CWC: WRAP-UP FOR MARCH 16-26, 2009

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000210 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN AND DENYER) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR MARCH 16-26, 2009 REF: A. STATE 23254 ¶B. THE HAGUE 181 This is CWC-18-09. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) After Iraq's delivery of its initial declaration, Delreps met with the Iraqi Ambassador and delegate on March 17 to discuss preparation for Iraq's presentation at the April destruction informals and the importance of having Iraqi experts arrive in The Hague in advance of that meeting. ¶2. (SBU) Delrep chaired a meeting of the Geneva Group on March 16. The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) met March 17 for a presentation by the new head of the Implementation and Support Branch of the Technical Secretariat (TS),and on March 24 in expanded format with like-minded states to discuss the search for a new Director-General (DG). The OPCW and UNICRI hosted a seminar on the chemical dimensions of non-proliferation on March 18, and the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism hosted a meeting with Saudi counter-terrorism officials on March 25. Details on all of these meetings follow. -------------- IRAQI DECLARATION AND PREPARATIONS FOR EC-56 -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On March 17, Delreps met with Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa and Iraqi First Secretary Abbas to deliver the non-paper in Ref A. Banaa agreed that the early arrival of experts from Baghdad would be important in ensuring adequate preparation for the destruction informals. Abbas noted that Director of Verification Horst Reeps had also suggested this, and that he had forwarded this to Baghdad. Banaa suggested that the U.S., UK, and Iraq meet first, followed by a later meeting with the TS. ¶4. (SBU) Delreps informed Banaa that the non-paper had also been delivered to officials in Baghdad and suggested that logistical questions about visas and official invitations be directed to the TS. In reviewing the non-paper, Delreps emphasized the importance of Iraq being able to paint a clear picture of the condition of the storage bunkers, as well as any residual production capacity, and of the current security situation. Delreps reminded Banaa of U.S. plans to submit a declaration of the recovered rounds and to make a brief explanatory statement at the EC-56 destruction informals. ¶5. (SBU) In discussing future challenges, Delreps raised the need for the Council to establish destruction deadlines. Banaa expressed confidence that, "with U.S. help," a general plan for destruction could be developed and a destruction program carried out. ¶6. (SBU) On March 18, OPCW Chief of Cabinet Richard Ekwall called to inform Delrep of the Director General's plan to meet with Ambassador Banaa on March 19 to reinforce the need for Iraq to submit a general plan for destruction without delay. Following this, the DG planned to authorize release of Iraq's declaration to member states by the end of the week. Delrep informed Ekwall of U.S. discussions with Iraq, as well as the possibility of a U.S./UK/TS meeting with Baghdad experts before EC-56. ¶7. (SBU) On March 19, First Secretary Abbas requested a meeting with Delrep and confirmed that the DG had spoken to Amb. Banaa. Abbas shared the documents the DG had provided (forwarded separately to Washington) and asked for U.S. advice on developing a plan for destruction. Delrep noted that this would need to be done by experts in Baghdad, but recommended Abbas contact Chemical Demilitarization Branch Head Dominique Anelli to begin discussing this matter with the TS. Delrep also provided copies of the Albanian and Libyan general plans for destruction as a reference, and acknowledged the challenge that the condition of the bunkers presents in developing a detailed plan. Finally, Delrep suggested that if the plan has not been submitted prior to EC-56, the delegation from Baghdad should come to any EC-56 pre-meeting prepared to discuss a working draft. -------------- GENEVA GROUP -------------- ¶8. (U) On March 16, Delrep Granger chaired a meeting of the local Geneva Group at the delegation office to discuss the Group's annual report on OPCW activities. Both the UK and French delegates remarked that their respective assessed contributions for 2009 were higher than in 2008 (in the case of the UK, by more than EUR 200,000), despite a lower budget and a projected fall in assessments. Canadian delegate Angela Peart pointedly asked when the U.S. plans to pay its 2009 assessment. Delrep announced that with FY09 budget having recently been passed the first payment was expected sometime in April. Peart also noted that the UN scale of assessment currently is being negotiated in New York and might increase for a number of Geneva Group countries if the methodology is altered. ¶9. (U) After concluding discussion on the draft annual report, Delrep asked for views on reforming the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF). Peart suggested contacting the Geneva Group coordinators in Geneva for experience in dealing with similar bodies in other organizations. There were differing views on whether to fund ABAF members' travel, with the French delegate saying that professionalization of the ABAF would require financing and the German delegate noting Berlin's skepticism toward the idea given negative experiences in other organizations. The UK delegate stated that the ABAF's remit should be clarified to make it more effective and also questioned whether the current ad-hoc self nomination process should be