THE AMBASSDOR BRIEFS EU AMBASSADORS ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000601 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EU KWBG IS SUBJECT: THE AMBASSDOR BRIEFS EU AMBASSADORS ON THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AND THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH DONORS CONFERENCE Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 1.(C) Summary. The Ambassador briefed the EU Ambassadors March 6 on the Secretary's visit and the Sharm El-Sheikh donors conference. The Ambassador noted the U.S. desire to avoid a further outbreak of violence in Gaza. Reviewing the Secretary's conversations at Sharm, the Ambassador stressed U.S. reservations about Palestinian political reconciliation unless it is based on the Quartet conditions. The Secretary had stated that PM Fayyad is an essential part of the picture. The Secretary's discussions with Israeli leaders had covered Iran, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. In her conversation with PM-designate Netanyahu, he made clear his desire to work with us and the PA, although Netanyahu declined to declare that the two-state solution is his goal. Regarding Iran and Syria, the Secretary had made clear that we will not engage for the sake of engagement, but rather to try to solve problems. In both cases, the Israelis warned against open-ended dialogue. On settlements, Special Envoy Mitchell will engage the new GOI shortly after it is formed. The Ambassador noted that the Secretary had asked him to raise house demolitions in East Jerusalem, and he was in the process of doing so. In response to questions from the EU Ambassadors (plus Canada),the Ambassador provided more detail about U.S. reservations toward a role for Hamas in the PA since U.S. policy and law prevent the U.S. from dealing with Hamas; stressed that he does not intend to intervene in the Israeli coalition-formation process; debunked an Israeli "urban myth" about Fayyad's handling of the last cash transfer; and noted some progress in getting the GOI to limit restrictions on the shipment of essential goods into Gaza. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Ambassador accepted an invitation from Czech Ambassador Zantovsky to brief the EU Ambassadors March 6 on the Secretary's March 2-4 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as providing the U.S. perspective on the March 2 Sharm El Sheikh donors conference. In addition to the EU Ambassadors, Canadian Ambassador Allen and an adviser to EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Otte attended the meeting. PolCouns accompanied the Ambassador. ¶3. (C) Noting that this was Secretary Clinton's first visit to Israel in her role as Secretary of State, the Ambassador said her discussions with the GOI covered the Sharm conference, as well as Iran, Syria, the Palestinians and Lebanon. At Sharm, the Secretary announced the U.S. decision to donate $900 million to Palestinian economic development: two thirds will be spent in the West Bank and/or to support the PA budget, while one third will be spent on Gaza assistance, either through the PA or via a mechanism that ensures that Hamas does not benefit from the funds. Secretary Clinton had held over twenty bilateral side-meetings at Sharm. In almost all of those meetings, Iran was at the top of the agenda. The Secretary's meeting with Prime Minister designate Netanyahu was a positive preliminary exchange of views; our substantive engagement with Netanyahu will begin with a visit by Special Envoy Mitchell shortly after Netanyahu forms his government. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted three key questions that were on the Secretary's agenda: avoiding a new outbreak of violence in Gaza; discouraging the Gulf Cooperation Council states from establishing an assistance mechanism for Gaza that bypasses the PA and reiterating strong U.S. support for PA Prime Minister Fayyad; and, making clear that the U.S. will not support a Palestinian unity government unless it is based on acceptance of the Quartet conditions. Our approach, the Ambassador stressed, is designed to keep the PA competent and capable. A unity government that includes Hamas would play into the hands of those Israelis who claim they have no Palestinian partner. Hamas' goal is to bring down the entire basis of the U.S. approach to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. ¶5. (C) Regarding the Secretary's meeting with Netanyahu, the Ambassador said that Netanyahu made clear his desire to work with the U.S. and the PA. Netanyahu reiterated his intent to pursue a three track approach to the Palestinians, including economic, security and political elements. Netanyahu had declined to state that his goal is the two-state solution, claiming that he needed some time to work out his position. Netanyahu stressed, however, that he foresees maximum Palestinian self-rule as long as it does not threaten Israel's security. Netanyahu raised limitations on Palestinian sovereignty with regard to the right to establish an army, enter into treaties, or control their borders, air space, and electromagnetic space. The Ambassador pointed out that these issues also concern the current GOI. TEL AVIV 00000601 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Regarding U.S. plans to engage Iran and Syria, the Secretary told all her Israeli interlocutors that we are not interested in engagement for its own sake, but as a means to solve problems. The U.S. is conducting a policy review on Iran, and is sending Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro to Damascus to follow up on Feltman's meeting with the Syrian Ambassador in Washington the previous week. The Ambassador noted that Feltman and Shapiro were in Beirut March 6 and would travel on to Damascus the next day. The Israelis cautioned the Secretary against open-ended discussions with either Iran or Syria. The Secretary had assured them that the U.S. understands that, and intends to test them and to see if there is a way to make progress. