TFH01: FOREIGN MINISTER DELEGATION FACES DE FACTO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000831

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: FOREIGN MINISTER DELEGATION FACES DE FACTO
INTRANSIGENCE, GRANDSTANDING

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 813

B. TEGUCIGALPA 809

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Simon Henshaw, reasons 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: The OAS delegation of foreign ministers and
OAS Secretary General which visited Honduras August 24-25 to
press all parties to accept the San Jose Accord as the
peaceful solution to the current political crisis concluded
without a concrete result, due primarily to inflexibility on
the part of the de facto regime. The delegation met with
members of civil society, all branches of government and
supporters of the ousted Zelaya administration. Most
regime-supporters expressed greater hope in November
elections as a way out of the crisis than in a negotiated
accord. De facto president Roberto Micheletti turned the
delegation's scheduled meeting into a public show which was
televised nationally after the delegation's departure. A
telephone conference with President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was
also unproductive, leading some ministers to speculate as to
if a different democratic solution needed to be found. The
delegation's press statement at the end of their visit was
covered in the local media. The de facto negotiating team
informed the delegation at the end of its visit that the team
planned to return to Washington August 26 to continue talks
with the OAS. The OAS delegation expressed appreciation for
the U.S. suspension of visa operations and for air support.
End summary.


2. (SBU) OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza
accompanied a delegation of foreign ministers from Argentina,
Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, and
Panama who came to Honduras under the aegis of the OAS to
press all sides in the political crisis to accept the San
Jose Accord as the best peaceful solution to the crisis. The
delegation met with President Zelaya's wife and daughter,
representatives of the Zelaya administration, members of the
National Congress on both sides of the conflict, presidential
candidates, members of the Supreme Court (CSJ),the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal (TSE),church leaders, business leaders,
civil society representatives, military leadership and de
facto regime president Roberto Micheletti. The delegation
held a telephone conference call with President Zelaya and
then concluded their visit by making a statement to the
press.


3. (SBU) According to Embassy contacts and press reports, the
prevailing themes of most de facto regime representatives and
supporters was a concern over whether the accord provided
sufficient safeguards against further violations once
implemented, and that many people's hopes rested more in
successful elections in November than in a negotiated accord.


4. (C) Neil Reeder, Canadian Ambassador to Honduras resident
in Costa Rica provided a readout of the delegation's visit to
the G-16 donors group on August 26. He said the two major
points of the San Jose Accord for which the delegation
encountered opposition were the return of President Zelaya
and amnesty, which Micheletti supporters told the delegation
they view as recognition of impunity despite the fact that
representatives of the de facto regime agreed to this
provision during negotiations in San Jose. Reeder said the
delegation seemed to be surprised by how polarized Honduran
society was regarding the crisis as well as the inflexibility
of the de facto regime,s position. Reeder reported that the
Zelaya camp assured the delegation that Zelaya is ready to
sign the San Jose Accord and will abide by it. According to
Reeder, leftist parties told the delegation that they would
disrupt the elections if Zelaya was not permitted to return.
Reeder noted that the delegation delivered the message to its
interlocutors that lack of acceptance of the San Jose Accord
could have an impact on donor aid to Honduras.


5. (SBU) The delegation met with representatives of 21
Congressional Deputies who signed a joint statement opposing
the coup and the subsequent decisions of Congress to replace
the cabinet and impose measures to limit opposition to the de
facto regime.


6. (U) The delegation's meeting with Micheletti was delayed

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several times during the visit, and when the delegation
finally was able to meet with Micheletti, he had arranged for
cameras to record the entire session. Micheletti recited the
political rhetoric used by the de facto regime from the start
of the crisis that the events of June 28 were legal and in
defense of the Constitution, and that the Honduran people
were prepared to ride out international pressure. He
repeated his offer to resign, contingent on President Zelaya
returning only to stand trial. Micheletti reiterated the
public, personal statements he had made before against
Insulza and his first visit immediately following the coup.
The de facto regime then televised the video of the meeting
at least three times the following day as a "cadena," forcing
all other television transmissions to cease while the video
was on the air.


7. (U) Local press covered the visit largely in accordance
with their bias. Pro-coup daily paper "El Heraldo" repeated
the Micheletti themes, and did not present the opposing
viewpoints, though it reprinted the delegation's departing
press statement in full. The evening news broadcast on
Channel Four was somewhat more balanced, noting the de facto
regime's claim they had anticipated the USG decision to
suspend visa services, and stated that CAFTA terms would
prevent the United States from imposing a significant
economic embargo, but also covering the delegation press
release, as well as a statement from First Lady Xiomara
Castro de Zelaya on behalf of President Zelaya. On moderate
Channel 10, Zelaya supporter and Democratic Unification Party
presidential candidate Cesar Ham presented a partial readout
of his meeting with the delegation, noting that they said the
OAS would not observe November elections. (As a result of an
attack on its transmission equipment (ref B),pro-Zelaya
television Channel 36 remained off the air.)


8. (C) Insulza aide John Biehl (protect) told Charge that the
delegation had left discouraged with the de facto regime
authorities and supporters, total lack of flexibility. He
said almost all, including Supreme Court members, the
Attorney General, business leaders, the military hierarchy
and Cardinal Oscar Andres Rodriguez gave speeches arguing
that the June 28 events were completely legal and
constitutional, while the return of Zelaya and implementation
of the San Jose Accords would be unconstitutional. Biehl
noted that most of these representatives spent at least an
hour in another room of the hotel with the de facto regime
negotiators to the OAS before meeting with the delegation; he
believed this explained the almost verbatim presentations.
Micheletti was polite, but inflexible in his meeting with the
delegation, according to Biehl (he made no mention of attacks
against Insulza). Micheletti said he was willing to resign
the de facto presidency, but only if Zelaya resigned as well
and if all international sanctions were dropped.


9. (C) Zelaya also lost some support from the ministers
during a telephone conference at the end of their visit,
according to Biehl. Zelaya appeared out of touch, speaking
of his supporters being thrown in jail and tortured and dying
by the hundreds. This led some ministers to question whether
or not a democratic solution without Zelaya needed to be
considered. (Charge interjected that the issue was the
illegal and unconstitutional removal of Zelaya and that
Zelaya,s return appeared to be the only solution.)


10. (C) Upon departure late afternoon on August 25, Biehl
reported that he had been contacted by de facto negotiating
team member Arturo Corrales who told him that the team would
travel to Washington August 26 to continue talks with the
OAS. (The local OAS representative reported August 26 that
Corrales had been seen boarding that morning,s flight to
Miami.) Biehl told Charge that Insulza and the ministers had
been very appreciative of the U.S. announcement of the
closure of the visa section (Charge had passed the
information directly to Insulza),saying that it had given
them support at a particularly difficult time. He also
heaped praise on our air support, saying that the ministers
were thankful. (Comment: The C-17 made quite an impression.
End comment.)


11. (C) Comment: The de facto regime,s complete lack of

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flexibility was surprising. The regime held a series of
meetings over the weekend to discuss the delegation visit; it
is now apparent that the meetings hardened the regime,s
stance and that the participants agreed to form a united
front against any compromise. If there is a silver lining to
this cloud, it is that Insulza and the ministers now have a
clearer view of the situation on the ground. Biehl is close
to Insulza and his comment on other democratic solutions may
reflect Insulza,s thinking. It is hard, however, to
envision a democratic solution that does not include the
return of President Zelaya.
HENSHAW