changed. ¶10. (U) Geneva Group Co-chair Diana Gosens (Netherlands) will host and chair the next meeting in late May, which will feature a debrief on the 25-29 May ABAF meeting by ABAF members from Geneva Group countries. -------------- WEOG -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Ruth Surkau (Germany) convened the regular, weekly WEOG meeting on March 17. At his request, the new Head of the Implementation and Support Branch (IPB),Mark Albon (former South African OPCW delegate),presented an overview of IPB's activities and priorities. He wants to focus more programming on customs-related activities of States Parties for the important role customs authorities play in nonproliferation. His branch's Qauthorities play in nonproliferation. His branch's other focus is assisting States Parties in national implementation of the convention, including the drafting of legislation. ¶12. (SBU) Albon's branch primarily interacts with National Authorities, but he would like to see more cross-interaction among states' National Authorities. He sees a role for WEOG to play with their National Authorities providing assistance and expertise to those of lesser developed countries, and perhaps accompanying the TS on technical assistance missions. Albon noted his appreciation for voluntary funding from western countries, which greatly assists his branch's activities, and then not surprisingly, made a subtle call for increased funding. He indicated that IPB is unable to respond to all States Parties' requests for programming because of insufficient funding. ¶13. (SBU) In response to Surkau's question on how the TS prioritizes requests from States Parties, Albon clarified that programs requested by SPs that go unfunded from the voluntary budget in a given year typically move to the top of the priority list for those programs under the regular budget for the next year. Overall, Albon explained that requests from those States Parties without a National Authority have highest priority, followed by those without implementing legislation. Additionally, Africa, as part of the Africa Program, is given highest priority as the region furthest behind. ¶14. (SBU) In response to a question from the French delegate, Albon recognized that evaluating the effectiveness of National Authorities is a major challenge. He pointed to the comprehensiveness of declarations and implementing legislations as two possible areas to measure progress. In response to a question by the Italian delegate, Albon also recognized that it is important for the TS to engage and influence various stakeholders in those States Parties seeking assistance, in particular the chemical industry associations. ¶15. (SBU) Albon then departed and Surkau moved onto the next agenda item, the selection of the Director General (DG). German Ambassador Werner Burkart provided a read-out from the WEOG meeting with Executive Council (EC) Chairperson Ambassador Oksana Tomova (Ref B). Burkart reviewed the points WEOG members delivered to Tomova, stressing how WEOG made it clear that no documents or open ended working groups would be needed for the selection process. Burkart also noted how this issue was conspicuously left off the recently issued preliminary EC-56 agenda. He opined that Tomova will fall under increasing pressure from the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) to develop a more defined, rigid process. ¶16. (SBU) U.S. Delrep stated that WEOG members must be firm in their resistance to any pressure for EC- 56 to issue some kind of document on the DG selection process. She also noted Tomova's suggestion of meeting with WEOG-plus like-minded states as a good idea; many other delegations agreed. Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland all agreed that WEOG needed to remain firm in the expected wake of building NAM pressure. The French delegate added that delegations should strive for consensus as the incoming EC Chair will become Qconsensus as the incoming EC Chair will become "king maker." Sweden warned that consensus on this issue is unlikely. ¶17. (SBU) The Australian delegate reminded WEOG of Tomova's mentioning the possibility of having two Deputy Director Generals. While Burkart noted that this idea came out of the PrepCom, he was personally against this notion. The Italian delegate then proposed that WEOG invite the next EC Chair (Mexican Ambassador) to join Tomova when she meets next with WEOG to brief the group on the developments surrounding the selection process. Delegates agreed that WEOG will have to, at some point, address its increasingly large list of western candidates to decide how WEOG will proceed. The Dutch Ambassador proposed that WEOG address this issue after all the candidates had declared themselves. -------------- WEOG PLUS -------------- ¶18. (SBU) On March 25, WEOG coordinator Surkau chaired an expanded meeting ("WEOG Plus") including Japan, South Korea, and all non-WEOG European Union countries. EC Chair Tomova (Slovakia) gave an overview of her meetings with all of the regional groups on selecting the new DG. Tomova said that there was "basic consensus in principle" among all regional groups on selecting a consensus candidate and not resorting to voting. After all of her meetings, Tomova's impression is that the selection process must be careful, transparent, and open. ¶19. (SBU) Tomova noted that the Asian Group raised a number of points with her. Chinese Ambassador Zhang called for a democratic process with established rules to guide candidates. Zhang also suggested candidates needed to be nominated as early as possible to give them "space" and to allow for "graceful withdrawals." Iran raised the possibility