TFH01: NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS ON THE CRISIS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000851 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: TFH01: NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS ON THE CRISIS AND PROSPECTS FOR HONDURAS' POLITICAL FUTURE REF: TEGUCIGALPA 502 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Simon Henshaw, reasons 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting with Poloffs, National Party (NP) leaders Federico "Fred" Breve and Oscar Alvarez laid out the current Nationalist position on the Honduran political crisis, prospects for a resolution and their views on how the crisis will affect Honduran politics and society in the longer term. Poloff stressed the importance of resolving the crisis before elections and why this should be a priority for the National Party and Hondurans in general. While the Nationalist position described is very close to that of the USG and international community, its constituency contains a significant bloc of the pro-coup camp, placing the Nationalists in a precarious position regarding the crisis. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Breve and Alvarez are two leading figures in the National Party and are close advisors to frontrunner presidential nominee Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo. Breve was Minister of Defense until 2006 under the Nationalist Maduro administration, and is expected to be made Secretary of the Presidency if Lobo wins election. Alvarez was Minister of Public Security under Maduro, and Lobo has already declared Alvarez would be his "super minister," with authority over Security and other law enforcement and security-related agencies. ¶3. (SBU) Breve explained that the Nationalists officially supported a peaceful resolution to the political crisis, and that Pepe Lobo had publicly stated he did not recognize Micheletti as the legitimate president of Honduras. But he acknowledged that there remained significant concerns among Nationalists that a restored President Zelaya would be quick to disregard the San Jose Accord, which he believes lacks sufficient guarantees. He added that Lobo had faced a hostile audience when he addressed a Nationalist women's group August 26 because of his stance favoring the accord. Breve suggested the Micheletti-proposed option of mutual resignations and appointment of a third party as caretaker president was more viable and politically palatable. ¶4. (C) Alvarez said there still was too much popular concern in Honduras over the potential consequences of a Zelaya return, coupled with a lack of confidence that there are sufficient guarantees in the accord to prevent Zelaya from violating it. He noted that despite Zelaya's institutional weakness and the apparent opposition to him in the armed forces and other branches of government, Zelaya was still able to lead a mob into the Air Force headquarters on June 25 and seize his banned polling materials in defiance of the courts (reftel). Alvarez wondered aloud, if Zelaya violated the accord after his reinstatement, would the international community accept his being flown out to Costa Rica again? ¶5. (C) Poloff expressed USG concern that failure to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis before elections would cast a shadow over elections at best, and at worst lead to a failed process, with a high rate of abstention and continued social unrest. He added that even if successful elections could be held, the next president would inherit a political and economic disaster. Furthermore, failure to reach a peaceful, consensual resolution would call into question the legitimacy of the next government and provide the radical left with a greater foothold in Honduras than ever before. ¶6. (C) Breve and Alvarez disagreed with the contention that election prospects were worse without a resolution, noting their own independent polling suggested there would be a reasonably high voter turnout. But they agreed that without a pre-election resolution, the winner would have great difficulty in bringing the country back from crisis, and would face severe economic problems. ¶7. (C) They added that whatever the outcome, the political landscape would never be the same in Honduras, noting that independent "protest" candidate Carlos H. Reyes could potentially come in second (with Lobo first) in the presidential vote, and smaller parties could peel off TEGUCIGALP 00000851 002 OF 002 significant votes from the mainstream. Breve told Poloffs that even before June 28, the business community had been pressing political leaders to become more transparent and responsive to the needs of the broader population. Breve and Alvarez said there was a strong push to reduce political corruption and crime in order to create a healthier business and social environment in Honduras. They noted that following the crisis, these pressures would be even greater, and political parties would have to be more responsive to the people. ¶8. (C) Comment: Breve and Alvarez are both solid political thinkers and consummate politicians. At present, Lobo is the frontrunner for president, making Breve and Alvarez likely members of the next government if elections do take place and produce a clear winner. Therefore, questions of whether elections can take place successfully and what the next administration would inherit are at the forefront of their minds. End comment. LLORENS