CODEL CARDIN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OLMERT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000452 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR SY TU IS SUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OLMERT Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. CODEL Cardin called on Prime Minister Olmert at his Jerusalem office February 16. Olmert and the CODEL discussed the Gaza ceasefire negotiations, Turkey's role in the indirect negotiations with Syria, the Iranian nuclear threat, and Olmert's peace offer to Palestinian President Abbas. Regarding the Gaza negotiations, Olmert stressed that he will not agree to reopen the Gaza crossings without a deal to release the Israeli corporal held by Hamas. Olmert reviewed the history of Turkey's mediation of indirect negotiations with Syria, noting that President Asad had decided to halt the process. Olmert admitted that Turkish PM Erdogan had taken offense at Israel's decision to launch Operation Cast Lead only days later, but Olmert said relations with Turkey were very important and he was trying to "fix" them. He also hoped engagement with Syria would continue. Regarding Iran, Olmert said it was the most important challenge facing Israel. Olmert advised President Obama to be "cautious" in engaging Iran, which will play for time, and to coordinate any diplomatic approach with the Europeans. On the negotiations he conducted with President Abbas, Olmert expressed frustration that Abbas had walked away from what he termed "the best deal any Israeli PM ever offered." Olmert said that at his last meeting with Abbas in September, he had presented the text of an agreement that included Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines with one-to-one swaps of land; division of Jerusalem and a multi-national trusteeship for the Holy Basin; and the return to Israel of a limited number of refugees. According to Olmert, Abbas said he would think about it and never got back to him. Olmert commented that if Abbas would not accept this offer, why should a Prime Minister Netanyahu offer him anything? Referring to the CODEL's upcoming meeting with PA Prime Minister Fayyad, Olmert predicted that Fayyad would complain about a number of Israeli actions without acknowledging that they could have had an agreement that "would have changed everything." Olmert said that while Abbas was a "pleasant guy, not at all like Arafat," at the critical moment, Abbas "lacked guts." Olmert said Netanyahu would likely offer Abbas a new approach, but Abbas might tell Netanyahu to "go to hell." Olmert said that in the absence of a peace ;process, Israel should focus on improving Palestinian living standards and help the PA govern as much as possible. End Summary. Release of Shalit Olmert's Condition for Gaza Ceasefire Deal -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) CODEL Cardin, composed of Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD),Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI),Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS),Senator Tom Udall (D-NM),Representative Mike McIntyre (D-NC),and Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI),called on Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at his Jerusalem office February 16. Pol Couns (notetaker) joined the CODEL, while Olmert was accompanied by Foreign Policy Adviser Shalom Tourgeman, spokesman Mark Regev and MFA North America Congressional officer Yaron Sideman. Senator Cardin, noting Congressional support for Israel's actions in Gaza, asked Olmert to review the latest efforts through Egypt to negotiate a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. ¶3. (C) Olmert, noting that he had just returned from a visit to the Gaza border, said Israel's first priority must be to secure the release of Corporal Shalit, who has been held by Hamas in Gaza since June 2006. Olmert said Hamas demands the release of 450 "killers" in exchange for Shalit, adding that while he could not accept Hamas' list, he was ready to make a deal. Olmert said that while he realized that the U.S. had a different policy on exchanging prisoners with terrorist organizations, in Israel there was a long tradition of such arrangements as well as a moral commitment to soldiers and their families that every effort would be made to secure their release if they were captured or kidnapped. ¶4. (C) In addition to Shalit's release, Olmert described the other issues in the negotiations as stopping arms smuggling into Gaza, a total cessation of the firing of rockets at Israel, and opening the crossings. Asserting that "there is no humanitarian crisis in Gaza," Olmert said that opening the crossings was Hamas' primary demand. Olmert commented that he had informed Egyptian Intelligence Minister Omar Soliman that Hamas must first release Shalit before Israel will agree to open the crossings. Olmert said he realized that Hamas wanted the crossings to open so that they could import iron and concrete to rebuild their bunkers, but he would accept that if he could get Shalit out. Olmert noted that the Israeli security cabinet would review his position February 18 and he predicted that the cabinet would endorse it. Syria and Turkish Mediation TEL AVIV 00000452 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) Olmert said that when he decided to initiate contacts with Syria, he used Turkish PM Erdogan's good offices. Erdogan passed Olmert's messages to President Asad that conveyed Olmert's view that both parties understood what the other wanted, and therefore they should discuss it. Olmert noted that while Asad was considering how to respond, Israel learned that Syria was developing "nasty things," and "dealt with it." (Note: This was a characteristically vague Olmert reference to the Sept. 2007 Israeli bombing of a purported Syrian nuclear facility.) Olmert said despite that action, Asad decided to go ahead with proximity talks in Turkey, and Olmert's senior staffers held a number of sessions, with a Turkish representative carrying messages back and forth. Olmert said he met Erdogan on December 22 and was aware that Syrian