TFH01: HONDURAN CONGRESS REVIEWS AMNESTY ARTICLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000677 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: HONDURAN CONGRESS REVIEWS AMNESTY ARTICLE IN SAN JOSE AGREEMENT TEGUCIGALP 00000677 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Honduran de facto regime is analyzing in detail the San Jose Agreement to ensure it conforms with Honduran law and the Constitution before the Micheletti regime makes a final decision on whether to accept the agreement. Embassy Political and Economic officers met with all members of the Special Commission of Congress analyzing the amnesty aspect of the San Jose Proposal, which is considered one of its most contentious. Emboffs reiterated the U.S. position and encouraged the commission to consider the Arias agreement as the final opportunity for a peaceful resolution. Commission members expressed a broad range of opinions, but the bulk agreed the agreement needed further clarification on the scope and definition of amnesty. We will continue to push to get the Congress to issue a statement supporting Arias, mediation efforts. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Congressional commission studying article two of the agreement, regarding amnesty, is comprised of Deputies from all parties in the Congress, except the Democratic Union (UD),which is not participating in Congressional work in protest of the coup. Congress is the government body empowered to grant amnesties (in contrast to "pardon," which is the President's prerogative),and therefore Congress has been charged with the analysis. On July 28th and 29th Emboffs met with Juan Ramon Velasquez Nazar (Christian Democrat),Jose Toribio Aguilera (PINU),Enrique Rodriguez Burchard (Liberal),Ricardo Rodriguez (Liberal),Emilio Cabrera (Liberal),Rodolfo Irias Navas (National),Donaldo Reyes (National) and Rolando Dubon Bueso (National). This commission is expected to deliver an opinion/decision to the executive branch by the end of the week. ¶3. (C) Emboffs reiterated the U.S. position that Zelaya is the only legitimate president of Honduras, that the United States does not recognize the de facto regime of Roberto Micheletti and that the Arias proposal presents the best option at a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In all meetings Emboffs stressed that the agreement provides guarantees to preserve constitutional and democratic order and addresses the common concerns of Hondurans in reinstating Zelaya by providing robust safeguards through the oversight 
of verification and truth commissions. In addition, the Arias process was presented as a way to prevent further damage to the U.S.-Honduras relationship. ¶4. (C) More than fundamental disagreements with most points in the proposal, concerns seem to focus on clarification of details or apparent contradictions that could likely be solved by more explicit language. While most Deputies were positive on the Arias proposal in general, many felt there was a lack of clarity regarding the definition of amnesty, namely what crimes are covered in the amnesty and which are covered in the six-month moratorium. Some stated that the population does not yet understand the difference between amnesty for political crimes and pardons for common crimes and the commission is feeling strong public pressure rooted in a fear that Zelaya will get away with common crimes through the amnesty. Some members felt this put them in a position of saying to the Honduran people that some citizens were above the law. Another point of agreement among members was that while the Micheletti government was still open to dialogue they believed Zelaya had given up on the process. ¶5. C) Commission members also noted concern over the apparent inconsistency between clauses one and six, which ask for both the restoration of public authorities to their condition prior to June 28th and the establishment of a unity government. Many asked that the Ambassador/USG consider supporting the idea of Micheletti and Zelaya resignations followed by a third party, such as the President of the Supreme Court, stepping in as a placeholder President for the remainder of the current term. Most also reiterated that Honduras should be viewed as having put the brakes on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' influence in the region TEGUCIGALP 00000677 002.2 OF 002 rather than as a state that had committed a coup. Finally, most argued that the coup would be a deterrent against future corrupt administrations. ¶6. (C) Some specific personal views conveyed during these meetings: Dubon Bueso commented that though Zelaya would not control any of the branches of government, he would still have control over the budget through the Council of Ministers and this would give him power to do great harm. He said this one point is not addressed in the accord and should be. Donaldo Reyes said he remained perplexed by the U.S. position and our lack of support for the Micheletti regime, and that the Zelaya protests were the result of financial support from Chavez. Rodolfo Irias Navas questioned why we were not concerned with Honduran affairs when it was Zelaya trampling over the constitution. He added that many believe that as soon as Zelaya is back, Chavez will exert control over him through financial means. Toribio Aguilera said he was willing to propose that amnesty cover the misappropriation of funds for the 4th urn because this money came from a Venezuelan grant not from taxpayers. Cabrera said they believe that the international community would resume aid once the elections took place. Enrique Rodriguez appears to be the commission member most sympathetic to the USG position, and stated that there were no legal hurdles in the amnesty that could not be overcome with minor clarification. He noted there was debate amongst the commission members over whether amnesty could be granted to individuals by name, but noted there was precedent for this. Velasquez Nazar felt that the agreement was an improvisation but that the Hondurans have already come up with a solution, and the USG just does not like it. He also explained that the Commission's process in making a decision on the amnesty article would require a consultation process with civil society. ¶7. (U) Emboffs encouraged all members to request any guarantees or clarifications they felt were necessary to make the agreement work. ¶8. (C) Comment: On balance, the commission members were not dismissive of the San Jose Agreement outright, but there were clear correlations between those who were philosophically in favor of reaching a negotiated agreement to the political crisis and their willingness to interpret the agreement as acceptable within the framework of the Honduran Constitution. Our concern is that Congress will ultimately use constitutional questions as cover for rejecting the agreement. Our objective continues to be to get the Congress to issue a statement supporting Arias, mediation efforts. End comment. LLORENS