TFHO1: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DE FACTO FM LOPEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000919

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFHO1: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DE FACTO FM LOPEZ
CONTRERAS

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Summary: As per Department instructions, the
Ambassador met with de facto regime Foreign Minister Carlos
Lopez Contreras at the home of a mutual friend on September

14. The Ambassador discussed the visa revocations. Lopez
confirmed he had received the notice on September 11 and
understood the U.S. policy and legal reasons for our actions.
Both also shared their views on the San Jose Accord, the
Ambassador urging the regime to sign right away as the best
solution for the Honduran people. From the discussion, it
remained unclear whether Lopez was able and willing to press
Micheletti for a resolution or was just continuing
Micheletti's time-burning tactics. Nonetheless, the two
agreed to maintain a dialogue, within the framework of the
no-contact policy. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador held a one-hour meeting with regime
foreign minister Carlos Lopez Contreras on the evening of
September 14 in the private home of communications industry
executive and mutual friend Antonio Tavel.

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Visa Revocations
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3. (C) The Ambassador informed Lopez of the USG decision to
revoke the visas of leading regime officials and supporters,
including Lopez. He explained the revocations were intended
to make clear that U.S. patience with the regime and its
delaying tactics had run out, and that the United States was
serious in its opposition to undemocratic acts such as the
June coup. The Ambassador contextualized the revocation
within the framework of the September 3 statement by the
Department in favor of a rapid resolution of the crisis
through the San Jose Accord and the plan to take additional
measures to press for this goal.


4. (C) Lopez understood the revocations were not intended as
personal, but rather as a reflection of U.S. policy toward
Honduras at the moment. He said he did not take his own visa
revocation personally, but lamented its timing. He pointed
to his public statement earlier that day that he felt it was
unfortunate the revocations happened before he was able to
carry out his scheduled meetings with U.S. Senators and
Members of Congress, including Senator Lugar. Lopez added
that he would be interested in meeting with the Secretary at
some point to discuss the crisis and the de facto regime's
position. The Ambassador did not respond to this request.
Lopez said he had advised Micheletti not to take any
retaliatory action against U.S. diplomats or the Embassy,
because it would be counterproductive to regime interests.
He explained retaliation had been advocated by other
Micheletti advisors, but did not give details about those
measures. (Note: Based on conversations with Embassy
contacts, we speculate possible retaliation measures would
have been expulsion of the Ambassador and/or Consul General,
non-recognition of any new U.S. credentials, and/or refusing
re-entry of U.S. diplomats who exited the country. To date,
none of these actions has been taken. End note.)

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San Jose Accord
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador then laid out in detail U.S. policy
toward Honduras and the political crisis, making the case for
the San Jose Accord, arguing that the accord was a solution
that restores the constitutional order, while still taking
into account the concerns of the anti-Zelaya movement. He
noted that the Accord's 12 points were developed chiefly
based on inputs from the Micheletti negotiating team to
address their concerns about Zelaya. The Ambassador
explained that the accord took into account all the key
issues of both sides, in particular no constituent assembly,
early elections (no longer practical) to speed the "lame
duck" status of the incumbent, and the establishment of a
verification commission to fully enforce adherence to the
accord, while at the same time restoring the institution of
the presidency and providing for a political amnesty and

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temporary moratorium on criminal prosecution of all parties
to allow the country to heal.


6. (C) The accord was intended -- as was U.S. policy
regarding Honduras -- to prevent creating any "losers" in the
end, but rather to restore peace and allow for healing among
the Honduran people and a smooth transition to a
democratically-elected president. The Ambassador added that
if the accord were reached before elections, the inauguration
of the next president in January 2010 was likely to be the
most-attended presidential inauguration in the history of
Latin America. The Ambassador also pointed out that the
accord, contrary to the regime's political rhetoric, was
designed to counter the undemocratic efforts of Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, who probably secretly hoped Zelaya
would not return. He said Chavez was interested in Zelaya
becoming a permanent victim, both to ensure the failure of
the Obama administration's Latin AMERICA policy and to prove
the uselessness of the OAS and the Inter-American system.


7. (C) Lopez expressed his appreciation for the opportunity
to hear the U.S. point of view from the Ambassador, and said
he understood that U.S. support for the Accord was aimed at
solving the political crisis. He noted that a significant
portion of the Honduran public still were adamantly opposed
to Zelaya's return, and were not ready to accept amnesty or a
moratorium on prosecution. He added that the 12-point accord
was the result of input from a variety of Hondurans, alluding
to former president Carlos Flores' influence. He also said
that while the accord did reflect the counterproposals of the
Micheletti team following the first version, he and the team
had told Costa Rican President Oscar Arias at the time they
would need to convince civil society and key regime
supporters to accept it. Lopez added that elements of the
accord still were not quite where they needed to be in order
for it to be accepted by those opposed to Zelaya, in
particular pointing to a visceral rejection of the idea of
Zelaya's return and the need for greater depth in the areas
of the amnesty and moratorium on criminal prosecution.
(Note: The Micheletti regime and its supporters, particularly
media owners, have made no effort to prepare the public for
these prospects, but rather have worked energetically toward
the contrary, framing public discourse about the accord as a
defeat for democratic principals and constitutionality in the
face of foreign pressure. End note)


8. (C) Lopez hinted that he had gone to Micheletti to say he
needed to consider the prospect of Zelaya's return, but noted
that he was not a member of Micheletti's inner circle. Lopez
said that before being named the regime's foreign minister,
he had not known Micheletti personally. (Note: Lopez is the
regime's second foreign minister, replacing Enrique Ortez
Colindres, of racist infamy. End note.) He said he had
recently sent President Arias and Costa Rican Foreign
Minister Bruno Stagno a note explaining where the regime
stood on the Accord, seeking clarification on amnesty, and
offering some suggestions on how to manage Zelaya's return.
He said he also pointed out in the note that it was too late
to move up the election date. Lopez presented a copy of the
note to the Ambassador, who responded that he was already
aware of the note and stressed that time had run out on the
prospect of making significant revisions to the accord. He
said Micheletti needed to sign now, and then could hammer out
issues of concern in further detail in the week following.


9. (C) On a personal note, Lopez commented on the actions of
Micheletti's negotiating team member Arturo Corrales, saying
that Corrales had gotten out ahead of his mandate in
proposing a third option while preparing for the OAS foreign
ministers' visit. He said Corrales' actions had created an
impression that the regime had been insincere in its
negotiations before the visit. The Ambassador acknowledged
that many people had been troubled because Corrales had been
perceived as maneuvering and manipulating on behalf of the
regime, but the Ambassador said he felt it may have been more
a case of Corrales attempting to make the most of an
impossible situation. The meeting concluded with both Lopez
and the Ambassador agreeing that it was important to remain
in dialogue as much as possible, within the constraints of
the U.S. non-contact policy.

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10. (C) Comment: Lopez is a calm, intelligent, and
professional diplomat with over 30 years experience. He
served as Foreign Minister under the Flores administration,
and knows President Arias from the 1980's when the two locked
horns during the Esquipulas process. It appeared that Lopez
was in part feeling out the Ambassador in this meeting to
detect whether the regime had any potential "wiggle room"
regarding the Accord. The Ambassador took a strong position
to convey that there was none. Lopez did not raise the theme
of elections as a solution, and the discussion of elections
was limited to the Ambassador's mention of it with regard to
the Department's September 3 statement. We intend to
continue low-key dialogue with Lopez within the confines of
the non-contact policy in the hope that he will prove to be
an advocate for the San Jose Accord, and is not simply
playing Micheletti's game of running out the clock.
LLORENS