HONDURAS NOT YET TO COMMON GROUND ON CUBA AND OAS,

S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 000405 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019 TAGS: PREL OAS KSUM CU HO SUBJECT: HONDURAS NOT YET TO COMMON GROUND ON CUBA AND OAS, BUT PRESIDENT ZELAYA READY TO KEEP WORKING REF: TEGUCIGALPA 382 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador hosted President Zelaya and Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas for lunch on May 29 to discuss the issue of Cuba in the upcoming Organization of American States General Assembly (OASGA) meeting on June 1-3 in San Pedro Sula. The Ambassador stressed the domestic backlash that could result from the lifting of the 1962 resolution that excluded Cuba from the OAS. Therefore the United States could not support such a decision without the OASGA reaffirming, in the treatment of Cuba, its commitment to democracy and human rights consistent with the Democratic Charter. In the lengthy discussion, Zelaya appeared open to compromise, but was continually pulled back from the middle ground by the more radical and ideological Rodas. The meeting reached no conclusion, but Zelaya expressed the hope that compromise text could be found to accommodate differing perspectives. End summary. ¶2. (S/NF) The Ambassador reviewed the essential elements of the proposed &Group of 128 resolution that abrogates the 1962 resolution, but also calls for a dialogue with Cuba and establishes a framework for discussion of Cuba,s possible future reintegration into the Inter-American system based on the OAS,s democratic principles enshrined in the Democratic Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. He noted that any decision to lift the 1962 resolution was a very difficult step for the United States that could have serious domestic political repercussions. He noted that President Obama had embarked on a more open policy towards Cuba, was open to dialogue, but would not compromise U.S. democratic and human rights principles. ¶3. (S/NF) President Zelaya acknowledged USG concerns, but said there were many countries who would be just as troubled if the OASGA imposed strict conditions on Cuba, particularly since Cuba had expressed no interest in seeking membership in the OAS. The Ambassador agreed that the short-term implications may be minimal but that the OAS needed to provide a medium- and long-term framework for the reentry of Cuba that was consistent with the OAS,s democratic values. The Ambassador noted that the resolution proposed by the Group of 12 provided potentially good compromise language. ¶4. (S/NF) Zelaya said that the best option was to avoid discussing Cuba, and suggested there be some way to remove mention of Cuba and still lift the 1962 resolution. He said the OASGA should be dealing with issues of the present, such as crime, the hemisphere,s economic concerns and the environment and not "Cubanize" the gathering. The Ambassador noted that others, not the United States, had brought the issue of Cuba to this OASGA. The Ambassador stressed that any decision to lift the 1962 resolution would need to offer a framework for Cuba,s future reentry into the Inter-American system consistent with the Democratic Charter. Zelaya proposed a shorter, two-part statement that would lift the resolution without mention of Cuba, then reaffirm that all member nations needed to adhere to the OAS democratic principles, again with no explicit mention of Cuba. Rodas interjected that such language would not be acceptable and would be refuted by most Latin American countries. After much debate between the FM and the President, Zelaya moved back to a position more akin to the initial Honduran draft resolution -- a scaled back resolution of only a couple of lines that abrogates the 1962 resolution but does not mention Cuba by name. The Ambassador stated such a resolution would be unacceptable to the United States. ¶5. (S/NF) In closing, Zelaya reiterated that he did not want to host a General Assembly that was divisive, or that was harmful to anyone,s interests. The meeting ended without reaching any agreement, but a concerned Zelaya departed telling the Ambassador that he believed agreement could be reached in the coming days, and he was ready to work toward that goal. ¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Zelaya appeared open to a serious discussion that took U.S. interests into account, and on several occasions seemed to be approaching the U.S. position. Unfortunately, FM Rodas did not play a constructive role and repeatedly pushed the President away from a more conciliatory position, repeating her strong, dogmatic position. We will continue to stay in close touch with developments in Washington and seek guidance from the Department in an effort to bring Zelaya to a position acceptable to U.S. interests. End comment. LLORENS