CONGRESS PULLS BACK FROM THE BRINK ON REMOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000501 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN WHA/FO FOR A/S SHANNON AND DAS DAVE ROBINSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL HO SUBJECT: CONGRESS PULLS BACK FROM THE BRINK ON REMOVING PRESIDENT ZELAYA TEGUCIGALP 00000501 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On the evening of June 25, the National Congress came close to bringing to the floor a vote on the removal of President Zelaya from office. The Ambassador strongly advised Congress President Micheletti against such hasty action that could plunge Honduras into a deeper constitutional crisis. Other senior politicians also worked behind-the-scenes to push Congress back from the brink. In the end, congressional leaders backed away from the vote and limited themselves to launching an inquiry into legal violations that may have been committed by President Zelaya and his Administration. Supreme Court President Rivera told us that Congress does not have the power to impeach the President, since the repeal of such a law in 2005. Currently, the only means to remove a sitting President is through the filing of a criminal case filed by the Public Ministry with the Supreme Court itself. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On the evening of June 25, Congress President Robert Micheletti called the Ambassador to inform him that with the strong support of the Honduran political parties (including the two major parties ) Liberal and National),the National Congress had begun a formal debate to consider removing President Zelaya from office. Micheletti said that Congress would deliberate and review legal violations committed by the President and his Administration during his term of office. He said that the President's illegal decision to fire Armed Forces Chief Romeo Vasquez had been the immediate catalyst of the Congressional action. He said he believed that he had the votes to take this definitive action against the President. Micheletti said he wanted the United States to be informed of the Congressional deliberations and likely action. The Ambassador responded that while the USG had great respect for the Honduran Congress and would not ever attempt to tell the sovereign legislators what they should do, our view was that this action seemed totally premature, was dangerous and could precipitate a major constitutional crisis in Honduras with uncertain results. The Ambassador spoke of the high tension prevailing in the country and said the potential for social conflict and violence was high. Any hasty action by the Congress against a democratically-elected President was an extremely serious matter that could be viewed in a very critical manner by many in the international community. The Ambassador also noted that the OAS's Permanent Council was scheduled to discuss and debate the situation in Honduras tomorrow. He noted that while some people in the country were unsatisfied by the GOH's manipulation of the OAS's role in the June 28 poll, OAS involvement could be supportive of finding a legal, constitutional and peaceful way out of the crisis. ¶3. (C) Micheletti responded that President Zelaya was bent on bringing down the democratic system in Honduras. He noted that earlier that day Zelaya had threatened to shutdown the Congress and to put him in jail. He said that Zelaya had completely alienated the Honduran Congress and that the President had virtually no/no support. Micheletti appreciated the Ambassador's honest advice but felt that the moment for decision had arrived. The Ambassador again warned that such rash action could result in incalculably negative consequences in Honduras and advised patience and calm. Later the Ambassador made calls to several key Liberal Party leaders including Presidential candidate Elvin Santos and Former President Carlos Flores and conveyed our concern about the ongoing deliberations in Congress. Both agreed that Congress' action seemed rash and irrational, but both said that Zelaya's increasing radical rhetoric and actions, his willingness to push for a poll that was clearly illegal, and his firing of the military high command had alienated the TEGUCIGALP 00000501 002.2 OF 002 Congress. However, Santos and Flores said they were also trying to influence key congressional leaders, including Micheletti (who both described as stubborn),and would continue to make calls that evening. Later that evening we learned that following private consultations between the leaders of the different parties and delegations, an agreement was reached to avoid a floor vote on whether to remove the President. Instead, Congress voted to launch an investigation of the President's misdeeds with the purpose of considering some future action by the Congress. ¶4. (C) In a meeting on June 25, Honduran Supreme Court President Jorge Rivera Aviles told the Ambassador that he was extremely worried about the planned Congressional action against the President. Rivera said that congressional leaders had approached him about their plans to remove the President. Rivera said he advised against such action, which he described as illegal. Rivera said that in 2005 the Congress had repealed the impeachment law. Currently the only means to remove a President was through the filing of a criminal case by the Public Ministry (Attorney General) with the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court would appoint a Supreme Court Magistrate to hear the case. A ruling by the Magistrate against the President represented the only means to legally separate him/her from the office. Rivera said the Public Ministry might opt to move against Zelaya if he goes forward with direct support for the June 28, which a judge has ruled as illegal. ¶5. (C) Comment: Zelaya's decision to fire General Vasquez has further polarized Honduras and has radicalized anti-Zelaya sentiment in Congress and many public institutions including the judiciary and the armed forces. Fortunately, the decision by congressional leaders to pull back from the brink of a constitutional crisis provides a reprieve that hopefully can help ease the tensions from their current fever pitch. In a conversation with the Ambassador on June 25, Zelaya seemed to be more aware of his increasing isolation and vulnerability. The Ambassador took the opportunity to encourage him to do use his role as President of "all Hondurans" to do everything he could to lower the tensions and send conciliatory public messages, and engage in dialogue with the opposition. LLORENS