Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09THEHAGUE368
2009-06-25 17:31:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CWC: MEETINGS OF SENIOR U.S. EXPERTS IN THE HAGUE

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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DE RUEHTC #0368/01 1761731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251731Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2942
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1860
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1791
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1477
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000368 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN AND DENYER)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: MEETINGS OF SENIOR U.S. EXPERTS IN THE HAGUE
ON U.S. CW DESTRUCTION

REF: A. STATE 64170

B. STATE 51992

C. THE HAGUE 352

This is CWC-33-09.

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000368 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN AND DENYER) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CWC: MEETINGS OF SENIOR U.S. EXPERTS IN THE HAGUE ON U.S. CW DESTRUCTION REF: A. STATE 64170 ¶B. STATE 51992 ¶C. THE HAGUE 352 This is CWC-33-09. ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Between June 23 and 25, two senior-level U.S. experts visited The Hague to brief key stakeholders at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the U.S. program for destroying its chemical weapons (CW) stockpile (ref A),including projected operating schedules that go beyond the 2012 treaty deadline. This cable gives an overview of the meetings held and highlights of reactions to the message conveyed during the visit. More in-depth reporting covering all of the meetings will be sent septel. END SUMMARY. -------------- MEETINGS -------------- ¶2. (U) Robert Mikulak (ISN/CB Director and U.S. Representative to the OPCW's Executive Council (EC)) and Tom Hopkins (Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs),accompanied by Delreps, met with a wide range of delegations in The Hague during their June 23-25 visit. They also called on OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter and had an informal briefing for Amcits working at the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS). ¶3. (SBU) Bilateral meetings were held with delegations from India, China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Mexico (Amb. Jorge Lomonaco is also the current EC Chairman) and Japan (Amb. Minoru Shibuya is also the current Chairman of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP)). Mikulak, Hopkins and Delreps also met jointly with: close allies (the UK, France and Germany); the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) plus non-WEOG EU members, Japan and South Korea; the Czech Republic and Sweden as the current and incoming holders of the EU Presidency; EC members from the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC); regional group coordinators Pakistan (Asia),Estonia (Eastern Europe) and Colombia (GRULAC); Algeria, Sudan, Slovakia and the Netherlands; and Cuba and Malaysia as the current and previous Non-aligned Movement (NAM) coordinators. ¶4. (SBU) NOTE: The Iranian delegation stressed that t
hey had not received official permission from Tehran to meet but had decided to do meet unofficially in a cooperative and constructive spirit. Cuba also stressed that it was under instruction to meet in its capacity as NAM coordinator, along with Malaysia, and not bilaterally. END NOTE. -------------- MESSAGE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Presentations by the U.S. experts mirrored those given to Executive Council representatives during their visit to U.S. facilities during the week of June 1-5. In all meetings, Mikulak and Hopkins emphasized the tremendous effort the U.S. has already made in destroying its chemical weapons, beginning before entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They noted that, in addition to destroying all of its most modern (binary) weapons, the U.S. has destroyed all former production capacity and 97% of all nerve agent. What will remain in 2012 is only 10% of the U.S. stockpile, which will be reduced to 2% when Pueblo finishes in 2017. This remaining stockpile at Blue Grass will be eliminated by 2021. U.S. Reps also stressed that the U.S. chemical demilitarization program has received all of the funding it has requested and that an additional $1.2 billion has recently been allocated, a clear sign that the necessary resources are being made available. ¶6. (SBU) Mikulak and Hopkins emphasized the full commitment of the U.S. to complete destruction of its stockpile as rapidly and safely as possible, and stated that the U.S. is seeking every possible opportunity to accelerate progress at the remaining two facilities. They also explained that part of the purpose of their visit to The Hague was to seek the views of key delegations, and that the U.S. valued questions and thoughts about the way ahead. -------------- REACTIONS: MAJOR THEMES -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Reactions to the visit of senior U.S. experts following the EC visit were positive, although a few delegations put down friendly markers about the importance of the 2012 deadline. Many delegations made a point of complimenting the U.S. not only for its transparent and detailed presentation, but also for its outreach and its interest in the views of other member states. The tone of all discussions was collegial and constructive. There was general agreement on the importance of finding a consensus solution, preserving the credibility of the CWC, and upholding the reputation of the OPCW as a model of effective multilateralism. Delegations also noted that there was no question of U.S. commitment to complete destruction of its stockpiles or the object and purpose of the Convention. ¶8. (SBU) Several questions were common to most discussions. A seemingly procedural, but noteworthy, question was whether the U.S. was making a formal declaration of its inability to meet the 2012 deadline, and/or whether it would do so at the upcoming EC session in July (EC-57). Most were already well aware of reports that the U.S. would not complete destruction by 2012. U.S. officials reminded delegations that the destruction schedule was being presented for the sake of transparency, but that the dates were projections that the U.S. intended to improve. Many countries asked why the U.S. had chosen this moment to come forward with a more concrete schedule. Almost every delegation also wanted to know whether the U.S. believes Russia will meet 2012, and asked about the effect of the U.S. destruction schedule on other destruction efforts (e.g., Russia, Japan, Libya) and possibly on non-member states. ¶9. (SBU) Delegations, of course, sought U.S. views on how the situation should be handled: at EC-57, in the run-up to 2012, and after the deadline has Qin the run-up to 2012, and after the deadline has passed. Many, particularly the close allies, asked what solutions the U.S. was considering to accelerate its program and to manage the issue legally and politically at the OPCW. Closely related was skepticism that transporting chemical weapons from Blue Grass and Pueblo to currently operating facilities would not have a significant impact on the overall schedule. Disbelief is also widespread that domestic legislation (local, state or federal) could take precedence over international obligations. ¶10. (SBU) In all consultations, delegations were interested in knowing who else the U.S. was meeting this week. More telling was their interest in exactly how others had reacted to the U.S. news, an indication that there is no clear cut solution to the 2012 problem, and that a great deal of work and serious thought will be required in the next three years. Although the legal options of an amendment or technical change to the Convention were mentioned, the general sense was that these would not be viable options and a more innovative solution must be sought. Several delegations specifically stated that establishing new deadlines would not be a practical or politically acceptable solution. -------------- WHAT NEXT? -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In the coming weeks and on the margins of EC-57, Delreps will follow up with all remaining EC members, as well as with the OPCW Legal Advisor and other key TS directors. Delreps recommend that the U.S. presentation during the EC-57 destruction informals mirrors the information provided by Hopkins and Mikulak this week. ¶12. (SBU) One final common theme raised during meetings was what the Obama Administration is doing about the situation. While Mikulak and Hopkins emphasized that the Administration is reviewing options for dealing with the situation, delegations in The Hague -- as well as capitals -- will be expecting specific, regular updates on measures the Administration is taking to redress the situation and accelerate chemical weapons destruction. ¶13. (U) MIKULAK SENDS. GALLAGHER

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