AMBASSADOR RICE,S OCTOBER 20 MEETING WITH ISRAELI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002375 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2029 TAGS: PREL PHUM KPAL IS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE,S OCTOBER 20 MEETING WITH ISRAELI PRESIDENT PERES Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham; reasons 1 .4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: During U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Rice,s October 20th meeting with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Peres said he planned to meet with Abu Mazen early the week of Oct. 26. He said Israel should fully investigate the actions of its soldiers, as well as the spurious claims of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel would not create needless difficulties, but as a member of the United Nations felt bound to defend the UN Charter, since it guarantees Israel's right to exist and to defend itself. He said Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority leadership faced serious problems -- some self-inflicted and others inadvertently caused by Israel. He called for immediate moves to establish provisional borders and authorities and commencement of serious negotiations on all disputed territory not included in the provisional allotment. Peres cautioned, however, that the status of Jerusalem needed to be handled in a separate, parallel track. Ambassador Rice outlined USG efforts to manage fallout from the Goldstone Report on Israeli military actions in Gaza, and encouraged Peres to ensure that Israel did not allow itself to be pushed into counterproductive actions out of anger in response to the Report. She urged a full investigation in keeping with Israel,s democratic values, and Peres agreed there should be a full investigation. Ambassador Rice also explored Peres, views on the current difficulties of the Palestinian leadership and how best to move toward resolving the final status of co-existent Israeli and a Palestinian states. End Summary. ¶2. (C) U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice met with Israeli President Shimon Peres on October 20 just prior to the opening of the annual President's Conference in Jerusalem. President Peres kicked off the meeting by expressing his personal appreciation, and that of his country, for USG efforts to manage fallout from the Goldstone Report on Israeli military actions in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. He also asked Ambassador Rice to express his personal gratitude to President Obama for the latter's commitment to pursuing a Middle East peace process under "extremely difficult conditions." Pres. Peres said also that he had spoken with Abu Mazen and planned to meet with him the week of Oct. 26 to give impetus to the peace process. (Comment: While he was clear in stating this intent, none of Ambassador Rice's other interlocutors in the GoI evinced any knowledge of this plan. In addition, Peres' staff indicated that the meeting may be more aspiration than Peres suggested. End comment.) End comment. ¶3. (U) Ambassador Rice thanked President Peres for his kind remarks, and for his leadership and vision. She underscored President Obama's personal commitment to comprehensive regional peace, including two states -- Israeli and Palestinian -- living side-by-side. Turning to the Conference itself, Ambassador Rice thanked President Peres for giving her the opportunity to speak on behalf of the United States government. ¶4. (C) President Peres offered his thoughts on managing negotiation of a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He said it was important that no one be in a hurry to resolve all final status issues, and suggested that the status of Jerusalem should be dealt with separately, but in parallel, with negotiations on the status of the West Bank. Peres said he recognized that this approach faced resistance from the Palestinian leadership, who put Jerusalem at the top of their list of issues to be resolved. With regard to the West Bank, Peres said Israel had in mind an immediate handover of Areas A and B, and additional land from Area C "if needed for industrial parks." This territory would result in provisional boundaries with additional border adjustments to be negotiated until agreed final borders had been achieved. He also offered that the GOI was looking at interim measures to make the Palestinian Authority appear to have more control of Gaza until such time as the PA could actually exert such control. Other measures under consideration, according to President Peres, included refurbishment of the French hospital in Gaza, continued relaxation of restrictions on movement and access in the West Bank, and support for USG efforts to expand the capacity and capability of the Palestinian security forces. ¶5. (C) Peres said that while he and Prime Minister Netanyahu came from different political streams, the Prime Minister fully shared Peres' desire for peace and understood that time was running out. He added that on issues that could be resolved quietly, Prime Minister Netanyahu was ready and TEL AVIV 00002375 002 OF 002 willing to move quickly. While noting that the current atmosphere of crisis creates misinterpretation, Peres said President Obama has been fair in his dealings with both Israel and the Palestinians, and for that, Israel should be thankful. In response, Israel "can move, should move, and will move." ¶6. (C) Replying to Ambassador Rice's question about how he saw PA President Abbas' current circumstances, Peres characterized Abbas as being in a very poor situation. Peres said the Palestinian leader had lost the prestige and momentum he had enjoyed in the wake of the August Fatah Party Congress. The Israeli release of 20 female Hamas prisoners in exchange for a video of Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit, the mishandling of the Goldstone report by both the PA and the Israeli mission in Geneva (who leaked the PA decision to withdraw its resolution before the HRC),and Abu Mazen's unrealistic expectations for the meeting in New York with PM Netanyahu and President Obama had all combined to seriously undermine his leadership. Peres said his advice to Abu Mazen would be that he cannot improve his position by competing with Hamas on its own terms; rather, he should force Hamas to compete on his terms, negotiating and pointing to the PA's sustained economic and security reform successes in the West Bank. ¶7. (C) Returning to the Goldstone Report, Peres noted that Israel was a member of the United Nations. Hamas' actions and calls for Israel's annihilation are contrary to the UN Charter. The same holds true for Iran, yet there is no accountability for these statements and actions because the built-in anti-Israel majority in the UN and the Human Rights Council prevents it. Peres contended that the existing international agreements aimed at conventional arms and nation-state aggression needed to be updated by an international code addressing terrorism. International calls to sanction Israel for protecting its children from 12,000 rocket and mortar attacks over eight years, while ignoring Hamas actions that endangered Palestinian children in Gaza, show how inadequate and biased the current international system has become. Peres said Israel's military officers should be held accountable, but not by people like Goldstone, Qadhafi or Ahmedinejad. He opined that Goldstone lost credibility even before his report had been done, simply by not refusing the job when he saw the mandate for the report and the composition of the committee with whom he would be working. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that the USG had been very clear in its views on the flaws of the mandate, as well as on the unacceptability of the report's conclusions and recommendations. She said the U.S. had worked hard in Geneva to address the report in a responsible fashion, and now the report,s proponents would try to move the action to New York. Prior to Goldstone, Rice said, we had sensed some relaxation of the reflexive hostility in the General Assembly and were hoping to moderate some of the most offensive resolutions. She urged the Israeli government to not give the General Assembly any measure of legitimacy by looking as though we care too much about what it does. We will manage it by not giving it too much importance and she urged Israel to do the same. ¶9. (C) Rice said the Security Council was different and has to be taken more seriously since its actions can have the force of law. She underscored USG commitment not to allow the issue to move from the Security Council to the International Criminal Court. The Ambassador said that while Israel finds the Report offensive and abhorrent, the USG will continue to manage it in a responsible way, consistent with our interests and added that it will be important not to allow anti-Israel moves to prompt Israel to do anything shortsighted out of anger. Ambassador Rice urged the Israeli government to fully investigate the allegations under its own democratic procedures and consistent with its history and values. President Peres took the point, and repeated his view that Somalia, Yemen, and Iran could not be allowed to teach human rights to the rest of the world. He said he was especially disappointed in the Russians, and wondered how they might have reacted if the report had been done with reference to Chechnya. He said Israel would not create difficulties for the sake of creating difficulties. However, in his view, UN members needed to defend the UN Charter. In any event, said Peres, we will have a full investigation of IDF actions in Gaza. CUNNINGHAM