TFH01: WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR WEEKEND VIOLENCE

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR WEEKEND VIOLENCE

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Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4(d)


1. (SBU) Summary: While civil action has so far remained
peaceful save for the death of one protester on July 5, there
has been a palpable increase in tension leading into the
scheduled July 18 round of negotiations between President
Zelaya and de facto regime head Micheletti. The prospects
for violence as we approach the weekend are certainly on the
minds of many Hondurans, and scenarios of violence abound in
both the public rhetoric and the rumor mill. The Embassy has
closely monitored reports and rumors as we hear them, though
many remain uncorroborated. End summary.


2. (S) President Zelaya has made several public statements
citing Article 3 of the Constitution asserting the right of
the Honduran people to use insurgency to combat the
Micheletti regime. (Note: While Article 3 has been cited by
Zelaya supporters from the start of the crisis, Zelaya
himself had refrained from such rhetoric until this week End
note.). We have information that preparations have been made
by pro-Zelaya forces to carry out the violent acts implied by
Zelaya's statements.


3. (S) As of July 6, we had a report that Venezuelan
President Chavez had arranged for food, weapons (pistols
and rifles) and other supplies to be brought into Honduras
from Nicaragua for the use of Zelaya supporters. On July 13,
there was a report that up to 30 Salvadoran leftist activists
had entered Honduras with powder for use in improvised
explosive devices.


4. (S) Information we have obtained from sources very close
to Zelaya indicate that though Chavez is agitating for
insurgency sooner rather than later, Zelaya intends to hold
off on calling for such action until he perceives that the
Arias talks are not progressing, or that the Micheletti side
is not negotiating in good faith. Our best guess, therefore,
is that no escalation of violence will occur until Sunday,
July 19 at the earliest, though other reporting indicates
that as early as Friday, July 17, the Bloque Popular intends
to take violent action hoping to provoke the Honduran
military and/or police into an even more violent response.


5. (S) At the least, we expect that Zelaya would make a
public announcement that the Arias talks had failed, giving
us fair warning that violent actions might occur. Another
scenario would be that if the radical left perceives talks
are progressing, they would seek to provoke violence in an
effort to torpedo a resolution they deemed undesirable.


6. (S) In either case if things go wrong and violence erupts,
we expect it might take the form of explosives
planted at government offices, fast food restaurants or near
private homes of high-profile regime supporters.
(Note: there have been isolated cases of grenades and small
improvised explosives placed in garbage cans and thrown into
buildings over the course of the crisis, but with no injury
so far. End note.) Individual agitators mixed in with large
protests would have little problem inciting conflict with a
few well-timed and well-placed shots. We have information
that the Honduran military is running low on non-lethal crowd
control measures (like tear gas),which may increase the
possibility of violent confrontation.


7. (SBU) Pro-Micheletti daily "El Heraldo" published an
article July 16 titled "Plan Caracas" detailing one such
scenario. According to the article, the destabilization
effort would begin by staging a protest at a guarded public
building. Gang members paid between 300 and 500 Lempiras
(approximately USD15 to 25) would be placed at the front of
the crowd and would violently engage the military in an
effort to provoke return fire. Then, "irregular groups"
infiltrated into the crowd would then open fire to ensure a
massacre. The massacre would be blamed on military forces
controlled by the de facto Micheletti regime and provoke
anarchy in the country.

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8. (SBU) The final piece of the plan according to "El
Heraldo" is for Zelaya to enter the country via its southern
border with Nicaragua under the protection of local drug
traffickers and "armed cells" that had infiltrated into
Honduras. While "Plan Caracas" sounds fantastical and has
not been confirmed by other Embassy sources, it is emblematic
of the rumors circulating Tegucigalpa that Zelaya is planning
to return to retake the presidency violently, and with
Venezuelan support.


9. (S) Another version of the Zelaya return scenario has him
returning overland from Nicaragua amidst a crowd of
civilians, thereby presenting the Honduran Armed Forces with
an impossible decision between using force against
civilians or letting Zelaya enter. Several Embassy contacts
believe such a return could happen as early as Saturday, but
are more likely to take place after the 30th anniversary
celebrations of the FSLN revolution in
Nicaragua, scheduled for July 18-19.


10. (C) Post received reports from numerous sources on July
16 that President Zelaya had already entered
Honduras and was in his home department of Olancho awaiting
an opportunity to move on the capital. The
rumors claimed the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) were
"militarizing the area in an effort to prevent Zelaya's
return." Post's HOAF sources stated the rumors were
incorrect and there was no military buildup in that area.


11. (S) Comment: The ubiquity of rumors of violence and
rumors of Zelaya's return, ready for a fight, has Honduran
society on edge. We will continue to closely monitor any/all
indications that pro-Zelaya and international forces may be
planning for fight. End Comment.
LLORENS