ISRAEL DEFENDS DECEMBER 26 NABLUS RAID

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002830 SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KWBG KPAL IS SUBJECT: ISRAEL DEFENDS DECEMBER 26 NABLUS RAID REF: JERUSALEM 2317 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Following the murder of Rabbi Meir Avshalom Hai on December 24, senior MOD and IDF officials strongly expressed the GOI's obligation to protect its citizens in response to acts of terrorism -- as demonstrated by the December 26 Nablus raid which resulted in the deaths of three Palestinian suspects. These officials acknowledged that the IDF and Shin Bet had not fully coordinated its Nablus operation with Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF); the IDF is investigating internally why such coordination was lacking. However, IDF and MOD officials note that contact between the Israeli security services and the PASF has been constant since Rabbi Hai's murder; according to the IDF, Israeli security services and the PASF plan to meet later in the week to review the operation and try to find a way forward. Given the terrorists' apparent affiliation with Fatah, and the fact that at least one of them had recently been released from an Israeli prison and that another had been amnestied to the PA after agreeing to forgo violence, the GOI seems to have decided to conduct the Nablus operation urgently rather than give the PA the opportunity to deal with the terrorists and risk losing them. The GOI appears to recognize there is repair work to be done with the PA. We have urged them to do so and to preserve the gains made on security. But the murder of the Rabbi, the Israeli response and the PA reaction illustrate the sensitivities involved. These will become more salient should hundreds of convicted terrorists be released into the West Bank as part of a deal over Gilad Shalit's return. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) MOD Chief of Staff Yoni Koren called A/DCM December 26 to pass on that the GOI had received "solid intelligence" regarding the identities of five Palestinians suspects involved in the murder of Rabbi Meir Hai on December 24. He said the IDF and Shin Bet decided to conduct an arrest operation early December 26 in the Nablus casbah, which ended with the shooting deaths of three Palestinians. He stressed that this was not a targeted assassination, contrary to PA accusations. When A/DCM noted the deceased Palestinians' alleged affiliation to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AAMB), Koren stated that the Palestinians were members of Fatah. Koren said the IDF had been in contact with the PA regarding the operation (reftel),but acknowledged that coordination had "not gone well." ¶3. (C) Koren stressed, however, that PA security had "failed to control its own people." He said Rabbi Hai's murderers were not members of Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),so Israel had acted to maintain security for everyone -- Israelis and Palestinians alike -- in the Nablus area. Koren said the GOI was aware that PA PM Fayyad had complained to Washington, and commented that he believed the PA is embarrassed that Rabbi Hai's murderers were members of Fatah, including one reportedly a former Fatah security officer. MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad subsequently told the Ambassador that Israel reserves the right to protect Israeli lives -- when an Israeli is killed, the Israel security services will always respond. Gilad acknowledged the PA's anger at the raid, but added "they know what the situation is," despite attempts to involve the United States (to which he strongly objected). He said they were working to calm the situation through existing security channels. ¶4. (S) On December 28, DATT and emboff spoke with Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) Head of Production Division Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, who acknowledged that the IDF and Shin Bet had not fully coordinated their Nablus raid operational plan with the PASF. He noted that the IDF was conducting an internal investigation to determine why such coordination was lacking. BG Baidatz said that the IDF had received clear intelligence regarding Rabbi Hai's murderers, and had determined that a quick IDF operation into the Nablus casbah was imperative or they risked having the killers escape. He said that the IDF had been in constant contact with the PASF following Rabbi Hai's murder, and that such contact would continue -- including meetings planned later in the week between Israel security services and the PASF to review the operation and try to find a way forward. ¶5. (SBU) Israeli press extensively covered the IDF raid into Nablus. On December 27, Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth described the raid as "settling the score" for Rabbi Hai's murder, and noted that the three killed Palestinians were AAMB and/or Fatah Tanzim members. Yedioth's well-connected military analyst Alex Fishman argued December 27 that the IDF operation sent multiple signals, first to Jewish settlers in the West Bank that the IDF is "on their side," and that TEL AVIV 00002830 002 OF 002 terrorists will be dealt with "swiftly and firmly." To the PA, the IDF raid made clear that while a comprehensive investigation had been initiated and arrests made, such action was not sufficient -- the IDF was not willing to wait. Finally, Fishman stated that the IDF raid made clear the price to be paid for a return to violence by any prospective Palestinian prisoners to be released as part of a Gilad Shalit exchange. ¶6. (SBU) Fishman noted, however, that the IDF operation may ultimately undermine PA authority in Nablus. Yedioth acknowledged PA outrage over the attack, as well as a request for clarification from the White House made to the PM's Office regarding the raid. Israeli media sources quoted IDF senior officials as saying that the PA had taken "impressive action" in the aftermath of Rabbi Hai's murder. ¶7. (SBU) During the December 27 Cabinet meeting, PM Netanyahu commended Shin Bet and the IDF for the quick operation in response to Rabbi Hai's murder. PM Netanyahu said the GOI's policy against terrorism is clear: an aggressive response against any attack on Israeli citizens and against any firing of rockets or missiles at Israeli territory. ¶8. (SBU) The IDF issued a statement on December 26 that it will "act firmly against those who aspire to harm" Israeli citizens, acknowledging the deaths of three Palestinians during the Nablus raid. A December 27 brief by the IDF's Military Strategic Information Section noted that the three Palestinians were "armed and dangerous," and killed after refusing calls to turn themselves in. The brief stated that an IDF ballistics investigation confirmed that weapons seized during the raid were used to murder Rabbi Hai. ¶9. (SBU) The IDF brief also noted Israel has taken "considerable security risks" by removing checkpoints in the West Bank, which the IDF believes might have prevented Rabbi Hai's murder. (Note: Oded Herman of the MOD's Political-Military Bureau told EconCouns December 29 that the IDF had inserted a "flying roadblock" near Beit Iba following Rabbi Hai's murder.) The brief stated that the joint IDF/Shin Bet operation "intended to complement Palestinian Security Forces, which still fall short in contending with terrorism." In that vein, the IDF will not "relinquish its basic rights to defend its citizens and its forces will continue to act determinedly to fulfill their mission -- defending the Israeli civilians and security forces from those who seek to cause harm." CUNNINGHAM