TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT ARIAS DISCUSS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000902 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT ARIAS DISCUSS HONDURAN CRISIS REF: TEGUCIGALPA 901 TEGUCIGALP 00000902 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador and President Arias reviewed the Honduran situation on September 9. They discussed the Secretary's meeting with President Zelaya last week in Washington, as well as the U.S. position on economic assistance, visas and the elections. The Ambassador also briefed Arias on Embassy advocacy efforts in Tegucigalpa on behalf of the San Jose Accord. The Ambassador discussed his separate meetings with former President Callejas, regime supporters (business leaders and political figures),and with the Presidential candidates. The Ambassador said that in a dinner on September 8, the Presidential candidates had expressed an interest in meeting with President Arias in San Jose. The Ambassador and Arias agreed that the candidates collectively had the political legitimacy and institutional authority to play an influential role in resolving the Honduran crisis and help convince Micheletti to agree to sign the San Jose Accord. Arias unhesitatingly agreed to meet with the candidates, and a tentative date has been fixed for September 16 in San Jose. End Summary. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador spoke to President Arias on the morning of September 9 and briefed him on our recent actions in support of his mediation effort to resolve the Honduran crisis. The Ambassador told Arias that the Secretary's meeting with President Zelaya on September 3 had gone well. He said the Secretary had strongly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to restoring the democratic order in Honduras and outlined the additional measures the U.S. was taking to terminate economic and development assistance, our unwillingness to recognize the elections if the San Jose Accord is not in place, and our decision to revoke the visas of selected regime members and supporters. The Ambassador also said that the Secretary had also made clear to Zelaya that he needed to stop making inflammatory and controversial remarks that were creating a less favorable climate for the successful conclusion of negotiations, and pressed him to publicly express his willingness to sign the San Jose Accord. As a result of the meeting, the Ambassador noted that Zelaya had sent the Secretary a letter on September 7 reaffirming his willingness to sign the San Jose Accord (in Tegucigalpa), and stated his support for the enforcement role of the Verification Commission. President Arias reiterated his view that the Secretary was exerting strong pressure on the regime and that U.S. support for democracy in Honduras was clear and unwavering. Arias asked for our views on whether it was better to sign the Accord in San Jose or in Tegucigalpa. The Ambassador suggested that if all of the details and the work plan had been completed, signing the Accord in Tegucigalpa might be acceptable; however, if not, it would be best to sign in San Jose and then have Zelaya, Micheletti, Arias and invited Heads of State and Foreign Ministers travel to Tegucigalpa. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador gave President Arias a detailed briefing of this week's meetings in Tegucigalpa. The Ambassador discussed the September 7 lunch with former President Rafael Leonardo Callejas (who remained a powerful figure in the National Party). The Ambassador and Arias agreed that the Nationalist Party had not played a constructive role in helping to resolve the crisis, since they were convinced that the coup had weakened the Liberal's electoral prospects. Nevertheless, the Ambassador told Arias that Callejas claimed he supported the San Jose process and had agreed to seek a meeting with Micheletti and urge him to sign the Accord (ref A). The Ambassador also discussed his September 7 coffee with regime supporters including business leaders, President Carlos Flores, and Micheletti Commissioners to the San Jose process Arturo Corrales and Vilma Morales. The Ambassador stressed that we had passed on a very strong message that U.S. patience had run out and outlined the U.S. positions on aid, visas and elections. He said that following the meeting, several of the business leaders had met with Micheletti to discuss the U.S. position and agreed to brief the Ambassador on the results on the morning of September 10. TEGUCIGALP 00000902 002.2 OF 002 ¶4. (S) The Ambassador stressed the importance of his dinner with four of the six Presidential candidates on September 8 (SEPTEL). The Ambassador told Arias that our tough message on assistance and visas, but particularly the U.S. position that without the San Jose framework the U.S. was not in a position to recognize the coming general elections, had had an impact on the candidates. The Ambassador and Arias agreed that the candidates retained great legitimacy and institutional authority and could play a lead role in the restoration of democracy in Honduras and the holding of internationally supported elections. The Ambassador said he had made the case to them that the carefully crafted Accord represented the only viable way at this stage to normalize Honduras' relations with the international community, restore the traditional strategic alliance with the U.S., achieve conditions for reconciliation of the Honduran family, and confront the severe socio-economic crisis facing the nation. The Ambassador mentioned to Arias that he had told the candidates that San Jose would allow them to deal with the Zelaya problem once and for all ensuring that his political story would come to a peaceful and constitutional end on January 27. The Ambassador told Arias that he had urged the candidates to use their institutional power as the democratic stakeholders and leaders to press Micheletti to immediately sign the San Jose Accord. Although there was fear of Zelaya's true intentions, all four of the candidates representing the moderate establishment parties agreed that a negotiated solution needed to be found for the Honduran crisis. The Ambassador noted that despite some disagreements the candidates agreed that as key political stakeholders they could influence events in Honduras in a positive way and did not close the door on approaching Micheletti. Most importantly, the candidates expressed their willingness to travel to San Jose to meet with Arias as soon as possible and discuss how to implement the San Jose Accord in return for international community support for the elections. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador told Arias that if he concurred, he would also reach out to the other two candidates to agree to meet with Arias. Arias agreed that the candidates could play a critical role in pushing for an agreement and enthusiastically accepted the offer to meet with the candidates. Arias said he would meet with all six candidates, but was also opened to meet with a smaller group. (Note: The Ambassador subsequently spoke to Pepe Lobo and Elvin Santos. Since Lobo will be in the U.S. beginning September 9 and returning September 15, Lobo and Santos proposed the meeting on September 16 in San Jose, which Arias and Costa Rican foreign Minister Bruno Stagno readily accepted. The Embassy will be encouraging the other candidates to attend. The candidates plan to make arrangements to travel together. End Note) ¶6. (S) Comment: The collective engagement of the Presidential candidates in support of the San Jose process provides an opportunity to engage both sides and push for a final agreement. We will work with the candidates and the Costa Rican government to make sure that this meeting happens on September 16 in Costa Rica. LLORENS