of accepting nominations after the July 7 deadline and also reiterated their request to clarify the process through open-ended discussions on modalities. India asked if the EC is obliged to choose one consensus candidate or if the EC can recommend more than one candidate to the CSP. ¶20. (SBU) The African Group suggested that Tomova expand discussions on the DG appointment beyond regional groups or even EC members. GRULAC said there is no need for complicated procedures, nor to discuss the process at length. GRULAC -- as well as the African and Asian groups -- rejected a "north-south" rotation, with some preferring rotation among regional groups instead. ¶21. (SBU) Tomova reported that she met with the DG after her regional group consultations and was surprised to learn that he had not approved the first provisional agenda for EC-56 that was released on March 13 that had conspicuously omitted any mention of the DG selection. The DG felt it was important to follow on from the decision reached during EC-55 and allow for discussion of the issue at EC-56. At his request, the agenda was revised to include an item to DG appointment. Tomova said that she would prepare in advance appropriate language on the issue for the EC-56 report. (Del comment: The early provisional agenda appears to have been the work of Secretary Khodakov; the fact that neither the DG nor the Chairperson had seen it before publication, and without a Bureau meeting to discuss it, is disturbing. End comment) ¶22. (SBU) German Ambassador Burkart spoke in favor of remaining firm on the July 7 deadline, having EC-58 (in October) agree to a consensus candidate, and avoiding convening an open-ended working group Qand avoiding convening an open-ended working group or otherwise complicating the process. Burkart's comments were echoed by a number of delegations, including the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France, Ireland, the Czech Republic, and France. Reacting to the point raised with Tomova by India, Burkart said that the EC was tasked with making "a recommendation" and that clearly means only one candidate. Swedish delegate Christer Ahlstrom said that the Convention (specifically Article VIII.43) and past practice point to only one candidate being recommended by the EC and subsequently chosen by the CSP. Delrep reiterated calls to keep the process simple and in the hands of the EC Chair and to keep discussion within the EC and open to all member states. ¶23. (SBU) Under Any Other Business, Delrep announced that the invitation letter for the EC visit to U.S. Chemical Weapon Destruction Facilities in June had been sent to Tomova and that April 1 is the deadline for regional group representatives to be named. Surkau promised to distribute the invitation and coordinate the WEOG nomination via email. -------------- UNICRI MEETING AT OPCW -------------- ¶24. (U) On March 18, Delreps attended an OPCW- hosted seminar entitled "Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation: the Chemical Dimension." The meeting was part of a wider program developed by the UN's Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) for countries in South-Eastern Europe; however, the OPCW session was open to all member states. Director-General Pfirter opened the meeting by noting the active engagement of the OPCW with organizations like UNICRI, and the important contribution the OPCW makes to preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. UNICRI Director Sandro Calvani then highlighted the need for multilateral organizations to work together, develop new approaches, and share knowledge. He described the UNICRI "Knowledge Management System" project, started in May 2008, to assist countries in South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in communications regarding the trafficking of CBRN materials. ¶25. (U) Filippo Sevini (European Commission representative) provided an overview of the Commission's Instrument for Stability, established in 2006. The instrument consists of two parts: responding to emerging crises, and building capacity to prevent and respond to crises. Sevini also reviewed three Commission priorities in this area: counteracting WMD proliferation, addressing threats of trafficking and organized crime, and building emergency response capacity. Specific projects include establishing "regional centers of excellence" to help countries in fighting illicit CBRN trafficking and financing. ¶26. (U) OPCW Legal Advisor Santiago Onate gave a presentation on the legal framework of the CWC for transfers and import/export of scheduled chemicals. He reviewed the general obligations of the Convention and explained the need for implementing legislation to extend the prohibitions of the CWC to individuals as well as States Parties. Onate also noted the connection between implementation of the CWC and UNSCR 1540. He summarized annual reporting obligations and the importance of States Parties and the Secretariat working together to resolve issues that arise regarding transfers. ¶27. (U) Steve Wade (Head, Declarations Branch) provided an overview of the CWC verification Qprovided an overview of the CWC verification regime, and noted that verification begins with a State Party's declaration. He outlined the cycle of declarations, from the initial submission to TS evaluation, to on site inspection and monitoring, to analysis and reporting. In a detailed description of the CW verification regime, Wade listed Iraq as one of the States Parties in possession of chemical weapons. He described some of the future challenges facing the verification division, and concluded by mentioning work currently being done with the