HONDURAN COUP: LIBERAL PARTY CANDIDATE AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000594 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM HO SUBJECT: HONDURAN COUP: LIBERAL PARTY CANDIDATE AT CROSSROADS REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 592 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 587 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 581 ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 580 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a July 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Liberal Party presidential candidate Elvin Santos worried that his campaign had been harmed by the recent coup, which fractured his Liberal Party. Of even greater concern to Santos was the possibility the November 29 elections would leave the incoming president isolated internationally and polarized internally. The Ambassador agreed that this was a risk and pressed Santos to be part of the solution by convincing de facto regime President Micheletti to participate in the June 18 talks in San Jose to discuss, even hypothetically, the conditions under which he would agree to the reinstatement of Manuel Zelaya as president. Santos agreed to make initial overtures through proxies to Micheletti and pressed the Ambassador to develop ideas that could form the basis of negotiations. End summary. -------------- Ambassador Lays Out U.S. Position -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by laying out U.S. policy in the wake of the June 28 ouster of President Zelaya. He emphasized that the constitutional and democratic order must be restored in Honduras. To do this, President Zelaya must be reinstated prior to the November 29 elections. The best avenue for a quick and peaceful resolution was the successful conclusion of the talks hosted in San Jose by President Arias. President Obama and Secretary Clinton strongly support the Arias process. The Ambassador highlighted the flexibility on the terms of Zelaya's return, noting that his return would necessarily be the result of negotiations that would ensure an orderly succession following the elections. Any agreement would be monitored by the international community and guaranteed by the United States. -------------- Santos Caught In Middle -------------- ¶3. (C) Santos emphasized that he played no role in the coup that ousted Zelaya; rather he had the most to lose in the political crisis. Now, following the coup, Santos worried that his candidacy was in peril. Before the coup, he enjoyed a 14-point lead over his main rival, National Party candidate �A;Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo. In the weeks since, Santo's standing had fallen and he now trailed Lobo by six points. The Liberal Party was badly polarized between Zelaya and Micheletti supporters. Were he to publicly call for Zelaya's return, Santos said, he would immediately alienate pro-Micheletti party members, independents, as well as possible defectors from the National Party. On the other hand, were he to publicly support Micheletti's government, he would lose support from the Zelaya camp. Although Zelaya's popularity had fallen sharply prior to and following the coup, he continues to command loyalty from an important portion of the Liberal Party. This political dilemma was why Santos had maintained a low profile and limited his public appearances to events that highlight his concern for peace and democracy and his solidarity with the Honduran people. ¶4. (C) With his electoral strategy in tatters, Santos wondered aloud what sort of Presidency he would inherit even if he were to win. He voiced concern that the de facto regime may not respect the independence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE),which might lead international observers to view the elections as illegitimate, foment political unrest and perpetuate international isolation. This was not the kind of situation he wanted to inherit as President. Santos pressed the Ambassador to recognize that the elections were not related to the current political crisis and to mobilize USG resources to help build legitimacy around the democratic process. -------------- Help Us Help You -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the legitimacy of the upcoming election process was undermined without the successful restoration of the democratic and constitutional order. Santos needed to reach out to Arias, OAS SecGen Insulza and Micheletti to help broker a solution. He needed to appear to be above the fray and to be an important part of the solution. His efforts, if successful, would bolster his electoral chances and go a long way to restoring legitimacy to the upcoming electoral process. Santos responded that while he had spoken with Arias and Insulza and genuinely wanted to help resolve the crisis, he had not met with Micheletti since the coup. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador suggested that Santos reach out to Micheletti through former President Carlos Flores and Micheletti advisor Arturo Corrales to convince him of the urgent imperative to bring Zelaya back for the sake of the party, its candidate and of Honduras. Santos needed to convince Micheletti to participate in the June 18 session in San Jose and discuss, even hypothetically, what conditions might be acceptable to both sides in the event of Zelaya's return. ¶7. (C) Santos, clearly worried about the approach to Micheletti, said the problem is one of trust. Zelaya doesn't trust Micheletti to engage honestly in the Arias talks and Micheletti doesn't trust Zelaya to abide by any agreement he makes in San Jose. What is needed is a mechanism of guarantees. An outside actor, particularly the United States, is best placed to provide ideas for the parties to negotiate an effective and mutually acceptable framework of guarantees. Without a workable plan it would be difficult for him to approach Micheletti. Nevertheless, Santos promised, he would seek advice from Flores and ask Corrales to make an initial overture to Micheletti. LLORENS