CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 56TH

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000236 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN AND DENYER) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 56TH SESSION, APRIL 21-24, 2009 REF: THE HAGUE 210 Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) (U) This is CWC-19-09 -------------- Summary and Introduction -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The two main topics that are likely to dominate Executive Council (EC) debate and informal discussions are the search for a new Director General and Iraq's recent submission of its declaration. On the DG search, candidates continue to emerge - most notably from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG),which has led to some speculation about how WEOG will eventually choose one candidate to support. Western and like-minded States Parties have encouraged EC Chair Ambassador Tomova to resist attempts to discuss procedures, criteria, modalities, and the like in an open ended working group. However, pressure from the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) to hold such a meeting is mounting. ¶2. (SBU) Iraq's declaration has now been available to States Parties for several weeks. There has been little discussion of the contents, but Del expects an Iraqi presentation at the destruction informals and accompanying statements by the U.S. and UK to generate far more. While the U.S. statement regarding recoveries and destruction of chemical weapons in Iraq is best kept simple, based on recent interactions Del recommends EC guidance include if-asked responses to questions about the legal basis for and status of the U.S. submission. A reaction of stunned silence could easily be the extent of States Parties' responses to information shared in the informals, but pointed questions about U.S. actions, Iraq's ability to fulfill its CWC obligations, and the Secretariat's ability to carry out its verification mission, are sure to come. ¶3. (SBU) The agenda for EC-56 also includes a number of more routine items, many of which were deferred from previous sessions. ¶4. (SBU) Iran's participation in this Executive Council (EC) is an unknown factor. Chief obstructionist Mohsen Naziri Asl has finally departed from The Hague. Del assumes Gholamhossein Dehghani will lead the delegation as at EC-55. 
Iran's delegation has been quiet at recent meetings. The delegation may follow its moderately cooperative role from EC-55, or revert to its more traditional spoiler role. The crystal ball is cloudy this time. -------------- DG SEARCH -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Following the EC-55 compromise that called for States Parties to present candidates no later than 7 July 2009, the search for a new Director General has gained momentum, with four official candidates from Algeria, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Germany having been nominated so far and at least two more countries (Switzerland, Finland) having indicated their intent to do so. EC Chair Tomova has continued her consultations with regional groups, reporting on the results to WEOG-Plus and the EC Bureau. ¶6. (SBU) All regional groups agree in principle that it is preferable for EC-58 in October to recommend a consensus candidate to the Conference of States Parties, and that the process of selection must be open and transparent. The idea of a "north-south" rotation has received little to no public support. Several delegations have indicated interest in a regional rotation, but most agree this would place undue constraints on the process. The greatest divergence in views is on the question of whether an open-ended working group of some sort should be established to clarify modalities, procedures, and other details of the selection process that Western delegations believe are best left in the hands of the EC Chair. ¶7. (SBU) WEOG continues to speak in favor of keeping the process simple and avoiding documents or procedural discussions. South Africa and others, however, have called for an open meeting prior to the upcoming EC to discuss exactly what WEOG and like-minded States Parties would prefer to avoid. No such meeting has been scheduled yet, but still could be. The impression of WEOG Vice Chair Burkart and others is that Tomova is coming under increasing pressure to hold at least one open meeting on the subject, in addition to or in place of the small meeting format in which she would prefer to work. Tomova intends to report on the results of her consultations to EC-56, and will prepare appropriate report language (likely to be the starting point for negotiations in which the NAM attempts to establish a more formal process). ¶8. (SBU) Guidance requested: Del would appreciate guidance on what we could accept as well as redlines for any potential procedural discussion. For this EC, we would definitely want to avoid anything that restricts the new Council and new Chairman in vetting candidates after the deadline. However, it might be appropriate to agree on a format for the candidates to address EC-57 (for example, all candidates invited to speak to the Council in plenary, advised to address their vision for the Organization, given a speaking time limit (10 minutes) with time for questions from the floor, etc.). -------------- IRAQ -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Iraq's declaration and status will no doubt be the subject of discussion at the upcoming EC, but just how remains to be seen. Of note, Iran is not among the twenty-some delegations that have picked up their copy of Iraq's initial declaration. Del has heard very little in the corridors, and anticipates delegations may need more time to digest not only the declaration, but what they will hear at the destruction informals on April 20. ¶10. (C) On April 7, Del informed first France and Germany, and then WEOG, that the U.S. intends to make a brief statement at the informals regarding pre-1991 chemical munitions U.S. forces have recovered and destroyed since 2003. Del also noted that the U.S. will be providing additional information to the Secretariat. The UK also indicated its intent to do the same. In the private meeting with France and Germany, Germany asked whether the U.S. is submitting its information as an official declaration, whether it views this is an obligation, and why its submission is coming now. Burkart noted that Germany would of Qis coming now. Burkart noted that Germany would of course avoid such questions in public, but that he anticipated others might not. Canadian Delrep also asked privately whether the U.S. and UK viewed their declarations as a legal obligation. In WEOG, other comments on Iraq's declaration centered on the complexity of the task ahead and the importance of proactive engagement with Iraq, especially given the possible implications of EC "handling" of Iraq for universality. Several delegations also noted the issue of supplier countries and questioned Iran's possible statements on this aspect of the declaration. ¶11. (C) On April 6, Delrep was contacted by the Technical Secretariat for a follow-up meeting on the U.S. submission (April 3) of its information on the rounds recovered in Iraq. Specific questions have been forwarded separately to Washington. TS questions stemmed from a desire to clarify how the U.S. views its submission ) whether it is truly a declaration or a