World Trade Organization to help customs and border officials more easily identify regulated chemicals. ¶28. (U) The highlight of the seminar was Director of Special Projects Krzysztof Paturej's presentation on the OPCW's role in chemical safety and security issues. Paturej laid out the mandate from the Second Review Conference in April 2008 for the Organization to be a platform and venue for supporting global cooperation on a range of issues -- including chemical safety and security, for fostering collaboration, and for raising awareness of best practices. Paturej tempered this mandate with a list of things that the OPCW would not do (i.e., the Organization's "red lines"),including: - taking on an independent role (i.e., going beyond supporting member states' activities); - developing TS expertise on the issue; - including safety and security issues in verification and inspection activities; - developing regulatory measures; and - developing guidance or advice on chemical safety and security issues. ¶29. (U) Again referencing a mandate from the Second Review Conference, Paturej also touched on the need to engage stakeholders, such as chemical industry and the scientific community, in the OPCW's work. He noted that the OPCW already had experience in this regard, citing a number of events held to mark the OPCW's tenth anniversary in 2007, as well as the industry forum and the academic forum held in conjunction with the Second Review Conference. Paturej went on to suggest developing a long-term strategy for the OPCW to develop its relationship with stakeholders. He singled out Article X (Assistance and Protection) and Article XI (Economic and Technological Development) as two key areas having a direct relation to chemical safety and security where implementation would be broadened through cooperation with stakeholders. -------------- OPCW OPEN ENDED WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM -------------- ¶30. (U) On March 25, Annie Mari (France) chaired a session of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Terrorism. She opened by reiterating her sense that the group should build on links to Article VII and Article X, and should explore the topic of safety and security of chemical industry, given its direct bearing on the prevention of terrorist acquisition of chemical weapons. She also indicated that she would be holding informal discussions with delegations on the future work of the group. Marie then listed some of the OPCW's recent and upcoming events related to terrorism including the previous week's UNICRI seminar; the March 26-27 Clingendael workshop on 1540; a workshop in Croatia in April, a possible tabletop exercise in Poland; and an Algeria-hosted conference on chemical terrorism. Qconference on chemical terrorism. ¶31. (U) The speakers for this meeting of the working group were Saudi ministry officials: Secretary of the National Authority Mohammed A. Al- Matrafi and General Director of the Ideological Security Directorate Dr. Abdulrahman Alhadlaq. Al- Matrafi gave a largely irrelevant briefing on Saudi Arabia's implementation of the CWC that included a review of the various provisions of the Convention; and was related to the work of the OEWG only through a vague reference to the fact that implementation of CWC prohibitions is a preventive measure. ¶32. (U) The briefing that followed was not only inappropriate for the OPCW, but also offensive. Dr. Alhadlaq gave a lengthy presentation on his area of expertise: combating terrorist ideology. With the exception of a gratuitous reference to having seen ideology that would encourage terrorists to use WMD, the presentation was unrelated to work of the Open Ended Working Group and to the OPCW. Alhadlaq provided a detailed overview of the cycle of recruitment and radicalization, the propagation of extremist ideology over the internet, and the work Saudi officials are doing to propagate more moderate ideology. His explanation of factors that drove individuals to extremism included a desire to force the U.S. and UK out of Iraq and Afghanistan and the "fear of hellfire." These factors were supported by pictures found on extremist websites of U.S. soldiers and Abu Ghraib. Alhadlaq also explained in detail various methods Saudi officials use to rehabilitate terrorists. Of his presentation, the one slide Mari was able to recall in her summary as relevant was on the physical protection of industrial sites (actually related specifically to oil processing facilities and pipelines). ¶33. (U) The stunned silence following the briefings was broken by the Algerian Ambassador (and candidate for the post of Director General),who asked about a Saudi center for terrorism, and also asked the Saudi officials for their assessment of the level of threat of a terrorist attack using chemicals. The officials responded that there have been "many reports" of terrorists attempting to acquire chemical weapons/WMD. ¶34. (SBU) Del comment: The Saudi briefings were by far the least relevant the working group has had to date. The politically inflammatory nature of the second presentation, and the lack of relevance of either to the work of the group, would seem to indicate that neither the group's chair nor the Secretariat previewed their content before the meeting. In a private conversation following the meeting, the UK delegate noted that this was likely to strengthen the case of delegations who wish to discontinue the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism. German Ambassador Burkart also shared his view that it was clearly time to assess the relevance and future orientation of the group. End comment. ¶35. (U) BEIK SENDS. GALLAGHER