GAZA SITUATION REPORT, JANUARY 5, 16:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000015 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019 TAGS: KWBG MOPS PREL PTER PINR EAID ASEC IS SUBJECT: GAZA SITUATION REPORT, JANUARY 5, 16:00 REF: A. JANUARY 5 KAPLAN E-MAIL ¶B. JANUARY 4 REIDHEAD E-MAIL SITREP ¶C. JANUARY 4 KAPLAN E-MAIL ¶D. TEL AVIV 0005 ¶E. 08 TEL AVIV 2930 ¶F. 08 TEL AVIV 2922 ¶G. 08 TEL AVIV 2906 Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary: IDF ground operations continued January 5 with heavy artillery fire and troop advances on Gaza City. After bisecting the Gaza Strip, IDF ground forces are methodically closing in on Gaza City. IDF leadership describes a "root canal" ground operation aimed at preventing rocket fire, seeking and destroying ammunition storage sites and Hamas combatants, and apprehending terrorists for further interrogation. IDF forces continue to hold ground in northern Gaza used earlier as rocket launching grounds. The number of rocket attacks has decreased, although 28 rockets were fired at Israel as of 1600 local. "Tens of thousands" of reservists were called up January 4 and 5, according to press reports, which indicated that some are intended to reinforce the northern border while others are being held in reserve for any expansion of operations in Gaza. PM Olmert made a number of phone calls to international leaders in the effort to convince the international community that Israel is making efforts to assist the population of Gaza as much as possible. Israeli press widely covers French President Sarkozy's anticipated arrival in Israel during the evening of January 5. The GOI continues to restrict media access to Gaza; while the MFA said it would allow a few foreign journalists to enter Gaza January 5, no foreign journalists in fact entered Gaza. On January 4, the GOI announced the establishment of a humanitarian coordination cell within the MOD. IDF sources confirmed that 49 out of 80 planned trucks of humanitarian supplies crossed into Gaza on January 5. IDF sources reported that approximately 200,000 liters of diesel fuel were transferred through the Nahal Oz fuel depot, but the Gaza power station contractor refused to pick up the delivery. Local embassies were planning to evacuate an additional 198 foreign nationals on January 5; no U.S. citizens were evacuated. However, the Canadian Embassy informed us that 18 Canadians and 16 other third country nationals were unable to leave Gaza via bus due to IDF-implemented road obstacles north of Gaza City. Continued call ups of local guards for reserve duty could affect Embassy Tel Aviv's security operations. End summary. Military Operations -------------- ¶2. (S) As of 1230 local, DAO members on the border with Gaza reported heavy artillery fire throughout the Northern Gaza Strip (from southern Gaza City to the northern border),which has been on-going throughout the morning. Apache and Cobra helicopter gunships provided tactical support for on-going troop advances toward and around Gaza City. DAO observers reported at 1400 local that there were no signs of ground operations along the border south of Karni. According to DAO, military police continued to deny foreign journalists access to the exclusive military zone surrounding Gaza, but did allow DAO personnel and other diplomats past checkpoints to areas near the Sufa crossing. ¶3. (SBU) According to Israeli media outlets, the security establishment has set three main goals for the described "root canal" ground operation to destroy terror infrastructure in Gaza: 1) prevent further rocket launches; 2) seek and destroy ammunition storage sites and Hamas operatives; and 3) apprehend if possible those involved in terrorism for further interrogation. After bisecting the Gaza Strip, IDF troops have surrounded Gaza City, and are now cautiously and methodically closing in. IDF ground forces lay to the north, south, and east of the city, with Israeli naval vessels deployed off-shore to the west. IDF ground forces deployed from the Karni crossing to the Mediterranean have cut off Gaza City from potential Hamas reinforcements and supplies from the south. ¶4. (SBU) IDF forces continue to hold ground in the northern towns of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya; ministers were briefed during the January 4 cabinet meeting that 73 percent of all rockets fired at Israel during the last week were launched from these areas seized by IDF forces. The number of rocket attacks has decreased as a result, although approximately 28 rockets as of 1600 local have thus far been fired at Israel on January 5, including at least 4 long-range grads. No Israeli casualties were reported as a result of these strikes as of 1600 local. The Israel Air Force (IAF) struck over 30 targets during the evening of January 4, including tunnels, TEL AVIV 00000015 002 OF 004 homes of Hamas operatives, and ammunition and rocket stores. Following the death of an IDF soldier on January 4, there have now been five Israeli fatalities -- two soldiers and three civilians -- since Operation Cast Lead began. According to Reuters and AFP, over 530 Palestinians have been killed since the operation began. Approximately 50 IDF soldiers have been wounded as a result of the ground combat operation. ¶5. (SBU) Israeli press outlets speculate that Hamas is attempting to draw IDF forces into dense urban areas in order to maximize IDF casualties or attempt soldier kidnappings. Several press outlets report comments from "security sources" cliaming that the IDF has internalized the lessons learned from the 2006 war in Lebanon: for example, by maneuvering constantly around the combat zone in order to prevent creating stationary targets for Hamas -- as well as opportunities to kidnap IDF soldiers. ¶6. (SBU) The press reported an attempted kidnapping by Hamas of an IDF soldier on January 4. According to the press, the IDF soldier from the Golani infantry brigade had been cut off from his unit, and engaged in a firefight with Hamas operatives who attempted to pull him into a tunnel. The soldier was apparently able to escape following the arrival of helicopter air support. In response to the intense media coverage -- both local and international -- of the alleged kidnapping of two IDF soldiers, the IDF spokesperson stated the IDF will not respond to false Hamas-generated rumors, and would report in the future any factual kidnappings to the public in an appropriate manner. Northern Border -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) DAO reports Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) concerns regarding possible action by Hizballah, Iran, or Global Jihad organizations, particularly with the one-year anniversary of Imad Mughniyah's death on February 12. On-going IDI and Israel Naval Intelligence analysis strongly indicates a possible maritime attack scenario within the region or abroad. The current IDI assessment is that Hizballah may act now, as Hizballah may see Israel as less likely to be drawn into additional fighting over a one-time Hizballah terrorist response due to on-going IDF operations in Gaza. ¶8. (SBU) The Israeli press covered January 4 comments made by Director of Military Intelligence Major General Amos Yadlin suggesting Hizballah may open a second front against Israel in the north. The IDF called up "tens of thousands" of reservists on January 4, which could be used against potential attacks in the north and the West Bank. Israeli media outlet YNET picked up Syrian newspaper al-Watan's coverage of significantly increased Lebanese and UNFIL patrols in southern Lebanon. Political and Diplomatic Developments -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The regular Sunday cabinet meeting was moved to Tel Aviv on January 4 as is customary in times of major military operations. The cabinet discussed the continued fighting in the south and in addition to hearing a statement from PM Olmert (ref B),was briefed by Defense Minister Barak, Foreign Minister Livni, IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ashkenazi, as well as by senior intelligence chiefs. Livni briefed ministers on the various diplomatic issues related to the operation in the south. Education Minister Tamir discussed school cancellations in the south during the emergency. Shin Bet Director Diskin suggested Hamas was "at a breaking point," and was searching for a formula which would provide an exit point without causing the organization further humiliation. ¶10. (SBU) The Israeli press widely reports on the impending arrival of French President Nicholas Sarkozy during the evening of January 5. Sarkozy will meet with Olmert, Livni, and President Peres during the visit. Olmert spoke to Sarkozy on the phone in advance of the visit, assuring Sarkozy that Israel is making efforts to assist the population in Gaza as much as possible, and in this context, is transferring "considerable humanitarian aid." Israeli media outlets note Sarkozy's comments to three Lebanese newspapers that Hamas "bears heavy responsibility" for the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. The Israeli press also widely covered criticism by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who reportedly accused Israel of conducting "inhuman acts" in Gaza which would cause Israel to "destroy itself." ¶11. (SBU) According to press, Olmert also spoke by phone with TEL AVIV 00000015 003 OF 004 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on January 4, telling him that Israel will be unable to halt its military operation until the goals that it has set are accomplished. Olmert reportedly said this could be carried out by military means or by those diplomatic measures that must be formulated by the international community. Olmert said Israel has done much to allow the passage of equipment that will prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and added that IDF forces have been instructed to refrain from attacking innocents. The press reported Medvedev as stating no country could tolerate terrorism against its citizens and added that ways to conclude the operation and achieve a stable quite must be considered. ¶12. (SBU) Olmert and Barak met with Quartet envoy to the Middle East Tony Blair on January 4. Olmert reportedly repeated Israeli military goals to Blair, but also said that Israel does not rule out diplomatic activity by the international community which could bring about a situation in which the rocket fire at Israeli communities ceases and Hamas no longer constitutes a threat to southern Israel. On January 4, Livni met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov; according to the press, Livni rejected a Russian initiative to mediate between Israel and Hamas. FM Livni met January 5 with the EU Troika. ¶13. (SBU) Defense Minister Barak briefed the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on January 5. According to press, Barak said the IDF had struck Hamas a "a very heavy blow," and expressed certainty that Israel would end the operation in Gaza with "the upper hand." However, Barak said the GOI had yet to achieve its objectives and therefore would continue the operation. Echoing a note struck repeatedly by Olmert in his phone conversations with international leaders, Barak noted that Israel was engaged in diplomatic dialogue with international officials regarding the operation. Elections -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Minister for Pensioners' Affairs Rafi Eitan proposed January 4 that the Israeli general elections scheduled for February 10 be postponed by six weeks; senior officials in Kadima, the Labor Party and Likud continue to oppose any postponement. According to a poll taken by the Panels Polling Institute, a small majority (49 percent of 1,045 polled) oppose delaying the elections. Forty percent favor postponing the elections, while 11 percent were uncertain. Media Access -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The GOI continues to control media access to Gaza. Foreign journalists have been barred from entering Gaza since November 4, despite a December 31 High Court ruling that they be allowed in. Journalists on the Gaza border also have been pushed back as the IDF has steadily expanded the closed military zone surrounding Gaza. Most are now covering the conflict from vantage points northeast of Gaza around Nir Am and Sderot. On January 3, the IDF also confiscated the personal cell phones of soldiers involved in the ground campaign. MFA Deputy Director General for Economic Affairs Irit Ben Abba told EconCouns that a small number of foreign correspondents would be allowed into Gaza January 5. However the IDF's Office for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) confirmed late in the day that none of the journalists had entered Gaza. Humanitarian Assistance -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Per ref C, MFA DDG Ben Abba and MFA Deputy Director for International Organizations Eviator Manor briefed on January 4 representatives from UN agencies, the ICRC, the EU, the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR),as well as USAID and PRM. According to Ben Abba and Manor, a humanitarian coordination cell has been established in the Israeli MOD to improve the GOI's humanitarian response capacity by catering to the humanitarian needs identified by international organizations. The cell will allow rapid coordination between the MOD, MFA, and COGAT. For now, international organization representatives are not being invited to join the cell, although the MFA would like to meet twice weekly with the UN and other aid agencies. ¶17. (SBU) On January 5, COGAT confirmed the crossing of 49 truckloads of medical supplies, medication, and food commodities from Greece, Jordan and Egypt through Kerem Shalom into Gaza. According to COGAT sources, the fact that 49 truckloads made it through the crossing was "a miracle." TEL AVIV 00000015 004 OF 004 This included 18 truckloads of wheat flour for UNRWA. COGAT also confirmed that 196,400 liters of diesel were shipped through the Nahal Oz fuel depot. However, COGAT sources say the Gaza power contractor did not pick up the diesel. According to COGAT, UNRWA volunteered to have their contractor make the delivery but the UNRWA contractor was threatened by the power company and dissuaded from delivering the fuel. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates the minimum basic food needs in Gaza at 1,219 metric tons per day, or approximately 40-45 truckloads of food alone per day. ¶18. (C) A total of 198 foreign nationals were expected to be evacuated through Erez during the day. However, the Canadian embassy informed us that a busload of 18 Canadian citizens and 16 other third country nationals was unable to make it to Erez due to IDF-implemented road obstacles. The Canadian sent an armored bus from Erez to the site of the obstacles with the hope of picking up the Canadian citizens, but artillery shelling was too intense and the bus had to turn back to Erez. ¶19. (S) Israeli officials maintain that Hamas combatants are using religious and medical facilities as cover for their operations, believing the IDF will be reluctant to strike mosques, hospitals and humanitarian operations. During a January 4 meeting with UN and other aid agencies, including USAID and PRM, senior MFA officials asked for help evicting Hamas militants from Gaza's main hospital, Shifa. According to an unnamed defense officials quoted in the Jerusalem Post on January 5, "Hamas operatives are in (Shifa) hospital and have disguised themselves as nurses and doctors." DAO reports growing concern among IDF officers at what they see as Hamas' effort to reconstitute certain command and control capabilities at Shifa Hospital. Embassy Local Guards Being Called-Up -------------- ¶20. (S) Embassy Tel Aviv RSO reports 15 local guards have been called up for IDF reserve duty. RSO estimates embassy security operations will not be affected as long as the number of local guards called up for reserve duty does not exceed 20. RSO plans to petition the MFA via letter for a special exception to further call ups. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy el Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************* CUNNINGHAM