transparency measure, under what Article/obligation the declaration has been made, etc. Although the Secretariat has apparently not conducted its own legal review of the U.S. declaration, the primary concern voiced was to be able to provide answers ) if possible - that are consistent with the U.S. view. Several TS participants in the meeting seemed to hold the view that the U.S. should have submitted a letter instead of a declaration that could raise more questions (about fills, locations, etc.) than it answers. ¶12. (C) Del expects a follow-up meeting with the Secre tariat, including the Office of the Legal Advisor, to discuss this matter. The submission of the UK's information in a different format is likely to further complicate such discussions, especially given the difference between the U.S. and UK legal basis for recovery/destruction actions. TS officers indicated a strong interest in resolving legal and other questions prior to the April 20 destruction informals. ¶13. (SBU) Del continues to work with Iraqi delegate Abbas to gauge Iraq's involvement and progress with the TS and other delegations. Del has also repeatedly reinforced with Iraqi Ambassador Banaa and delegate Abbas the importance of having experts from Baghdad arrive early in The Hague to shape an effective presentation for the destruction informals and begin work on a general plan for destruction. Delrep also communicated to Abbas the need expressed in Baghdad for an official invitation from the OPCW to facilitate issuance of visas, but believes Abbas will wait for instructions from Baghdad before approaching the Technical Secretariat on this matter. According to Abbas, Iraq has received no questions so far on its declaration; the only inquiry has been from the German delegation, which indicated a desire to have a meeting of technical experts on the margins of the EC. -------------- CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES -------------- ¶14. (SBU) With no 90-Day reports on the agenda this session, Del expects discussion will be dominated by other topics. Following the U.S. suggestion, the Director General is issuing a note to adjust/regularize the schedule of submission of these reports. Del does expect some congratulatory remarks for India having completed destruction of its CW stockpile, and the usual expressions of concern that the slow pace of destruction in the two major possessors. The real debate on U.S. Qtwo major possessors. The real debate on U.S. destruction is likely to come in July, when discussion of the report of the EC visit to Pueblo and Umatilla is on the agenda. ¶15. (SBU) Iraq clearly presents a new challenge in the area of chemical weapons, although there is currently no specific agenda item under which this topic could easily be discussed. The EC will soon need to face its obligation to establish destruction deadlines for Iraq; this and the range of associated and complicated topics would benefit in the coming months from the political and technical guidance of an Ambassador (perhaps the Vice Chair for CW issues) and senior TS staff. Despite the lack of a specific agenda item, Del believes initial views on this subject could manifest themselves in the form of report language. ¶16. (U) The Note by the Secretariat on continued verification measures at the UK's converted form chemical weapons production facility at Portreath remains on the agenda. During the April 8 EC preparatory meeting, Vice Chair for the CW Cluster Ambassador Burkart recommended that, due to the ongoing discussions on this item (understood to be between Russia and the UK),the paragraph be dropped from the agenda. Secretary for the Policy Making Organs Alexander Khodakov recommended the item be retained, as the Secretariat has produced a paper on "general guidelines" for such facilities that may allow interested delegations to resolve their differences. The Secretariat hopes to distribute these guidelines by April 10. -------------- SCHEDULE 1 FACILITY AGREEMENTS -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Del has tentatively scheduled a meeting the week of April 14 with the Iranian delegation to follow up on issues outstanding from discussions at EC-55. Del requests guidance as to whether the U.S. intends to make any changes to the current draft of our own Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, and/or whether we will insist on revisions to Iran's agreement. -------------- ARTICLE X -------------- ¶18. (U) On April 7, Polish delegate Maciej Karasinski held his first round of consultations as the new Article X facilitator. Based on these consultations, Del expects both Article X documents on the agenda to be noted. Given opinions expressed regarding the note by the Secretariat on the effectiveness of current Article X programs (EC-55/S/2),the facilitator may also propose report language on regularizing and/or improving this type of reporting. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶19. (U) The DG's report on the Status of Implementation of Article XI as of December 31, 2008, is still on the agenda, having been deferred from EC-55 because delegations had not had a chance to discuss the report in consultations. As this fact has not changed since EC-55, it is likely the report will be deferred again. Del understands Chen Kai, China's new deputy head of delegation, may be interested in assuming predecessor Li Hong's role as Article XI facilitator. -------------- INDUSTRY ISSUES -------------- ¶20. (SBU) It is unclear whether, following meetings held during the April 1-2 session of the industry cluster, delegations are now in a position to note the two industry related documents on the EC agenda. On the issue of OCPF site selection, Del understands that China is likely to push for stronger report language on the need to find a facilitator. -------------- ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ISSUES -------------- ¶21. (SBU) ABAF: The U.S. added this agenda item during EC-55 in the belief that the discussion of ABAF reform should continue, and with the view that any consideration of funding for delegates from the regular budget would need to have a Council decision before the Draft Budget is published in July. However, as the last Geneva Group discussion showed (REFTEL),there is no consensus among Geneva Group members on possible funding for delegates and a general lethargy about letting ABAF make recommendations to the Council without further guidance in the form of questions or direction. Del has not heard of any follow-up activity by the Costa Rican Vice Chair for budget and administrative issues. Unless instructed to pursue active discussion during this EC, Del recommends providing questions privately to friendly ABAF members for the ABAF review of its own activities with the objective of getting some useful recommendations from ABAF for the Council consideration in the fall. ¶22. (SBU) At the EC Chair's preparatory meeting on April 8, Russia noted that it has made a request to the Secretariat to add a paragraph under the ABAF item on the reappointment of Russia's representative on ABAF. Secretary Khodakov acknowledged that this request had been received and added that the Chinese representative will also be addressed in this new paragraph. (Del note: The Iranian delegate serving on ABAF has also departed The Hague. A new Iranian nominee may appear at some point. End note.) ¶23. (U) Beik sends. GALLAGHER