Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA692
2009-08-03 19:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS WITH MEDIATION
VZCZCXRO3642 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHTG #0692/01 2151920 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031920Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0311 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1152 RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//CINC/POLAD// IMMEDIATE RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000692
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: AEMR KDEM MARR PGOV PINR PREL HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS WITH MEDIATION
PARTICIPANTS
REF: (A) TEGUCIGALPA 663 AND PREVIOUS (B) SECSTATE
69222
TEGUCIGALP 00000692 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000692
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: AEMR KDEM MARR PGOV PINR PREL HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS WITH MEDIATION
PARTICIPANTS
REF: (A) TEGUCIGALPA 663 AND PREVIOUS (B) SECSTATE
69222
TEGUCIGALP 00000692 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador hosted a dinner on August 1
with former President Carlos Flores and Micheletti team
members to the Arias mediation, Arturo Corrales and Vilma
Morales (neither are members of the Micheletti regime; see
Bio notes para 7). Morales and Corrales said they remained
committed to an agreement under the Arias mediation.
However, they said the situation was difficult and
complicated due to the great polarization of Honduran
society and the great mistrust that exists between the two
sides. They briefed the Ambassador on various aspects of
the situation, giving their perspective on the status of
the mediation effort. End summary.
Micheletti Statement on NY Times Article
--------------
2. (C) Morales and Corrales described Micheletti's
statement dismissing the New York Times article that
reported his conversation with Arias as a major mistake and
showed Micheletti at his most "reflexive and reactive."
They had pushed hard to correct the record and
contributed to the draft issued later Friday evening that
reaffirmed the regime's support for the Arias mediation,
and acknowledged the valued role being played by Senator
Kerry in seeking a solution to the Honduran crisis.
Status of Political Amnesty
--------------
3. (C) Morales said that Congress came close to rejecting
the political amnesty proposal contained in the Arias draft
agreement on Friday, July 31. She said that if political
amnesty was off the table, it would be very difficult if
not impossible to have a viable mediation (which is Arias'
position). Morales had lobbied hard with the Congressional
committee assembled to review this issue. She said that in a
four-hour meeting Friday afternoon she made the case that
political amnesty was a viable and necessary part of an
agreement and would benefit all sides. She noted that the
anti-Zelaya legislators erroneously believe that the
political amnesty would only benefit Zelaya and his
supporters, not realizing that in fact Micheletti and his
supporters also would benefit from political amnesty,
particularly those members of the regime, in the military,
Congress and the judiciary, who may have been in some way
involved in the coup. She was able to get the committee to
back away from the position of outright rejection of
political amnesty. She said that she will provide
testimony on this issue in Congress on Monday, August 3.
She said that a creative way of working political amnesty
is to make it temporary and conditioned on both sides
zealously adhering and implementing the Arias agreement.
The idea is to use amnesty to create a set of incentives
for both sides to abide by the terms of the agreement.
Strong Enforcement Mechanisms are Essential to an Agreement
-------------- --------------
4. (C) Morales and Corrales believe that with some
modifications the current Arias proposal represents a good
blueprint for an agreement. However, both stressed that
the overwhelming majority of the anti-Zelaya coalition
simply do not believe that Zelaya will comply with its
terms. They both spoke of the importance of having
foolproof guarantees that the terms of the agreement will
be zealously implemented by both sides. Both joked that if
there were 1,000 Marines or UN peacekeepers to enforce it,
most people would support a technically sound agreement.
Therefore, the whole issue of guarantees and enforcement is
absolutely critical if the Micheletti side is going to make
the political decision to allow for Zelaya's return and the
restoration of his presidency.
