TFHO1: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH NATIONAL PARTY FIGURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000901

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: TFHO1: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH NATIONAL PARTY FIGURES

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Ambassador and DCM met with former Honduran president
and National Party leader Rafael Callejas and Honduran
business mogul and National Party financier Miguel Facusse
for lunch September 7 to press for their support to pressure
the Micheletti regime to accept the San Jose Accord.
Callejas said that the party, and its presidential candidate
Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo, had accepted that President Manuel
"Mel" Zelaya would have to be allowed back in the country in
order to end the political crisis. However, the party wanted
this to happen one month before the election, to coincide
with the constitutionally-mandated date when control of the
military passes from the president to the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE). Callejas admitted that it was in his party's
favor to have the return as late as possible, as an early
return of Zelaya opened the possibility of a mending of the
Liberal Party, a much weaker opponent to the Nationals since
the coup split the party apart.


2. (C) The Ambassador explained that the U.S. had run out of
patience with the de facto regime's failure to negotiate and
would continue to seek strong measures (such as our closure
of the visas section and cessation of aid) to pressure the
regime. He emphasized the statement by the Department that
in the absence of the San Jose framework we would not be able
to recognize the November elections. The Ambassador asked
for Callejas and Facusse's advice on how to pressure de facto
regime head Roberto Micheletti to accept the accord, noting
that Micheletti appeared isolated and that it was not clear
to whom he listened. Callejas said that a key figure was
Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez and urged the Ambassador to engage
with him. Both Callejas and Facusse said that they had
influence with Micheletti and would meet with him separately
(Callejas said he would do so on September 13, when he
returned from a trip abroad).


3. (C) Facusse reported that he had attended a recent
Business Council of Latin America (CEAL) meeting in El
Salvador where business leaders with connections to
Micheletti reported that Micheletti was now willing to
consider the return of Zelaya after the November 29 election
date but before the January 27 handover of power.


4. (C) Comment: Callejas had his U.S. visa revoked in 2006
following corruption charges; this was his first meeting with
the Ambassador. Despite his past, Callejas remains a
powerful figure within the National Party. In addition, he
is president of the Honduras national football team, an
important position in this soccer-fanatic nation. Facusse is
the wealthiest, most powerful businessman in the country, and
also a strong supporter of the San Jose Accord. The
National's support of a return of Zelaya one month prior to
the election is self-serving; it would be too late to give
the Liberals a chance to reunite, but early enough so that
the elections would (in their view) be seen legitimate by the
international community. That the party and Lobo are willing
to consider the return of Zelaya before the election is a
sign our message, that the elections will not be accepted by
the international community without an agreement, is getting
traction. The Cardinal is a powerful voice and could be
helpful in moving Micheletti. After a dinner with the
Ambassador in July, he agreed to push for acceptance of the
accord, but then, after the intervention of de facto regime
commissioner Mauricio Villeda (a member of Opus Dei),the
cardinal reversed himself and publicly supported the regime.
We will approach him again to seek his support. While the
return of Zelaya after the elections would not be acceptable
to us, if Micheletti is considering such a plan, it is a sign
he is beginning to feel the pressure.
LLORENS