Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA948
2009-09-22 16:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:
TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION - CORRECTED CABLE
how-toVZCZCXRO1508 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHTG #0948 2651617 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221617Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0713 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1207 RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//CINC/POLAD// IMMEDIATE RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000948
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY CLINTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION - CORRECTED CABLE
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000948
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY CLINTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION - CORRECTED CABLE
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
1. (C) Summary: Honduran authorities may no longer be able to
handle their deteriorating political situation and need the
intervention of an international commission, preferably
headed by senior UN and OAS officials accompanied by regional
foreign ministers. The current situation is rapidly
deteriorating. There is a significant potential for
violence; the regime is becoming more authoritarian and
militarized; it is possible that President Zelaya will be
imprisoned.
2. (C) The September 21 return of President Zelaya has
created an extremely unstable situation. The de facto regime
has declared a 26-hour curfew (which could be extended) and
surrounded the Brazilian Embassy, where Zelaya remains with
his wife, youngest son, about 70 supporters, and 12 Brazilian
Embassy staff members. Police cleared the remaining
500-1,000 Zelaya supporters from around the embassy about
5:30 am local time (7:30 am ET). The police used water
cannons and tear gas. There are unconfirmed reports of shots
being fired. Some protesters were injured and at least one
police car was burned. The situation inside the embassy
remains precarious, with little food and water and no power.
3. (C) The Micheletti regime has become more entrenched.
Besides moving against the demonstrators, the regime has
refused offers of negotiations and issued a diplomatic note
threatening the Brazilian Embassy. While we have had some
contact with military officials (who are equally entrenched),
our attempts to contact civilian regime officials have been
very limited.
4. (C) Zelaya seeks to rally supporters from around the
country for support. However, the crowd only peaked at
around 5,000 midday on September 21 and had dropped to 500 12
hours later. There are reports of police and military
roadblocks; these along with the curfew will make it
difficult for Zelaya's supporters to get to Tegucigalpa. The
police now fully control the area around the Brazilian
Embassy.
5. (C) The potential for violence is high, especially if more
of Zelaya's supporters manage to get to Tegucigalpa or if
they confront security forces that attempt to stop them along
the way. Zelaya's supporters within the Brazilian Embassy
are likely to resist if security authorities attempt to
enter. Honduras is now fully under the control of a
militarized, authoritarian regime, with no freedom of
movement. Opposition press has been silenced; the main
stream press serves as a mouth piece for the regime. Given
the precarious situation inside the Brazilian Embassy, it is
doubtful that Zelaya can long remain there. If he leaves,
the internationally recognized president of Honduras will
become a prisoner of the regime.
6. (C) The situation has clearly deteriorated beyond the
ability of the Hondurans to deal with the situation
peacefully. I believe that international diplomatic
intervention is needed urgently. We recommend a commission
headed by a top UN and OAS officials accompanied by a group
of foreign ministers from the region, balanced with those
from countries that the regime does not see as hostile, such
as Colombia, Panama, and/or Mexico. A call from the UN
Secretary General to Micheletti proposing the commission
could help calm the situation.
LLORENS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY CLINTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION - CORRECTED CABLE
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
1. (C) Summary: Honduran authorities may no longer be able to
handle their deteriorating political situation and need the
intervention of an international commission, preferably
headed by senior UN and OAS officials accompanied by regional
foreign ministers. The current situation is rapidly
deteriorating. There is a significant potential for
violence; the regime is becoming more authoritarian and
militarized; it is possible that President Zelaya will be
imprisoned.
2. (C) The September 21 return of President Zelaya has
created an extremely unstable situation. The de facto regime
has declared a 26-hour curfew (which could be extended) and
surrounded the Brazilian Embassy, where Zelaya remains with
his wife, youngest son, about 70 supporters, and 12 Brazilian
Embassy staff members. Police cleared the remaining
500-1,000 Zelaya supporters from around the embassy about
5:30 am local time (7:30 am ET). The police used water
cannons and tear gas. There are unconfirmed reports of shots
being fired. Some protesters were injured and at least one
police car was burned. The situation inside the embassy
remains precarious, with little food and water and no power.
3. (C) The Micheletti regime has become more entrenched.
Besides moving against the demonstrators, the regime has
refused offers of negotiations and issued a diplomatic note
threatening the Brazilian Embassy. While we have had some
contact with military officials (who are equally entrenched),
our attempts to contact civilian regime officials have been
very limited.
4. (C) Zelaya seeks to rally supporters from around the
country for support. However, the crowd only peaked at
around 5,000 midday on September 21 and had dropped to 500 12
hours later. There are reports of police and military
roadblocks; these along with the curfew will make it
difficult for Zelaya's supporters to get to Tegucigalpa. The
police now fully control the area around the Brazilian
Embassy.
5. (C) The potential for violence is high, especially if more
of Zelaya's supporters manage to get to Tegucigalpa or if
they confront security forces that attempt to stop them along
the way. Zelaya's supporters within the Brazilian Embassy
are likely to resist if security authorities attempt to
enter. Honduras is now fully under the control of a
militarized, authoritarian regime, with no freedom of
movement. Opposition press has been silenced; the main
stream press serves as a mouth piece for the regime. Given
the precarious situation inside the Brazilian Embassy, it is
doubtful that Zelaya can long remain there. If he leaves,
the internationally recognized president of Honduras will
become a prisoner of the regime.
6. (C) The situation has clearly deteriorated beyond the
ability of the Hondurans to deal with the situation
peacefully. I believe that international diplomatic
intervention is needed urgently. We recommend a commission
headed by a top UN and OAS officials accompanied by a group
of foreign ministers from the region, balanced with those
from countries that the regime does not see as hostile, such
as Colombia, Panama, and/or Mexico. A call from the UN
Secretary General to Micheletti proposing the commission
could help calm the situation.
LLORENS