TEGUCIGALP 00000692 002.2 OF 002
Influencing Micheletti
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador asked Morales and Corrales about
hard-core regime officials who were influencing Micheletti
not to accept the Arias mediation plan. Both said that the
other two mediation commissioners, regime Foreign Minister
Carlos Lopez Contreras and Mauricio Villeda (manager for
the Elvin Santos presidential campaign),are much more
skeptical about the process. Lopez Contreras is a polished
career diplomat, lawyer and member of the Nationalist
Party, ideologically very much on the right of the
political spectrum. He also may reflect the National Party
leadership's tendency to oppose an agreement since they
believe that a deal hurts their election prospects. The
National Party view in private is that as long as Zelaya
remains outside the country the Liberal Party will remain
splintered between its Zelaya, Micheletti and Santos
factions and will not be able to mount an effective
election campaign. Worse, Lopez is greatly influenced by
his wife Armida, who is one of the most active and
prominent civil society leaders of the "white" movement.
Armida is very strong, determined and rabidly opposed to
any agreement with Zelaya. Both described Villeda as a man
of great integrity, but someone who also carried a fair
amount of ideological baggage (he is an Opus Dei member).
Corrales believes Villeda was more flexible than Lopez,
since he understood an agreement would benefit the Liberal
Party.
The Role of Enrique Iglesias
--------------
6. (C) Corrales stressed that the strongest influence on
Micheletti was not so much within the regime, but
rather the influence of his supporters in the business
community, the Catholic Church, and the evangelicals who
are consistently pressuring him to stand firm. He said
these groups represented the core of his support base.
Both Corrales and Morales believe it is critically
important for Enrique Iglesias and other "credible"
international figures to come to Honduras and speak
directly to these civil society groups and help bring
them around to the view that a negotiated agreement was
in the best interest of all Hondurans. Iglesias is
greatly respected in Honduras and as IDB President was
viewed as an individual with great affinity for the
country and its people. He said if Iglesias could
influence the Micheletti supporters, it would be much
easier for Micheletti to finally take the plunge and
agree to the deal. They said the sooner Iglesias could
come, the better.
Bio Notes
--------------
7. (C) Corrales is not a Micheletti regime official. He
is a respected political consultant and a member of the
Christian Democratic Party. Micheletti trusts Corrales'
judgment, respects his abilities as a negotiator, and
personally asked him to serve on his delegation to the
Arias mediation. Morales is a highly regarded jurist and
constitutional expert who was President of the Supreme
Court until her term expired in late January of this year.
She is also not a member of the Micheletti regime; she is
affiliated with the opposition National Party. Micheletti
respects Morales and will listen to her advice. Corrales
and Morales are the two most moderate and independent
members of the Micheletti negotiating team.
LLORENS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: AEMR KDEM MARR PGOV PINR PREL HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS WITH MEDIATION
PARTICIPANTS
REF: (A) TEGUCIGALPA 663 AND PREVIOUS (B) SECSTATE
69222
TEGUCIGALP 00000692 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)
1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador hosted a dinner on August 1
with former President Carlos Flores and Micheletti team
members to the Arias mediation, Arturo Corrales and Vilma
Morales (neither are members of the Micheletti regime; see
Bio notes para 7). Morales and Corrales said they remained
committed to an agreement under the Arias mediation.
However, they said the situation was difficult and
complicated due to the great polarization of Honduran
society and the great mistrust that exists between the two
sides. They briefed the Ambassador on various aspects of
the situation, giving their perspective on the status of
the mediation effort. End summary.
Micheletti Statement on NY Times Article
--------------
2. (C) Morales and Corrales described Micheletti's
statement dismissing the New York Times article that
reported his conversation with Arias as a major mistake and
showed Micheletti at his most "reflexive and reactive."
They had pushed hard to correct the record and
contributed to the draft issued later Friday evening that
reaffirmed the regime's support for the Arias mediation,
and acknowledged the valued role being played by Senator
Kerry in seeking a solution to the Honduran crisis.
Status of Political Amnesty
--------------
3. (C) Morales said that Congress came close to rejecting
the political amnesty proposal contained in the Arias draft
agreement on Friday, July 31. She said that if political
amnesty was off the table, it would be very difficult if
not impossible to have a viable mediation (which is Arias'
position). Morales had lobbied hard with the Congressional
committee assembled to review this issue. She said that in a
four-hour meeting Friday afternoon she made the case that
political amnesty was a viable and necessary part of an
agreement and would benefit all sides. She noted that the
anti-Zelaya legislators erroneously believe that the
political amnesty would only benefit Zelaya and his
supporters, not realizing that in fact Micheletti and his
supporters also would benefit from political amnesty,
particularly those members of the regime, in the military,
Congress and the judiciary, who may have been in some way
involved in the coup. She was able to get the committee to
back away from the position of outright rejection of
political amnesty. She said that she will provide
testimony on this issue in Congress on Monday, August 3.
