdocument might form the basis for any arrangements made for the TS staff, and offered to provide a copy of the MOU later. ¶4. (C) On July 17, Ambassador Banaa requested an urgent meeting with Delrep Beik and Representative Mikulak on short notice. Khioka and Al-Miahi accompanied the ambassador. Banaa seemed to believe that the U.S. was working the security issue independently without consulting him, and insisted on better coordination. Delrep repeated what had been discussed with Banaa's delegation the day before, that security arrangements needed to be coordinated in Baghdad between the Iraqi government and OPCW, and that OPCW needed to work within the UN framework, formally requesting U.S. assistance if needed. Delrep gave the ambassador a copy of the UN-U.S. MOU on security in Iraq, which had been offered the day before. Delreps repeated their message from the previous meeting that established contacts and procedures would be useful as visits are planned, as well as clarification on how much lead time is necessary for security requests. To Khioka's statement that someone from the American Embassy would accompany the TS team, Delreps also clarified that the U.S. does not normally participate in bilateral TS visits in any country and would not expect to do so in Iraq, unless invited by the Iraqi government. ¶5. (SBU) In a later telephone call to DDG Freeman, Delrep asked if the TS had the UN-U.S. MOU; Freeman requested a copy. He informed Delrep that a letter from the Iraqi Ambassador two days earlier had contained assurances for security that the TS considered sufficient under the Convention. OPCW, he said, will proceed as they normally do, with advice and assistance from the UN, and had offered new timelines for the team's initial visit. Freeman agreed with Delrep that communications all around have had gaps and that ongoing coordination would be important to move things forward. -------------- IRAQI REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) During the July 13 meeting with Ambassador Banaa introducing new U.S. (Smith) and Iraqi (Al- Miahi) delegates, Banaa briefly described a list of requirements that the Government of Iraq intended to circulate to prospective donors/partners. He stated that several governments (Germany, Japan, Serbia) have expressed interest in assisting Iraq, but expressed concern over the lack of planning. This list of requirements was later provided by Al- Miahi to the U.S. delegation for review (copy scanned to ISN/CB). ¶7. (SBU) During the larger July 16 bilateral meeting with the Iraqi delegation, Jwan Khioka inquired about the status of an official U.S. response to the earlier Iraqi request for assistance. Delreps stated that it was under consideration and that a response will likely be released prior to the upcoming visit this fall of Iraqi officials to Washington. Delreps requested that, in addition to General Ali, representatives from the Foreign Ministry also join the visit to discuss the response initially in Washington, Qdiscuss the response initially in Washington, followed by a more detailed discussion in October in The Hague on the margins of the next Executive Council session (EC-58). ¶8. (SBU) Khioka also asked whether the U.S. had received a copy of Iraq's detailed plan for destruction of its remaining CW. Delreps replied that they had not, but offered to provide comments, if requested. They noted that the CWC destruction experts are based in Washington; however, Embassy Baghdad, or the Delegation in The Hague, could forward the destruction plan to appropriate Washington offices, as had been done for the draft initial declaration. ¶9. (SBU) In a bilateral meeting with Delreps July 15, Canadian representatives Louis-Philippe Sylvestre and Angela Peart expressed an interest in providing assistance to the Government of Iraq in meeting its CWC treaty obligations. Sylvestre stated that although Canada would likely not be able to commit personnel, there is government interest in providing equipment and other assistance. The Global Partnership Program is a possible vehicle for assistance. It was originally established as a mechanism for providing assistance to the former Soviet Union, but it has been extended globally. Sylvestre said coordination with the Global Partnership Program has been very successful and could work for Iraq. He fully supported having a collective of countries provide assistance to Iraq and would be interested in discussing this further with the United States and the UK. ¶10. (SBU) DDG Freeman informed Delrep that he had authorized re-prioritization of the 2009 Budget to allow the TS to fund Iraqi participation in UK/U.S. training for the National Authority in the UK later this year. -------------- U.S. AND UK RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) As during the last Executive Council (EC- 56),several countries (Iran, Russia, South Africa) raised questions about the U.S. and UK destruction of CW found in Iraq before it joined the CWC. In a surprise intervention during the informal meeting on destruction July 13, Iraqi Ambassador Banaa informed member states that all such questions should be directed to his government. In later bilateral meetings, Delreps thanked him for his forthright statement, assured him that the U.S. would direct any such questions we might receive to his delegation, and promised to provide any information in response first to his delegation. ¶12. (C) Delreps met privately with OPCW Legal Adviser Santiago Onate (Mexico) on July 15 to seek his views on the role of the OPCW regarding U.S. and UK recovered Iraqi CW. Onate referred to the views he expressed earlier to Delreps (ref B) and in his April 2009 conference call with U.S. legal counsel Brown (State) and Wager (DoD). He reiterated those views: the U.S. and UK letters in April are not declarations under the CWC; the circumstances surrounding the Iraqi CW recoveries were not contemplated by the framers of the Convention; all of the CWC obligations of a State Party could not be met if the recoveries were viewed as falling within the provisions of the CWC; and, as there was no CWC requirement to report any information, any information reported should be treated as a voluntary transparency measure. In the meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS Qthe meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS would not be capable of carrying out the supporting functions described by the Convention in a situation of conflict, as the TS would have neither authority nor security, and the location was that of a non-State Party to the CWC. ¶13. (C) Onate added that the acceptance by the TS of an offer by the U.S. and UK to review their records would not be considered an inspection and, therefore, no inspection report would be issued. He stressed that there is no requirement in the CWC for such a review. Any report would simply describe the actions the TS had performed, the contents of the reviewed documents, and might be analogous to the report on the recent Executive Council visit to Pueblo and Umatilla. Onate opined that other States Parties would be mostly interested in the disposition of the CW. He concluded that the issue was a political question as to whether the events would be treated as an instance of CWC non-compliance, which would be futile, or, taking the South African proposal at face value, might provide an opportunity to learn what might be useful for similar situations in the future. Onate did question why the U.S. and the UK informed the UN Security Council but not the OPCW. Delreps pointed out that joint U.S./UK letter to the UNSC was in response to the earlier resolution's (UNSCR 1483) provision requesting the information. ¶14. (C) Delegation legal adviser Gibbs and other U.S. and UK delegation members participated in a telephone conversation with UK legal counsel Louise Symons (MOD) on July 16 regarding the UK's legal analysis supporting their Schedule 1 Declaration submitted to the TS in April. Symons believed that the CWC applied to the Iraqi CW recoveries but that UNSCR 1483 relieved the UK of any possible non- compliance. Gibbs pointed out that, if the applicability of the CWC was conceded, future recoveries under different circumstances would place CWC States Parties in an awkward situation if no UNSCR were available. Symons agreed and stated that she had not considered such possibilities. She suggested that the UK might be willing to agree that events like the recoveries were not contemplated when the CWC was negotiated and that the CWC therefore would not be "relevant," but she said that further discussions would first be necessary with UK MOD counsel. ¶15. (C) In discussing the immediate problem, the submission of the UK Declaration, it was generally felt that an attempt at withdrawal would be immediately noticeable and subject to scrutiny. Gibbs stated that any solution would be welcome that was not prejudicial to the characterization of an intended U.S. transparency filing on the recoveries. A possible solution would be informal solicitation of a letter from the TS to the UK requesting clarification of the nature of the UK Declaration, to which the UK would respond that the submission was intended not as a formal Declaration but as a transparency measure provided in the format most familiar to the TS, that of a Declaration. Gibbs suggested, and Symons agreed, that further legal consultations by e-mail would be appropriate. -------------- RECORDS REVIEW PREPARATIONS -------------- ¶16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson Q16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson and Smith met with Director of Verification Horst Reeps (Germany) to discuss the ongoing preparations for a visit by the TS to review the U.S. destruction records for recovered CW in Iraq. The group identified the first week of September 2009 as a target date for this activity. Reeps said he does not expect extensive records and understands that the reporting was conducted in a combat situation. He noted that the team will likely comprise just himself and Senior Chem Demil Officer Gabriela Coman-Enescu (Romania). When asked about the expected product from this visit, Reeps speculated that it could be a joint report prepared in a combined effort of transparency by the U.S. and the TS. He stated that the report would be internal to the TS and would be delivered to the DG; the DG might then make an oral or written report on the matter to the Executive Council. -------------- PLAN TO INSPECT IRAQI BUNKERS? -------------- ¶17. (C) On July 16, Delreps Robinson and Smith called on Senior Chem Demil Officer Jeff Osborne (U.S.). Osborne explained that he had prepared a proposal to the DG detailing how investigation of the bunkers in Iraq could be conducted. He said the DG had noted the proposal as a possible tool to assist Iraq, if requested. Osborne was not aware of any specific requests from Iraq for assistance from the TS. Delreps expressed considerable concern over the potential safety and environmental risks of Osborne's proposed fact-finding. While Osborne believes that the TS is qualified to perform this task, Delreps wondered whether he had current and complete information. Osborne explained that the proposal will not be presented to Iraq and that the decision remains with the DG. -------------- DEL COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) While the OPCW Technical Secretariat has a range of views on Iraq -- from Jeff Osborne volunteering to go, to greater caution by those responsible for the safety of OPCW staff -- TS coordination is controlled by the current Director- General and his Deputy. ¶19. (C) On the other hand, messages between the OPCW, the Iraqi Embassy in The Hague, and Baghdad continue to show major gaps. The Iraqi Ambassador's plea for greater coordination is valid internally as well as with the U.S., UK and TS. Delreps tried to emphasize in all of their meetings with the Iraqi delegation that Iraq must take the lead, the U.S. is ready to assist if needed, and that the central point for security issues lies in Baghdad, while CWC-related questions should include The Hague. Del believes Jwan Khioka got the message; we were not so sure about Ambassador Banaa or his new delegate, Al-Miahi. ¶20. (C) Donor coordination will likely be needed in the future, but it may be too early to put too many players into the loop until the Iraqis have the basic elements of their implementation plan settled with the TS. ¶21. (U) BEIK SENDS. GALLAGHER