TFHO1: REACTION TO U.S. VISA REVOCATIONS, NIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000921 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/VO E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CASC HO SUBJECT: TFHO1: REACTION TO U.S. VISA REVOCATIONS, NIV CLOSURE Classified By: Classified by Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Public statements from de facto regime members and supporters in response to the September 10 revocation of their U.S. visas have in general been understated, with a few attacks directed at the Ambassador. In private meetings, however, the response has been a mix of anger and confusion from those whose visas were revoked and a desire to avoid a similar fate from those still with valid visas. Members of both categories have shown in private a renewed interest in facilitating good faith negotiations under the Arias process by the de facto regime. Reaction to the continued closure of non-immigrant visa operations remains subdued. End Summary. -------------- Visa Revocation Notifications -------------- ¶2. (C) The Embassy informed the 13 de facto regime members and supporters of the prudential revocation of their U.S. visas by letter from the Consul General on September 11. All letters, with two exceptions, were delivered by Embassy drivers to their intended recipients. The Defense Attache's office verbally informed Honduran Armed Forces chief, General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, and his letter was delivered to him on September 13. National Industrialists' Association (ANDI) President Adolfo Facusse did not receive his letter and was denied entry to the United States by DHS on September 12. The Ambassador and Consul General met with him on September 14 (see para 5). -------------- Public Reaction -------------- ¶3. (SBU) De facto regime President Micheletti made several public statements which were calm and non-inflammatory, recognizing the right of any sovereign country to issue, deny or cancel a visa, while noting the U.S. move would not change his stance on the June 28 "constitutional succession." He said that it was only "a matter of time" before the United States "understood" what had really happened in Honduras. De facto foreign minister Carlos Lopez Contreras (visa revoked) declared the action "discriminatory." Most of those whose visas were revoked did not make public statements in response, but were quietly reported to be defiant: Congresswoman Marcia Villeda, for example, was reported to have traveled to the Bay Islands for a break, saying she "no longer liked Miami Beach." Ministry of the President Chief Rafael Pineda Ponce struck back by falsely claiming that the Ambassador had pushed the Honduran government hard to reform its constitution in a private meeting prior to June 28 (thus labeling him both pro-Zelaya and a supporter of Zelaya's actions cited by the de facto regime as basis for undertaking the coup),while de facto negotiator Mauricio Villeda (visa not revoked) angrily called for the Ambassador to leave Honduras. -------------- Private Concern -------------- ¶4. (C) Phone calls to the Embassy from individuals concerned about their own visas indicate that the revocations have had a strong effect. For example, the publisher of the pro-regime "El Heraldo" and "La Prensa" dailies Jorge Canahuati (visa not revoked) called both the Ambassador and Consul General, volunteering that perhaps the tone of his papers had been "combative" and seeking advice on how he could help bring the Honduran people together and promote dialogue. Lopez Contreras told a mutual friend of the Ambassador and himself that he would be willing to meet to discuss a way forward on the San Jose Accords, the first time he has agreed to do so since June 28 (the meeting took place Monday, September 14, reported septel). Business leader Samuel Bogran (visa revoked) also requested a meeting with TEGUCIGALP 00000921 002 OF 003 the Ambassador September 16. -------------- Meeting with ANDI President -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador and Consul General met September 14 with ANDI President and prominent business leader Adolfo "Fito" Facusse. The Embassy had not delivered a notification letter to Facusse prior to his departure for Miami on September 12. DHS had denied entry to him and his 11-year-old son, whom Facusse was taking to Florida for a regularly scheduled medical appointment. He held a press conference earlier in the day saying he wanted to clear his name if his visa had been revoked for corruption or narco-trafficking. Facusse was angry at the United States for failing to notify him of the visa cancellation prior to his trip and said he thought the move "illegal." He also believed the visa revocation strategy was misguided, likely to harden the stance of those de facto regime supporters at whom it was aimed. For his part, he denied having taken an active role in the coup, noting his friendship and support on some issues for President Zelaya pre-June 28. (Note: Facusse was the only businessman publicly to support Honduras' accession to ALBA and Petrocaribe. End Note.) He also brought copies of public statements he'd made denouncing the illegal removal of Zelaya by the Honduran Armed Forces and his calls for legal action against them. He admitted to having been a strong supporter of the "constitutional succession," and expressed his frustration at the inability of the international community to understand the situation in Honduras and the need to recognize elections without Zelaya's return. He repeated the common concern among many Hondurans that Zelaya could not be trusted to abide by any agreement and that the international community would do nothing to stop him from continuing his illegal moves against the Honduran constitution. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the unanimity of the international condemnation of the June 28 coup, the clear agreement that it was in fact a coup, and the strong likelihood of continued Honduran isolation if an accord was not reached. He said the U.S. government was extremely frustrated at the lack of good faith negotiations by the de facto regime, one result of which was the strong measure of revoking individuals' visas. He encouraged Facusse to use his substantial standing and influence to push for negotiations and to use his creativity to come up with whatever guarantees were needed to assure the de facto regime and its supporters that a returned Zelaya would not be free to threaten Honduran democratic institutions. The United States and international community would not, he confirmed, turn its attention away from Honduras once the democratic and constitutional order was restored. By the end of the meeting, Facusse agreed to work for national reconciliation and good faith negotiations, volunteering to participate in meetings with de facto regime members and others to push them towards negotiations. -------------- NIV Closure -------------- ¶7. (U) Public reaction to the continued closure of non-immigrant visa (NIV) operations has also been subdued. One on-line newspaper reported the fact that the bank contracted to take MRV and call center fees continues to do so despite the suspension, implying strongly that the Embassy was bilking Hondurans. (Note: the Embassy has authorized the bank to accept MRV and call center fees for those who have medical emergencies. End Note.) The Embassy's clarification of this policy was subsequently published by the same paper. The Consular Section continues to process one to two medical emergency cases per day. One press reported cited a 30 percent reduction in travel to and from Honduras as a result of the crisis and specifically the NIV suspension. Reports from U.S. Embassies in surrounding TEGUCIGALP 00000921 003 OF 003 countries show virtually no increase in non-permanent resident Honduran NIV applications. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (U) Comment: Despite understated public responses to the visa revocations and predictions of a hardened de facto regime position as a result of them, post has privately noted a rapid reaction in a positive direction to these steps. Public declarations aside, most Hondurans value their ability to travel to the United States greatly, and see the possession of a valid U.S. visa as a sign that, in the end, they are "OK" with the United States. Though some will undoubtedly stand fast in the face of their visa cancellations, others have already demonstrated that they recognize this as yet another sign that the United States is taking the situation in Honduras seriously, and that time to reach a solution is running short. End Comment. LLORENS