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador also said the Secretary had instructed him to raise house demolitions in East Jerusalem with the GOI, adding that he was in the process of doing so. He will ask the current GOI to prevent implementation of demolition orders so that we can have an opportunity to engage the new GOI on this subject. The Ambassador noted that Jerusalem Mayor Barkat's comments on this issue had "not been positive." ¶8. (C) Irish Ambassador Forbes commented that he thought Secretary Clinton's references to a two-state solution had not been as "fulsome" as those of Secretary Rice. He also asked when SE Mitchell planned to establish an office in Jerusalem. The Ambassador responded that Secretary Clinton had expressed strong support for the two-state solution at every opportunity during her visit. He pointed out that at the MFA's joint press conference, outgoing Foreign Minister Livni had been eloquent on Israel's need for the two-state solution. Regarding SE Mitchell's plans, the Ambassador said he would establish a small team in Jerusalem by late spring or early summer. ¶9. (C) Italian Ambassador Mattiolo asked the Ambassador to comment further on Palestinian reconciliation since the U.S. position would affect the international community and the prospects for Gaza reconstruction. The Ambassador responded that our approach is grounded in political reality. Reconciliation on Hamas' terms would mean the end of the peace process. On both legal and policy grounds, the U.S. is prohibited from dealing with Hamas unless it accepts the Quartet conditions. A unity government including Hamas would also bring an end to Israel's security cooperation with the PASF. The Ambassador noted that there is a great deal that can be done to assist Gaza through the UN and PA, although he observed that some in the EU see it differently. We should focus on what we can accomplish before we face what we cannot. We also need to see to it that pledges from Sharm are met. ¶10. (C) Canadian Ambassador Allen asked for the Ambassador's thoughts on reports that Netanyahu plans to make Yisrael Beiteinu party leader Avigdor Lieberman foreign minister. Allen also noted that during the visit that week of the Canadian foreign minister, PM Olmert had complained that the U.S. had forced him to transfer $60 million to the PA and that the money had ended up in the hands of Hamas. Regarding Netanyahu's assignment of ministerial portfolios, the Ambassador stressed that the U.S. will not intervene. Netanyahu is aware of the likely reaction to such an appointment and will make his own decision. The world will not come to an end if Lieberman is named. ¶11. (C) As for Olmert's claims about the PA's use of the $60 million, the Ambassador commented that this has become a kind of Israeli urban myth. Noting that he had discussed the issue several times with Olmert himself, the Ambassador said the Israelis do seem to feel they were deceived by Fayyad but we do not accept their version. The Secretary did intervene with Olmert. The part of the money Fayyad did not use to pay PA salaries was spent on reconstructing homes that were destroyed in Gaza. The Israeli version appears to be that only Hamas-owned homes were destroyed by the IDF, but this is not true and the PA is controlling to whom the housing assistance is delivered. The Secretary herself had corrected Olmert on this point. The Israeli conclusion was based on a false premise. ¶12. (C) UK Ambassador Phillips asked whether the Secretary had raised the opening of the Gaza crossings in her meetings. The Ambassador confirmed that she did, noting that we want more predictable arrangements. The Israelis now accept that approach in principle but not always in practice. Olmert had agreed there should be no blockage of the shipment of food into Gaza, which represents some progress. We are now focused on getting the GOI to broaden their approach to cover basic supplies such as paper. We are also working on getting in the supplies needed to furnish classrooms for the American TEL AVIV 00000601 003 OF 003 School. We have told the MOD that USAID could order all the supplies it needs for the school through the tunnels, but we would prefer to work through the appropriate Israeli channels. The Ambassador informed the EU ambassadors that MOD has established a new planning group for Gaza relief, leading us to think the GOI is moving in the right direction. He added that the GOI has made clear that it does not intend to open the crossings, which they see as their only leverage with Hamas to secure a prisoner exchange for the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. ¶13. (C) EU Representative Otte's assistant Sverdrup mentioned that during a visit to Gaza by Javier Solana, Solana had noted that there was no lack of scrap metal in Gaza and therefore no security justification for Israel to bar the import of scrap metal. Sverdrup said it would be best for Israel to provide a negative list of banned imports. The Ambassador agreed that a negative list would be preferable, noting that he had raised the idea with the GOI several weeks earlier. The GOI's position is that they are willing to consider relaxing restrictions on what they allow to enter Gaza and to approve specific reconstruction projects proposed by the PA. They will not agree to provide a negative list, however, because they believe this would reduce their leverage over Hamas. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM