TFH01: HONDURAN CONGRESS RECEPTIVE TO SAN JOSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000722 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM EAID HO SUBJECT: TFH01: HONDURAN CONGRESS RECEPTIVE TO SAN JOSE ACCORD, BUT FEARFUL OF PUBLIC BACKLASH REF: TEGUCIGALPA 700 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Poloff represented the U.S. Mission in a meeting between the "troika" of the G16 donors' group and Honduran Congressional deputies, headed by the current President of Congress Jose Alfredo Saavedra Paz on August 5. (Note: the troika represents the current, previous and future chairs of the G16, is comprised of Canada, the United States, and the United Nations. Canadian Ambassador Neil Reeder, resident in San Jose, led the delegation. UNDP Representative Rebeca Arias participated on behalf of the UN. End note.) The meeting was the first between representatives of the international donor community and the Congress, and was welcomed by Congress as an opportunity to clarify the positions of both sides regarding the current political crisis. After the troika representatives reiterated the international community's position that the San Jose Accord represented the best opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully, and that a resolution needed to be reached before the campaign season for the November elections was underway, deputies and proxies from four of the five parties represented in Congress laid out their opinions regarding the crisis and the events of June 28. ¶2. (C) The deputies also explained the position of the Congress regarding the issue of political amnesty in the San Jose Accord, based on the findings of a special congressional commission. They stated that amnesty was legally possible as described in the accord, but must be limited in scope only to cover political crimes. They added that whatever amnesty was agreed to in the final accord would then be subject to approval by the full Congress. Ambassador Reeder noted that a timeframe for such a process should be clarified, because the reconciliation process could not be used as a means to wait out the clock until the November elections. Reeder also noted the importance of successful, legitimate elections to the process of resolving the political crisis. Emboff added that without reaching an accord in advance, it would be difficult for the international community to see elections as fully legitimate. ¶3. (C) In the deputies' statements to the troika, many repeated common claims used to justify the coup that President Zelaya had violated the Constitution and was on the verge of committing his own "self coup," brushing aside the other two powers of state. Nationalist Deputy Rodolfo Irias Navas claimed that the international community had been too quick to judge the events of June 28, and employed the frequently-heard question from political figures who support the coup: "Where was the international community before June 28?" Emboff noted that for years before June 28, the international community had been working with the GOH to strengthen democratic institutions, rule of law and political processes, but that on June 28 when the branches of government faced a constitutional crisis, they opted to forego these institutions and processes in favor of force to remove the sitting president. The response from the deputies was a shift from the political rhetoric with which they opened the meeting to an acknowledgement from many that while they believed San Jose Accord was a good agreement, they feared the general public was not willing to accept it. They said without clear public acceptance, they did not see a way for political leaders to sign the accord. ¶4. (C) Comment: Press coverage of the meeting was moderate, and feedback from deputies to Emboffs was appreciative for the opportunity to share views directly. Given the visible shift in opinion from the members of the congressional commission assigned to study the amnesty from outright dismissal to their final ruling that it was legal and technically feasible (Ref A),Post believes that continued, personal engagement of key political figures, coupled with a similar push with key civil society leaders could produce a shift in opinion toward acceptance of the accord and a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Congress has left the door open to a possible resolution, but we must bring to light the public forces that favor the accord if the politicians are to take the final leap. End comment. TEGUCIGALP 00000722 002 OF 002 LLORENS