TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000947 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY CLINTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI HO SUBJECT: TFH01: NEED FOR COMMISSION Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Honduran authorities can no longer handle their deteriorating political situation and need the intervention of an international commission, preferably headed by senior UN and OAS officials accompanied by regional foreign ministers. The current situation is rapidly deteriorating. There is a significant potential for violence; the regime is becoming more authoritarian and militarized; it is possible that President Zelaya will be imprisoned. ¶2. (C) The September 21 return of President Zelaya has created an extremely unstable situation. The de facto regime has declared a 26-hour curfew (which could be extended) and surrounded the Brazilian Embassy, where Zelaya remains with his wife, youngest son, about 70 supporters, and 12 Brazilian Embassy staff members. Police cleared the remaining 500-1,000 Zelaya supporters from around the embassy about 5:30 am local time (7:30 am ET). The police used water cannons and tear gas. There are unconfirmed reports of shots being fired. Some protesters were injured and at least one police car was burned. The situation inside the embassy remains precarious, with little food and water and no power. ¶3. (C) The Micheletti regime has become more entrenched. Besides moving against the demonstrators, the regime has refused offers of negotiations and issued a diplomatic note threatening the Brazilian Embassy. While we have had some contact with military officials (who are equally entrenched), our attempts to contact civilian regime officials have been very limited. ¶4. (C) Zelaya seeks to rally supporters from around the country for support. However, the crowd only peaked at around 5,000 midday on September 21 and had dropped to 500 12 hours later. There are reports of police and military roadblocks; these along with the curfew will make it difficult for Zelaya's supporters to get to Tegucigalpa. The police now fully control the area around the Brazilian Embassy. ¶5. (C) The potential for violence is high, especially if more of Zelaya's supporters manage to get to Tegucigalpa or if they confront security forces that attempt to stop them along the way. Zelaya's supporters within the Brazilian Embassy are likely to resist if security authorities attempt to enter. Honduras is now fully under the control of a militarized, authoritarian regime, with no freedom of movement. Opposition press has been silenced; the main stream press serves as a mouth piece for the regime. Given the precarious situation inside the Brazilian Embassy, it is doubtful that Zelaya can long remain there. If he leaves, the internationally recognized president of Honduras will become a prisoner of the regime. ¶6. (C) The situation has clearly deteriorated beyond the ability of the Hondurans to deal with the situation peacefully. I believe that international diplomatic intervention is needed urgently. We recommend a commission headed by a top UN and OAS officials accompanied by a group of foreign ministers from the region, balanced with those from countries that the regime does not see as hostile, such as Colombia, Panama, and/or Mexico. A call from the UN Secretary General to Micheletti proposing the commission could help calm the situation. LLORENS