DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW,S MARCH 31, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000242 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 TAGS: OVIP PREL EAID NL AF PK SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW,S MARCH 31, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH DUTCH MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT KOENDERS Classified By: Political Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (U) March 31, 2009; 6:10 pm; The Hague, Netherlands. ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Jacob Lew, Deputy Secretary of State James Bever, Director for Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force USAID Piper Campbell, Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary Rebecca Callaway (Embassy Notetaker) Netherlands Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Coordination Yoka Brandt, Director General for Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Tjeerd de Zwaan, Netherlands Ambassador to Pakistan Koen Davidse, Director Fragile States Unit, MFA Paula Sastrowiowto, Afghanistan Reconstruction Desk Officer, MFA Erik de Feijter, Security Policy, MFA Dirk Jan Nieuwenhuis, Private Secretary to the Minister for Development Coordination ¶3. (SBU) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Lew sought Dutch input on ways the United States could learn from the Netherlands, experience in Afghanistan. Koenders described the Dutch approach of conducting a detailed assessment of an Afghan province, involving the military and civilians in common projects as often as possible, and working with the local government. Koenders and the Deputy Secretary also discussed the potential of saffron cultivation as an alternative to poppies. END SUMMARY. -------------- Seeking Dutch Input -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary noted the Dutch have had a largely successful transition from a military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to a civilian PRT. He welcomed continued Dutch attention to Afghanistan and told Koenders the United States wanted to understand what made the Dutch approach successful. Koenders emphasized that a "3D plan" (development, diplomacy, and defense) is not enough by itself -- a local, legitimate government is indispensable. Plans must also be tailored to suit different regions. -------------- Dutch Practices -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Koenders highlighted Uruzgan province, where the Dutch PRT is based. Before they even began to work in Uruzgan, he said, the Dutch conducted a detailed assessment of the province to understand the geography of the tribal areas and the conflict zone, and the relationship between traditional leaders and new institutions. ¶6. (SBU) Koenders emphasized the importance of involving the military and civilians in common operations from the start. This included preparing together before the mission. It also meant ensuring civilians were ready to work with the leadership of any given area immediately after a conflict, especially in situations where one side had opposed the Taliban. Finally, Koenders said that the Dutch immediately begin long-term development projects. ¶7. (C) Koenders described a Dutch innovation -- establishing a PRT house. TQs is a place where NGOs working behind the scenes can obtain information and support from PRT authorities in exchange for information on the areas in which they work. Koenders said this is "so we don,t do stupid things" and emphasized the need to include local NGOs in PRT efforts. ¶8. (SBU) Reflecting on the big picture, Koenders said it was important for Dutch Ministers to visit Afghanistan to see the progress made. He said it would be a mistake for each country to limit aid to its own province, because the reality is that some of the work required is "extra-provincial." He also stressed the need to convince the national government to Qalso stressed the need to convince the national government to conduct programs in the provinces. -------------- Corruption -------------- ¶9. (SBU) When asked about corruption, Koenders spoke about the need for accountability and auditing. He said concrete benchmarks were necessary "to show we,re going somewhere." He acknowledged corruption exists, but asserted that not everyone in the government is corrupt. As a consequence, he said, the Dutch work both outside of and with the government. -------------- Alternative Agriculture -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary and Koenders discussed alternative agriculture. They agreed a body of traditional agricultural knowledge has disappeared in many places, but often only within the past 5 to 10 years. The Deputy Secretary expressed a cautious optimism, given that only ten years ago Afghanistan has the capacity to export some wheat and pomegranates. He said the Afghans needed to engage energetically for alternative agriculture to be successful. Although the U.S. is actively looking at how to provide additional agricultural expertise further out into rural areas, the focus would be on training and empowering Afghan farmers and merchants to make the systems work. He asked Koenders how the Dutch had implemented their alternative agriculture program. ¶11. (SBU) Koenders said the Dutch have taken several different approaches. One is vocational training at the agricultural level; the Dutch Agriculture Minister will sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Afghans about this program next week. Another focuses on entrepreneurship, and saffron in particular. He said that although saffron takes two years to mature, a private company which had started a saffron venture has been expanding rapidly. Koenders and the Deputy Secretary both noted that saffron is, ounce for ounce, far more valuable than opium. The meeting concluded on an optimistic note about future Dutch and American collaboration on issues related to Afghanistan. GALLAGHER