She said that a creative way of working political amnesty
is to make it temporary and conditioned on both sides
zealously adhering and implementing the Arias agreement.
The idea is to use amnesty to create a set of incentives
for both sides to abide by the terms of the agreement.
Strong Enforcement Mechanisms are Essential to an Agreement
-------------- --------------
4. (C) Morales and Corrales believe that with some
modifications the current Arias proposal represents a good
blueprint for an agreement. However, both stressed that
the overwhelming majority of the anti-Zelaya coalition
simply do not believe that Zelaya will comply with its
terms. They both spoke of the importance of having
foolproof guarantees that the terms of the agreement will
be zealously implemented by both sides. Both joked that if
there were 1,000 Marines or UN peacekeepers to enforce it,
most people would support a technically sound agreement.
Therefore, the whole issue of guarantees and enforcement is
absolutely critical if the Micheletti side is going to make
the political decision to allow for Zelaya's return and the
restoration of his presidency.
TEGUCIGALP 00000692 002.2 OF 002
Influencing Micheletti
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador asked Morales and Corrales about
hard-core regime officials who were influencing Micheletti
not to accept the Arias mediation plan. Both said that the
other two mediation commissioners, regime Foreign Minister
Carlos Lopez Contreras and Mauricio Villeda (manager for
the Elvin Santos presidential campaign),are much more
skeptical about the process. Lopez Contreras is a polished
career diplomat, lawyer and member of the Nationalist
Party, ideologically very much on the right of the
political spectrum. He also may reflect the National Party
leadership's tendency to oppose an agreement since they
believe that a deal hurts their election prospects. The
National Party view in private is that as long as Zelaya
remains outside the country the Liberal Party will remain
splintered between its Zelaya, Micheletti and Santos
factions and will not be able to mount an effective
election campaign. Worse, Lopez is greatly influenced by
his wife Armida, who is one of the most active and
prominent civil society leaders of the "white" movement.
Armida is very strong, determined and rabidly opposed to
any agreement with Zelaya. Both described Villeda as a man
of great integrity, but someone who also carried a fair
amount of ideological baggage (he is an Opus Dei member).
Corrales believes Villeda was more flexible than Lopez,
since he understood an agreement would benefit the Liberal
Party.
The Role of Enrique Iglesias
--------------
6. (C) Corrales stressed that the strongest influence on
Micheletti was not so much within the regime, but
rather the influence of his supporters in the business
community, the Catholic Church, and the evangelicals who
are consistently pressuring him to stand firm. He said
these groups represented the core of his support base.
Both Corrales and Morales believe it is critically
important for Enrique Iglesias and other "credible"
international figures to come to Honduras and speak
directly to these civil society groups and help bring
them around to the view that a negotiated agreement was
in the best interest of all Hondurans. Iglesias is
greatly respected in Honduras and as IDB President was
viewed as an individual with great affinity for the
country and its people. He said if Iglesias could
influence the Micheletti supporters, it would be much
easier for Micheletti to finally take the plunge and
agree to the deal. They said the sooner Iglesias could
come, the better.
Bio Notes
--------------
7. (C) Corrales is not a Micheletti regime official. He
is a respected political consultant and a member of the
Christian Democratic Party. Micheletti trusts Corrales'
judgment, respects his abilities as a negotiator, and
personally asked him to serve on his delegation to the
Arias mediation. Morales is a highly regarded jurist and
constitutional expert who was President of the Supreme
Court until her term expired in late January of this year.
She is also not a member of the Micheletti regime; she is
affiliated with the opposition National Party. Micheletti
respects Morales and will listen to her advice. Corrales
and Morales are the two most moderate and independent
members of the Micheletti negotiating team.
LLORENS