NETHERLANDS/EU: VIEWS ON FEBRUARY GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000135 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: PREL EU AF NL ZL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: VIEWS ON FEBRUARY GAERC REF: A. THE HAGUE 118 ¶B. THE HAGUE 116 ¶C. FALLS-GIAUQUE EMAIL 2-17-09 ¶D. THE HAGUE 54 Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d) ¶1. (U) Summary: The Dutch MFA reviewed the GAERC agenda for February 23-34, including Afghanistan, the Middle East, Sudan, the EU's Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans, and the economic crisis. Dutch plans for the March 2 Middle East conference are covered in reftel A, and Dutch views on the EU response to the economic crisis are reported in reftel B. FM Verhagen's letter to parliament on the GAERC agenda was reported in ref C. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Afghanistan: In a February 20 briefing for non-EU allies, EU Deputy Correspondent Rochus Pronk stated that Verhagen intends to appeal for more investments for EUPOL, noting the Netherlands has doubled its investments. Verhagen also will discuss PM Balkenende's recent visit to Afghanistan, where he supported programs and policies that promote good governance, anti-corruption, fair elections, and improved GOA security efforts. EU ministers are expected to discuss U.S. policy developments. ¶3. (SBU) Middle East: FM Verhagen will support a political message to all parties that they should make concessions. Verhagen told the Dutch parliament publicly that he will support efforts to reduce maritime arms smuggling to Gaza. Also, the Dutch-Danish proposal to revive the EU border mission in Gaza is "still on the table." (Note: A Dutch newspaper reported the Government of Egypt was not receptive to the Dutch plan. The Dutch MFA informed Embassy the Hague that Verhagen's Egyptian counterpart responded positively during discussions with the Dutch. End note.) ¶4. (U) Sudan: The EU is unlikely to take up Sudan unless the International Criminal Court (ICC) takes action. The Dutch support ICC action, and especially the ICC's independence, despite the possible impact on peace negotiations in Sudan. The Dutch would oppose an Article 16 procedure at the UNSC to delay ICC action and believe the international community should remind Sudan of its obligation to cooperate with the ICC. ¶5. (U) Eastern Partnership: The Dutch strongly support this partnership to build relations with the EU's neighbors but want to ensure the partnership does not become a signal of future EU membership. "Don't create false expectations." Belarus should not qualify for the partnership, given its record on democracy and human rights. ¶6. (C) Western Balkans: In Bosnia, the process of reform has been slow. The Dutch support the "5 2" conditions for closing the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, and wants to ensure the EU mission there has a strong mandate. The Dutch have no preference on a new High Representative. On Serbia, the Dutch remain opposed to a fact-finding mission to consider Serbia's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). "The ICTY prosecutor's decision should be determinative." A fact-finding mission would undermine the prosecutor. The Dutch say the French and Czech presidencies, along with the support of Belgrade, supported the idea of a fact-finding mission to assess ICTY cooperation. The Germans joined the Dutch in supporting ICTY independence/authority, but the Germans also want to get a conclusion on the issue. ¶7. (C) On Montenegro, the GAERC agreed to postpone until March whether to ask the EU Commission for an opinion on QMarch whether to ask the EU Commission for an opinion on Montenegro. The Dutch believe asking the EU Commission for an opinion on Montegro's application would be a premature "political decision." The Dutch argue that further reforms are needed in Montenegro. Minister for European Cooperation Timmermans made the point that the Netherlands supports EU enlargement, but the EU should stick to its criteria. The Germans support the Dutch but a "large majority" of EU members, as well as the Commission, believe the decision is technical rather than political, and therefore support the request for an opinion. It's unclear whether the EU's rules would allow the Netherlands to block the request. GALLAGHER