Foreign Minister Muallim might join them, but at the last minute Asad refused to allow Muallim to attend. Olmert said that "according to media reports," Erdogan then spent four hours talking to Asad on the phone while Olmert sat in the next room, occasionally answering Asad's questions as conveyed by Erdogan. ¶6. (C) On December 27, Israel launched air strikes on Gaza, following several days in which Hamas fired 60-70 rockets a day into Israel. Olmert commented that Erdogan was "very offended" that Olmert had not warned him of Israel's plans to attack Gaza. Olmert said he sent Erdogan a message noting that he had not known when they met on December 22 that he was going to approve the military operation that began December 27, but that even if he had he would not have informed Erdogan because the Arabs would then have accused Turkey of approving Israel's military action. Olmert said he found it "interesting" that Erdogan charged Israel with genocide, since Turks are in no position to make that charge against others. Olmert then said he did not want a fight with Turkey, with which Israel enjoys a very important relationship, adding that he hoped the problems with Turkey could be "fixed." He also said he hoped Israel would continue to engage Syria. Iran the Most Important Issue -------------- ¶7. (C) At the beginning of the meeting, Senator Cardin said that Obama's policy on Iran had the same goal as President Bush's policy except that Obama would use diplomacy as well as economic pressure. Calling Iran Israel's most important policy issue, Olmert said he was pleased to learn that President Obama shared President Bush's goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The question was how to do so. Olmert said that Israel was opposed to negotiating with Iran, but added that he realized the President of the U.S. had to factor in broader concerns than Israel. Olmert advised that if Obama decides to negotiate with Iran, he should be aware that Iran will try to play for time. A better approach in Olmert's view would be to create a broad international coalition to increase the pressure on Iran. He also suggested the U.S. coordinate its efforts with the Europeans. In response to Representative Moore's question about the UN's role, Olmert noted President Ahmadinejad's speech to the UNGA last fall called for removing Israel from the map. Israel has a right to be suspicious, Olmert said, noting that all attempts so far to stop Iran's nuclear program had failed. Olmert concluded that we all need to recognize reality. He urged President Obama to "be careful" in approaching Iran. Best Offer Ever Made to the Palestinians -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the negotiations that he conducted with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Olmert said he offered Abbas a peace agreement that went beyond all previous Israeli offers. Abbas should have signed it on the spot, but "he ran away" instead. Outlining his offer, Olmert said it included Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, with one-to-one territorial swaps to compensate for the inclusion of settlement blocs in Israel; the division of Jerusalem, with Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and a five-nation international trusteeship, including Saudi Arabia and the U.S., over the Holy Basin; and the return to Israel of a "limited number" of refugees, adding that the Palestinians had accepted the number he proposed. Olmert said he offered Abbas a complete agreement, including maps and technical annexes, on September 16. Abbas said he would consider it and get back to Olmert, but that was the last time that Olmert saw Abbas. Noting that he expected Likud Party leader Bibi Netanyahu to become Israel next prime minister, Olmert said that if Abbas did not accept Olmert's offer, why should Netanyahu offer him more? TEL AVIV 00000452 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Asked by Senator Wicker what conclusions he reached from this experience, Olmert said he still felt that the Israeli prime minister who concludes a peace agreement with the Palestinians will stay in power a long time because the Israeli people will be grateful to have the conflict settled. Noting that the CODEL would next meet PA Prime Minister Fayyad, Olmert predicted that Fayyad would complain about many things Israel is doing. He said that while half of Fayyad's complaints might be true, if Abbas had signed the agreement it would have "changed the situation entirely," even if it took five years to implement. Olmert said his bottom line was that he had also been in a tough political situation, but he had decided to set aside political goals in order to reach his goals. Unfortunately, Abbas "lacked the guts" to do the same. Olmert speculated that Abbas may have been waiting to get a better deal from President Obama, but if so, that showed that Abbas did not understand how the U.S.-Israeli relationship works. ¶10. (C) Asked if there was a better option for the Palestinians, Olmert commented that Fayyad was a "good manager but not a politician." Abbas had been elected by sixty-two percent of the Palestinians, so he had the authority, but he did not exercise it. Olmert said, however, that Abbas was not like Arafat. Arafat was a killer, but Abbas is "a pleasant guy." They had spent many hours together in "wonderful talks," more time than any Israeli leader had spent with any Palestinian, but in the end, Abbas "was not there." Noting that he had been "set aside" as Israel's leader, Olmert declined to comment on what his advice for the next prime minister would be. Olmert said he did not want to embarrass Netanyahu. Bibi will offer his ideas to Abbas, Olmert said, but Abbas may tell him "to go to hell." ¶11. (C) Representative McIntyre asked what could be done in the West Bank in the meantime. Olmert said Israel and the U.S. should help the PA as much as possible. It is "good for Israel" if the Palestinian standard of living improves since "Israel is not fighting the Palestinian people." ¶12. (U) CODEL Cardin has cleared this cable. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM