LIBERMAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND MINSK PART OF GOI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001340

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MASS RU IR IS
SUBJECT: LIBERMAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND MINSK PART OF GOI
EFFORT TO EXPAND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

REF: MOSCOW 1488

Classified By: Political Counselor Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (S) Summary. The MFA's readout on Foreign Minister
Liberman's June 2-3 visit to Moscow closely tracked with
Embassy Moscow reftel, but with some interesting differences
of nuance: the Israelis stated that Liberman's outreach to
the Russians represents a new foreign policy priority for
Israel, but is not intended to supplant the centrality of
strategic ties to the U.S. Gaining Israeli support for the
Moscow Middle East peace conference was high on the Russian
agenda, but Liberman demurred and suggested the Russians
settle the agenda with the U.S. during President Obama's
visit. MFA Director for Eurasia Koren, who accompanied
Liberman, stressed Israeli concern that Russia still plans to
go ahead with the delivery of S-300 air to ground missiles to
Iran, and asked that the President raise this issue with the
Russians. Koren was visibly embarrassed about Liberman's
statement that Israel has no plans to attack Iran, since this
is out of synch with repeated warnings by PM Netanyahu and
Def Min Barak that Israel is keeping "all options on the
table." Russian Ambassador Stegniy told the Ambassador June
18 that PM Netanyahu had phoned PM Putin June 17 to discuss
Netanyahu's diplomatic speech as well as Iran. Putin
reportedly cautioned Netanyahu that Russia remains completely
opposed to military action or even threats of military action
against Iran. Despite differences over Iran, Israeli-Russian
relations are developing rapidly. Liberman was only one of
five Israeli cabinet ministers to visit Moscow since the
Netanyahu government was formed in March, and Putin
reportedly told Liberman that he would like to see
Israeli-Russian trade triple within a year. The Israelis are
also pleased by Russian assurances that Russia is committed
to the security and well-being of the Israeli people, a
message that the Israelis think may have some impact on
Iranian and Syrian thinking. Liberman reportedly asked Putin
to tell the Iranians that he condemns the denial of the
Holocaust. On Belarus, Koren said the Israelis have no
illusions about the Lukashenko regime but they nonetheless
intend to remain engaged without getting too much out ahead
of the U.S. and EU. End Summary.

Liberman Prioritizing Relations with Russia
--------------


2. (C) MFA Director for Eurasia Gary Koren, a
Russian-speaker who accompanied Foreign Minister Avigdor
Liberman on his June 2-3 working visit to Moscow, provided
PolCouns with a readout June 16. Commenting on a report in
the New York Times, Koren stressed that while Liberman wants
to raise the profile of Israeli-Russian relations and
attaches a very high priority to their development, no one in
the GOI is seeking to have Russia replace the U.S. as
Israel's primary strategic partner. There is no substitute
for Israel's relations with the U.S. Koren said, adding that
the Russians made no reference to recent tensions in
Israeli-U.S. relations during Liberman's discussions with
Medvedev, Putin and Lavrov.


3. (C) Koren commented that the Russians received Liberman
well, treating him like a "local boy who had done well" who
had come home for a visit. Liberman previously visited
Russia in 2007 when he was Minister for Strategic Threats in
the Olmert government, but this was his first visit as
Foreign Minister. According to Koren, although the Russians
provided an official Hebrew interpreter, they were delighted
that Liberman chose to conduct all of his meetings in
Russian.

Moscow Middle East Conference
--------------


4. (C) Koren said gaining Israeli support for a Moscow
Middle East peace conference was the Russians' top goal for
the visit. When the Russians raised the conference idea in
2008, then-Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni
did not reject it, but were nevertheless skeptical.
Liberman's response to the Russians was somewhat more
positive, indicating GOI support for the conference in
principle, but he reiterated Israeli questions about the
agenda and participants. Liberman also suggested that the
Russians should engage President Obama on this during his
July 6 visit to Moscow. Koren noted that MFA DDG for
International Organizations Manor had consulted with the
Russian UN mission during a visit to New York this week, and
got the impression that the Russians feel that the U.S. is
now generally supportive of the Moscow conference.


5. (C) Lavrov told Liberman that the Russians are thinking
in terms of "Annapolis plus," with the goal of producing

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specific results. The basis would be similar to the Arab
Peace Initiative, minus the Palestinian refugee issue. Koren
noted that Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has already
indicated that Egypt is opposed to a conference if it will be
"only a photo op." Koren commented that the GOI was pleased
with the Russian statement on Netanyahu's Bar Ilan address,
though it noted the negative Arab reaction. Liberman thanked
Lavrov for Russia's "positive role" as Security Council
President in May, during which there were no "troublesome"
resolutions or presidential statements.

Arms Sales to PA, Georgia, Iran
--------------


6. (S) Koren said Liberman had conveyed the Israeli MOD's
approval of a package of Russian arms transfers to the
Palestinian Authority, though with some restrictions. The
GOI approved the transfer of twenty-five out of fifty
requested BRT 70 APCs, and without the mounted light machine
guns that the PA had wanted; 3,000 Kalashnikov rifles and
ammunition; and two helicopters which will be based in Amman
and for which the Israelis have agreed to provide an air
corridor to Ramallah.


7. (S) As reported by Embassy Moscow, Koren said the
Russians raised Israel's role in the resupply of arms for
Georgia, Koren said Liberman stressed that Israel would only
provide "defensive arms" to Georgia. Koren added that the
GOI views the supply of arms to Georgia as a potential form
of leverage over Russian arms sales to Iran and Syria. He
did not mention reports of Israeli plans to sell UAV
technology to Russia, but said the GOI is trying to develop
an understanding of Russia's policy on arms sales to the
Middle East.


8. (S) Koren said stopping the delivery of S-300 surface to
air missiles to Iran remains a top Israeli objective and
featured prominently in Liberman's discussions. Koren noted
that despite several high-level Israeli interventions,
including during the visit to Moscow of former PM Olmert
shortly before he left office, the Israeli sense is that the
Russians intend to go ahead with delivery of the S-300s. In
response to Liberman's comments on the destabilizing effect
of the S-300s, Koren said the Russian response was that the
S-300s are "only destabilizing if you are planning to attack
Iran." The Israeli assessment is that fulfilling the
contract for the sale of the S-300s is a matter of prestige
to Russia. It may also be associated in the Russians'
thinking with competition with the U.S. in that the Russians
believe the S-300 to be superior to comparable U.S. systems.
Koren said Liberman will raise the S-300 sale during his
meetings in Washington, and will likely request that
President Obama press the Russians not to go ahead with
delivery during his visit to Moscow.

Assessments of Iran, Possible Use of Force
--------------


9. (S) During Liberman's discussions on Iran, Koren said the
Russians admitted for the first time that they underestimated
the pace and technical sophistication of Iran's missile
program, something the Russians reportedly termed an
"intelligence failure." Koren implied that the Russian
political leadership is likely to conclude that their
intelligence on Iran's nuclear program has also been faulty.


10. (S) Russian Ambassador Petr Vladimirovich Stegniy told
the Ambassador June 18 that PM Netanyahu had phoned PM Putin
the night of June 17. Netanyahu offered some thoughts about
resuming negotiations with the Palestinians after his June 14
Bar Ilan address, and also made what Stegniy termed
"explicit" comments on Iran, presumably threatening the use
of force if diplomacy fails to stop Iran's nuclear program.
Putin reportedly replied that Russia sees new opportunities
for diplomacy with Iran in the wake of the mass
anti-Ahmadinejad demonstrations, and that Russia cannot
accept even threats to use force, arguing that threats only
strengthen Iranian hardliners. Stegniy commented that Russia
is "completely opposed" to a possible Israeli strike on Iran,
in part because it could ignite the Caucasus and southern
Russia as well as the Gulf.

Russian Ambassador Comments on Peace Process
--------------


11. (C) On the peace process, Stegniy told the Ambassador
that the Russians consider Liberman to be a largely positive
influence within the GOI, in part because of Liberman's
support for the Roadmap, while Netanyahu continues to have
reservations about the Roadmap, to which he did not refer
during his Bar Ilan speech. Stegniy said Netanyahu

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complained to Putin about Lavrov's meeting with Hamas leader
Khalid Mashal, to which Putin replied that Russia believes in
keeping channels open. Stegniy commented that Russia has
been engaged with Hamas for some time about the release of
kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, but he said without
elaborating that he had concluded that it was "impossible to
trust" Hamas' Damascus leadership on the Shalit issue.

Liberman in Belarus
--------------


12. (C) Briefing on Liberman's stop in Minsk, Koren said the
GOI had no illusions about Lukashenko and his regime, but
they decided that following Solana's visit, the timing was
right for Liberman to visit Belarus as well. Israel has two
interests in Belarus: the safety and well-being of the
Jewish community and limiting Belarus' military and
scientific cooperation with Iran. Liberman met with Jewish
leaders in Minsk and was reassured about their situation.
Koren noted that anti-Semitism is a more serious problem in
Ukraine than Belarus despite Ukraine's good relations with
the West. Liberman asked Lukashenko to minimize training of
Iranian military officers and scientists. As they had in
Russia, Koren said Liberman asked the Belarus leadership to
tell the Iranians that Holocaust denial and threats to
destroy Israel are unacceptable. Koren assured PolCouns that
Israel would like to follow the U.S. lead on Belarus, but
intends to remain engaged.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Liberman may be providing the leadership, but the
GOI broadly sees new opportunities in Israel's relationship
with Russia, despite their clear differences over how to
handle Iran, Syria, and Hamas. Speaking at the Russian
national day reception June 16, Israeli Tourism Minister Stas
Misejnikov, from Liberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party, announced
that he would depart for a working visit to Moscow the next
day, which would make him the fifth GOI minister to visit
Moscow since the Netanyahu government was formed in March.
Misejnikov also noted the rapid increase in the number of
Russian tourists visiting Israel, which jumped to 356,000 in
2008 from 193,000 in 2007, an eighty-four percent increase!
Misejnikov touted Liberman's decision to launch a Strategic
Dialogue with Russia similar to that which Israel has
conducted with the U.S. for the past decade, although the
Russian Embassy has told us that Russia prefers to keep the
dialogue limited and at a working level. Bilateral trade
lags behind Israeli trade with Turkey and Japan, not to
mention the EU and U.S., but Putin has reportedly called for
tripling trade levels this year. While not trusting Russian
intentions toward Iran and Syria, the Israelis do see some
utility in top-level Russian expressions of commitment to the
security and well-being of Israel and especially the roughly
two million Israelis who either emigrated from the former
Soviet Union or were born in Israel to Soviet emigrant
parents. They believe such Russian statements may have some
sobering impact on strategic calculations in Iran and Syria.



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