TFHO1: ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSULAR SECTION'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000684 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/EX E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CASC CLOK CMGT CPAS CVIS CFED SUBJECT: TFHO1: ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSULAR SECTION'S RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS TEGUCIGALP 00000684 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) Summary: The coup against President Mel, Zelaya on June 28th tested the Consular Sections ability to safeguard American citizens in a time of political uncertainty. The section proved to be up to the challenge, successfully processing hundreds of AmCit calls on the ACS hotline, and making efficient use of the warden system and embassy website to keep the American population in Honduras and the United States updated on the unfolding political situation, and travel precautions. This cable explores the section,s response to the political crisis, and takes a look at lessons learned from this experience, to better prepare this section and other posts for similar emergencies in the future. End Summary. -------------- ACS Hotline: Responding to the Crisis -------------- ¶2. (U) In the week that followed the coup, the American Citizen Services hotline was inundated with over 125 calls per day; to handle the high volume, the Consular Section closed to all but select emergency American Citizen Services. In the first week, calls were predominantly from AmCits in Honduras, seeking embassy advice on evacuation, travel and transportation, and general information on the political situation. As the crisis continued to unfold (and receive attention from the international media),the number of in-country calls were matched in number by calls from the United States. The hotline received calls from family members, congressional offices, universities, and church groups, inquiring after AmCits in Honduras and the status of the U.S. travel policy to the country. The number of coup-related calls decreased substantially in the weeks that followed, holding steady for the past 1.5 weeks at around five coup-related calls out of the approximately 50 calls the ACS phone line receives daily. Calls in recent days are from AmCits in the United States, seeking Embassy recommendations for upcoming travel to Honduras; though advised on the embassy,s position to defer all nonessential travel, these callers have appeared reluctant to rethink or postpone their travel arrangements. -------------- The Wardens: Reports from the Field -------------- ¶3. (U) About ten days after the coup, the Consular Section attempted to individually contact its wardens to better assess the aftermath of the crisis (in terms of protest and travel restrictions) across Honduras. In total, 14 wardens were reached, representing 9 of the 11 zones in Honduras in which the embassy has a warden presence. Wardens representing COPA zone - which includes the tourist site Copan - could not be reached, while wardens covering the Tegucigalpa zone were not contacted. Most other wardens reported that activity in their zones had calmed down substantially from the week following the coup. The number of protests (if they had not died down completely) had decreased dramatically, and any protests in the last few days had been peaceful. There were few roadblocks; wardens reported buses and commercial vehicles entering and exiting their zones without difficulty. Any military/police presence appeared to be nominal. Wardens in the Bay Islands reported calm but expressed concern for tourist businesses due to the stream of tourists leaving the islands due to the political situation, as well as the embassy,s travel recommendations dissuading travel to Honduras. -------------- NIV Activity and Patterns Post Coup -------------- ¶4. (U) The Consular Section was closed to Non-Immigrant Visa services the week following the coup, re-opening July 7 for scheduled interviews. Officers reported nothing out of the ordinary among applicants or their expressed reasons for obtaining visas, adding that applicants who have been TEGUCIGALP 00000684 002.2 OF 003 interviewed since the coup were scheduled well before June ¶28. Two notable exceptions were interviewed the week of July 20 when the attorney for the mayor of San Pedro Sula, as well as the mayor,s son interviewed for an NIV. Both sought temporary shelter in the US in order to escape the threats on their lives following the arrest of the AmCit SPS mayor (he was later released). Also of note, the families of two Supreme Court justices requested that their B1/B2 visas be "transferred" to their diplomatic passports. While the Consular Section has refused to accept or review any visa applications from the de-facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a handful of diplomatic visas from the Honduran government-in-exile have been approved. The number of referrals has increased as the wait time for a regular appointment has increased and pro-Zelaya applicants appear nervous about being able to leave the country. The Consular section put in place a procedure whereby all B referrals may contact the call center and will automatically be considered for an expedited appointment. Starting July 27th, officers will start interviewing regular applicants who scheduled NIV interviews after the June 28th coup; however the NIV section does not anticipate many applicants requesting visas solely because of the political unrest. -------------- American Citizen Services Post-Coup -------------- ¶5. (U) The Consular Section opened only for emergency American Citizen Services the week following the coup. ACS issued four CRBAs (Consular Report for Birth Abroad) for American citizens leaving the country in light of the political unrest. ACS resumed normal operations July 7. In the two weeks following the coup, the ACS hotline received a large number of calls from AmCits in Honduras looking to acquire emergency passports. However, AmCits were informed that the embassy would not issue emergency passports for reasons related to the coup; such requests would be processed within 10 days, the normal turnaround. Only one emergency passport (for a child) was issued specifically for reasons related to the political unrest. -------------- Lessons Learned -------------- ¶6. (U) Consular staff quickly responded to the needs of American citizens in the aftermath of the coup, processing hundreds of calls to the hotline, and updating warden messages, talking points, and the embassy page in a timely manner, effectively upholding the Mission,s goal to enhance the security and well-being of American citizens in Honduras. The section emerged with some lessons learned from its response to the crisis: ¶7. (U) First, training all LES on the CTF system is imperative to a successful response to a crisis in which there is a high volume of calls to the ACS hotline. In the week following the coup, there were 5 FSOs and 3-4 ACS LES answering the phones at any given time. However, the high volume of calls left those on the hotline with little time to effectively log calls into the Crisis Services system in CTF. Meanwhile, other LES in the office, who were available to answer calls, were not trained in the CTF system, and therefore had no reliable access to our talking points, and no way to log calls. The section,s response was to hold a CTF training mid-week for all LES, increasing the number of people available to process calls, and freeing FSOs to resume visa services the following week. ¶8. (U) Second, in the event that visa services should be shut down for an extended period of time, the consular section learned the value of maintaining close ties to CSC staff; with their assistance, the vast majority of 950 NIV applicants had their missed appointments rescheduled within 72 hours. This proactive relationship with CSC, as well as the prompt press release to Honduran media detailing the TEGUCIGALP 00000684 003.2 OF 003 closure of the section no doubt greatly reduced the number of NIV-related calls to the section, thereby creating more time to respond to ACS calls. ¶9. (U) Third, NIV realized that it should have opened more slots for emergency visa appointments to better accommodate applicants who, due to the section,s four-day closure, were now under time constraints for their visas. ¶10. (U) Finally, the section observed the importance of always having stand-by projects for NIV and IV FSOs. Even with the high volume of calls on the ACS line, the absence of visa interviews left officers with a certain amount of downtime; having projects (or catch-up work to complete) constituted a more effective use of FSOs, time. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (U) The seamless integration of the NIV, IV, and ACS sections, in collaboration with the support received from CSC and the Department, allowed the section to efficiently and successfully serve U.S. citizen interests in a time of crisis. End Comment. LLORENS