ISRAELI THINKING ON LEBANON ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000206 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER LE SY IR IS SUBJECT: ISRAELI THINKING ON LEBANON ISSUES Classified By: A/Political Counselor Peter H. Vrooman. Reason 1.4 (B/D ) ¶1. (C) Summary: From January 1-10, Poloff and visiting NEA Lebanon desk officer Matthew Irwin discussed Lebanon in meetings with Israeli MFA, MOD, and NSC officials, as well as local academics and journalists. Overall the meetings confirmed that Israel shares the goal of supporting Lebanese moderates and undermining Hizballah, but remains skeptical that strengthening institutions like the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and diplomatically engaging the Lebanese government would arrest Hizballah's ascent. Israeli officials emphasized their seriousness in resolving northern Ghajar and their desire to see the Lebanese government, not Hizballah, credited with a deal. Irwin emphasized that such a deal would have little utility if not completed before Lebanon's parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 2009. While the visit took place during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, officials assessed that Hizballah would be deterred from opening a second front but cautioned that Hizballah remained intent on attacking Israeli interests, perhaps overseas. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Shared goals on Lebanon, but continued skepticism -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During the discussions, Israeli officials agreed on the need to empower Lebanese moderates and undermine militants, but remained skeptical that moderates and government institutions like the LAF could stem the rising influence of Hizballah and its Syrian and Iranian backers in Lebanon. Officials also worried that Hizballah could consolidate control over Lebanese institutions via an electoral victory in June, turning Lebanon into a Syria-like "resistance state." ¶3. (C) However, officials seemed to have accepted the suggestion offered by NEA PDAS Jeffrey Feltman during his September 2008 visit that Israel pursue a do-no-harm policy in Lebanon. MFA Syria and Lebanon Director Eynat Shlein-Michael said Israel would keep a low profile in the lead-up to Lebanon's parliamentary elections on June 7. "There's not much we can do to empower the moderates, but we're coming to understand that we can very easily undermine them and inadvertently strengthen Hizballah." Shlein-Michael said the MFA had cautioned Kadima and Labor Party members including FM Tzipi Livni and DM Ehud Barak against hawkish rhetoric toward Lebanon in advance of Israel's February 10 elections, but acknowledged this advice could be trumped by electoral considerations. She also criticized Israel's July 17, 2008 prisoner swap with Hizballah as domestically expedient but harmful to Israel's long-term security. (Comment: This marks a positive shift in Israeli thinking since PDAS Feltman's visit in September, when several officials told Feltman that that "nothing Israel does or doesn't do can affect the situation in Lebanon." End Comment.) -------------- Ghajar -------------- ¶4. (C) MFA officials reiterated the decision by PM Ehud Olmert and FM Livni to resolve the northern Ghajar issue, indicated their satisfaction with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael William's mediation efforts, and agreed that a diplomatic solution would not only remove an irritant with Hizballah but potentially allow Lebanese moderates to argue for further engagement with Israel. Gilad Cohen, advisor to MFA DG Aaron Abramovich, said that a handover of northern Ghajar would take time. "It won't be done before our elections, and a new team will take several months to get situated before they're ready to move." Irwin noted that a Ghajar deal would lose much of its utility if not accomplished before the Lebanese elections in June 2009. Cohen agreed to raise the timing with DG Aaron Abramovich and pointed out that Israel had asked Williams to return on January 11 despite his offer to postpone in light of the Gaza crisis, indicating Israel's seriousness in pursuing a deal. ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting, Director for UN and International Organizations Political Affairs David Siegal noted that DG Abramovich had appointed DDG for International Organizations Eviatar Manor as coordinator of the government's Ghajar working group, which included officials from the Defense, Interior, and Justice Ministries. "The group has been told to find a way to keep Ghajar out of the Israeli Supreme Court, so we're trying to make this as easy as possible on the residents, who are vehemently opposed to re-dividing the village and almost as opposed to relocating TEL AVIV 00000206 002 OF 003 south of the Blue Line. We need to strike a delicate balance between Lebanese sovereignty and their rights as Israeli citizens to government services and legal due process." Siegal assessed that Israel's handling of northern Ghajar would be viewed as a precedent for an eventual handover of the Golan Heights or West Bank. ¶6. (C) Irwin emphasized to Cohen and Siegal that two of Israel's conditions for a deal on northern Ghajar outlined to NEA DAS David Hale during his December 2008 visit (international acknowledgment of renewed Israeli compliance with the Blue Line and assurances that Israel would be "consulted" prior to a handover of northern Ghajar from UNIFIL to the LAF) were incumbent upon the UN, not Lebanon. Irwin reiterated that it would be political suicide for a Lebanese leader to agree to an explicit Israeli veto over access to his own territory. All agreed that the third condition (preventing Hizballah from taking credit and a Lebanese government commitment to broader talks after a Ghajar deal) would require creative diplomacy by Williams. Siegal was skeptical that Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora would be able to outmaneuver Hizballah and portray a deal as validating diplomacy rather than resistance. Irwin cited Hizballah's public mockery of the Lebanese government's indirect discussions with Israel as a sign that diplomacy worried Hizballah. -------------- UNSCR 1701 loose ends -------------- ¶7. (C) Cohen indicated that Israeli over-flights of Lebanese territory were not necessarily intended to bolster Israel's argument to the UN and international community that Hizballah was rearming with impunity, but were needed to build a target list for future military operations. Cohen also noted that while critical of UNIFIL, Israel was "still glad they're there." Cohen noted that DAS Hale's proposal to resolve the Sheba'a farms dispute in principle without delving into cartographic details had raised concerns. Cohen also asked that that all future references to Sheba'a come in the context of "full implementation of UNSCR 1701" and requested U.S. support to have this language inserted in upcoming UN reports. -------------- Israeli deterrence largely intact -------------- ¶8. (C) Even in the wake rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel during Operation Cast Lead, MOD and MFA officials assessed that Hizballah would avoid attributable cross-border attacks due to uncertainty over Israel's response and a desire to avoid jeopardizing potential electoral gains. Officials differed on recommended responses to Hizballah's aiding or abetting further attacks by Lebanon-based Palestinian militants. NSC Syria and Lebanon Director Aiman Mansour reported he had recommended targeting Palestinian militant bases along the Lebanon-Syria border, while Uri Lubrani, senior advisor to DM Barak, advocated no response. "Hizballah can't afford not to retaliate for an Israeli attack on Lebanese soil." MFA and NSC officials also noted Israel's heightened security posture in advance of the February 12 anniversary of Imad Mughniya's assassination and agreed that Hizballah would likely be compelled to act should Hamas face a catastrophic defeat in Gaza. ¶9. (C) Mansour also cited unspecified Israeli intelligence indicating Syria might take advantage of Israel's distraction with Gaza to transfer to Hizballah long-range rockets and radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles that Israel had identified as red lines in backchannel messages to Damascus via the French. "We're planning to pass another warning, but if we detect a shipment, we'll hit it, probably inside Lebanon." Mansour added that "the Syrians have been hit so many times that we fear a significant response if we hit them again." -------------- Hizballah in regional context -------------- ¶10. (C) Lubrani noted that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah had "crossed a line" with his public castigation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. "The diplomatic chill will deepen, but there's not much else the Egyptians can do unless they want to put out a contract on Nasrallah." Sharon Bar-Li, Director of the Syria and Lebanon Division at the MFA's Center for Political Research (INR equivalent),said Egypt hoped to diminish Nasrallah's regional stature, noting he had already moderated his rhetoric after failing to incite TEL AVIV 00000206 003 OF 003 Egyptians and West Bank Palestinians to revolt against their quiescent leadership. "He's gambled his prestige on a Hamas victory, and he might lose." ¶11. (C) Mansour assessed that neither Hizballah nor Iran had taken Israel's now-suspended negotiations with Syria seriously. "Hizballah won't accept a Syrian-Israeli deal and has numerous spoiler options, including attacks inside Syria." Shlein-Michael lamented that the talks had facilitated Syria's cost-free rapprochement with Europe at the expense of Lebanese moderates, but called their paranoia of a Syrian-Israeli deal at Lebanon's expense "irrational." ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM