ZELAYA OPENS COMMUNICATIONS WITH CARLOS FLORES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000587 SIPDIS WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: ZELAYA OPENS COMMUNICATIONS WITH CARLOS FLORES REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 580 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 579 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 577 AND PREVIOUS TEGUCIGALP 00000587 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya and former President Carlos Flores, meeting in New Orleans July 12, agreed to remain in informal contact to help resolve the political crisis engulfing Honduras since the June 28 coup. Zelaya pledged to stay engaged in discussions hosted by Costa Rican President Arias but expressed skepticism about the usefulness of the talks. Zelaya is increasingly skeptical that he will return to power but said the United States must play a key role if the crisis is to be resolved quickly and peacefully. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador has received several readouts on the July 12 New Orleans meeting between President Manuel Zelaya and former President and Liberal Party elder statesman Carlos Flores. The Ambassador was unable to speak directly to Zelaya, who was in transit from New Orleans to Nicaragua. However, during a July 12 dinner at the First Lady's residence in Valle de Angeles, Zelaya's daughter, Pichu, relayed a message given to her earlier that evening from her father. Zelaya thought the meeting with Flores had gone well. Flores is well respected as the "grand old man" of the Liberal Party and enjoys great influence over de facto caretaker President Roberto Micheletti. As such, Zelaya thinks he can play a positive role in resolving the crisis and very much wants to keep this channel of communication open. ¶3. (C) Zelaya relayed his skepticism about the Arias talks, believing the Micheletti regime will use them to delay resolution of the crisis and consolidate its power. Nevertheless, strong backing by the United States and the international community had convinced him to stay engaged in the talks. While he did not plan to personally attend the next round of talks, he would send a delegation. (Note: President Arias told the Ambassador July 13 that he would call the next round for Saturday, July 18). ¶4. (C) Zelaya also asserted that USG engagement in the crisis was critical to bringing about a quick and peaceful solution. U.S. pressure on the Micheletti regime was of particular importance to force it to recognize the long-term advantages of restoring Zelaya. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador also spoke with Arturo Corrales, a senior (unofficial )member of Micheletti's negotiating team and a major political kingmaker, although he is from the small Christian Democrat Party. Corrales noted that Flores had been an outspoken critic of Zelaya and the two had not spoken since the June 28 coup. Zelaya had used the beginning of the meeting to vent his frustrations over what he suspected were dwindling hopes of returning to power. Flores noted that while Zelaya had done much to create the political conditions for the coup, the coup was wrong and he had not supported it. Flores said he would work to resolve the crisis. ¶6. (C) Corrales went on to say that Micheletti was committed to a successful resolution of the crisis and would be willing to resign the presidency if it would improve chances for national reconciliation. (Comment: Micheletti continues to say that Zelaya will not be permitted to return to Honduras during his tenure. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) On July 13, the Ambassador had breakfast with Carlos Flores to further discuss the situation and the New Orleans meeting. Flores described the meeting as positive and an opportunity to patch up his relationship with Zelaya. Flores described Zelaya as pulled in several directions and of three TEGUCIGALP 00000587 002.2 OF 002 minds: -- The Chavez mind: President Chavez continues to exert great influence over Zelaya and is pushing him to be inflexible and agree to nothing but full restoration of his powers and jail for those behind the coup. The international community should be cajoled into supporting this position. Under this policy of confrontation, the Honduran population would continue to be polarized, and armed insurrection may be the only way to restore political legitimacy. Armed insurrection is something Chavez would support. -- The American mind: Under this way of thinking, U.S. intervention in the crisis could be decisive in achieving a quick and peaceful resolution to the crisis. U.S. pressure is directly responsible for Zelaya's engagement in the Arias process. -- The Flores mind: Zelaya engaged Flores in New Orleans to open another channel of communication internal to the Liberal Party. Flores's influence over the Micheletti regime might offer Zelaya an opportunity to return to power. ¶8. (C)Flores said Zelaya would continue to pursue each of these avenues to see which offered him the best route back to power. However, Flores believes that Zelaya was increasingly skeptical that he would be able to return to Honduras before the November elections. While Zelaya believes his return would help to reconcile a now polarized society and do much to legitimize upcoming elections, the Micheletti regime has so far showed little sign of yielding in negotiations. Zelaya also recognizes his own unpopularity in Honduras and that any return would be difficult. ¶9. (C) Comment: Flores is the leading elder statesman of the Liberal Party. His involvement indicates that at its core, the Honduran crisis reflects the fracture of the ruling Liberal Party. The coup has greatly damaged the prospects of Elvin Santos, the Liberal Party's candidate in the upcoming election. Although a long shot, Flores appears willing to reconcile with Zelaya and mediate a solution in an effort to salvage some sort of party unity in advance of the November 29 elections. End Comment. LLORENS