Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA737
2009-08-13 01:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

TFH01: HONDURAS COUP: POLITICAL WRAP-UP 08/12/09

Tags:  PGOV PINR KDEM HO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000737 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: HONDURAS COUP: POLITICAL WRAP-UP 08/12/09

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 711 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000737 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: HONDURAS COUP: POLITICAL WRAP-UP 08/12/09 REF: TEGUCIGALPA 711 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (d) ¶1. (U) This is another in a series of round-ups of political news in the aftermath of the June 28 forcible removal and exile of President Manuel Zelaya from Honduras. ¶2. (C) In an August 12 phone conversation with independent Presidential candidate Carlos H. Reyes, the Ambassador stressed that it was important for all parties to refrain from violence. Reyes was injured on July 30; he said that he and a group of peaceful demonstrators were chased by police wielding batons. When the group reached the top of a retaining wall, the police struck Reyes in the back of the neck, causing him to fall 15 feet, breaking his arm. Reyes also said that the August 11 demonstrations were peaceful; and claimed the de facto regime infiltrated the protests to burn the bus and the restaurants. When the Ambassador asked why the de facto regime would seek to cause violence, Reyes was not able to provide an answer. ¶3. (C) In an August 12 meeting, Florangela Santamaria (protect),who has been a liaison between the Embassy and Congressional Deputies and other political figures opposed to the coup, told EmbOffs that that a dialogue between Zelaya and de facto regime supporters would be helpful, but stressed that they should have clear goals, such as identifying a national reconciliation government and developing mechanisms to ensure that both sides comply with the San Jose Accord. She said key Zelaya loyalists have expressed the belief that the most radical of the Zelaya members, such as Foreign Minister Rodas, could be sacrificed for the sake of national reconciliation, but the most extreme supporters of the de facto regime, such as the Attorney General, would likewise have to be sacrificed. She said that a group of 29 anti-coup members of Congress from three parties (Liberal, Democratic Unification, and Christian Democrats) wants to meet with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights when they visit August 17-21, as well as the OAS Foreign Ministers' delegation. ¶4. (C) EmbOff talked to Tegucigalpa Nationalist Party activist and de facto regime supporter and organizer Lorenza Duron de Agurcia on August 11. Duron has been an outspoken supporter of the events of June 28, and in previous conversations had insisted the removal of President Zelaya was legal and proper. During the August 11 conversation, however, she acknowledged the political crisis was taking its toll on society, and that it would be better to resolve the crisis before the election season began. She commented that the San Jose Accord appeared to be a good solution, as long as there were solid guarantees Zelaya could not renege on the accord once back in office. She agreed with Poloff that there needed to be more public dialogue and acknowledgment that there was growing public support for reconciliation, so the politicians would be able to reach an accord. ¶5. (C) The pro-de facto regime newspaper "El Heraldo" issued an editorial on August 10 stating that it recognizes the impact international isolation is having on the investment climate. The article stated that the regime was waiting for time to pass with the "illusion" that elections will solve everything. Finally, the editorial encouraged the government to recognize errors and not miss opportunities for dialogue to end the crisis and seek reconciliation with the international community. (Comment: It is an important shift that owner Jorge Canahuati, one of the most ardent supporters of the coup, would produce this editorial.) ¶6. (C) In a meeting with leaders of the National Party on August 6, EmbOffs conveyed the U.S. position that the San Jose Accord was the best mechanism to restore democratic order. Nationalist Party leaders said that they would win politically "either way," a) if no accord was signed, the continuing chaos would benefit them; b) if an accord was signed, they believe the amnesty element was deeply unpopular among the general public and Liberals would take the blame. EmbOffs stated that there would be longer-term consequences if no accord was reached, and encouraged the National Party to play a constructive role in resolving the crisis. LLORENS

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