Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA176
2009-03-16 14:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

Mission Honduras Merida Priorities for FY 2009-10

Tags:  PREL SNAR PGOV KJUS EAID MOPS MARR HO 
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PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHTG #0176/01 0751426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161426Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9424
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 8045
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1326
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC 0906
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO
RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000176 


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SNAR PGOV KJUS EAID MOPS MARR HO
SUBJECT: Mission Honduras Merida Priorities for FY 2009-10

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000176 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL SNAR PGOV KJUS EAID MOPS MARR HO SUBJECT: Mission Honduras Merida Priorities for FY 2009-10 ¶1. Summary: As Merida budgets are laid out for FY 2009 and FY 2010, Post seeks a shift away from a focus on expensive, high-tech equipment toward support that host governments with limited resources, such as the GOH, can sustain beyond the Merida mandate, rather than burdening them with recurring maintenance costs. Fixing a broken seized criminal assets program can harness the criminals' own resources against them. Building community policing can reduce the need for prosecution through healthier communities that police themselves. By turning the focus toward building domestic capacity through training, coordination and cost-effective solutions, the legacy of Merida can be a long-term success. End summary. -------------- ¶I. Key Law Enforcement Challenges -------------- ¶2. Challenge A -- Lack of Resources: The primary challenge facing the GOH in accomplishing the goals of the Merida Initiative is an overall lack of resources. In the case of interdiction, the Armed Forces (HOAF) lack the funds to procure, fuel and maintain the aircraft and boats needed to intercept traffickers, especially in the remote Atlantic coastal region of La Mosquitia. Furthermore, Honduras lacks any primary radar system to detect traffickers. The Honduran National Police (HNP) lacks the budget to pay salaries sufficient to prevent corruption in its ranks; obtain, maintain and fuel the vehicles it needs to patrol its border areas and urban neighborhoods; or construct and maintain prisons to safely and humanely house the burgeoning prison population. The Public Ministry lacks the funds to hire sufficient numbers of prosecutors to investigate and prosecute the cases presented to it by the police. While conviction rates for cases prosecuted are high (over 80%),prosecution rates hover in the 20% range for most categories of crime. ¶3. While the USG and other donors can assist the GOH to build and procure facilities and equipment, recurring costs such as salaries, fuel and maintenance will remain problematic, requiring innovative solutions on all sides. Donors must focus on programs that minimize recurring costs - training in procedures and maintenance will reduce waste, and expensive equipment should be avoided in favor of low-tech options wherever possible. The GOH for its part must implement more efficient and effective procedures for managing the resources it has. The GOH h
as dedicated more funds in its 2009 budget toward law enforcement and security, but assistance must be targeted toward efforts that can be sustained. ¶4. One potential source of additional funding for GOH law enforcement is through the use of seized criminal assets. The HOAF and HNP seized over $4 million in cash alone in 2008, but at present the GOH seized asset program represents a net cost to authorities. The legal framework exists for a successful seized asset program, but prosecutors and judges require training in how to implement the program. ¶5. As we are nearing the midpoint of FY 2009, USAID has yet to receive its FY 2008 funding for Merida. ¶6. Challenge B -- Corruption: Corruption remains another key challenge for the HNP, prosecutors and judiciary, though the GOH took some important steps toward combating corruption in 2008 and early 2009. The Police Organic Law created an Internal Affairs Division that answers directly to the Minister of Security and, once vetted, staffed and trained, should be a major force against police corruption. In January 2009, the most independent Supreme Court in Honduras' history was selected; the GOH and donors should work to ensure the new court makes tangible inroads to reduce judicial corruption. ¶7. Challenge C -- Geography: A lack of governance and infrastructure in La Mosquitia and along the Atlantic Coast provide traffickers with a broad, unguarded territory in which to operate. The residents currently receive more material support from the traffickers than from their own government. Economic development of La Mosquitia, combined with an increased permanent law enforcement and security presence is vital to removing this transit corridor TEGUCIGALP 00000176 002 OF 004 from the traffickers. -------------- II. Assistance Priorities -------------- ¶8. Priority A -- Vetted Units: a. The HNP's newly-created Internal Affairs Division requires vetting and extensive training to become an effective force against police corruption. b. Model community police precincts likewise will require extensive vetting, training and equipment to take back neighborhoods controlled by gangs and increase public participation in their own security. c. CEINCO, the HNP information analysis unit, will play a vital support role. In order to do so, it requires further equipment, software and training; sub-units such as the FBI-supported TAG unit will be needed for regional information sharing and analysis. d. In addition to the FBI TAG unit for information analysis, an on-the-ground HNP-Public Ministry interagency TAG Unit must be vetted, trained and equipped. This team will be the focal point for information, investigation and prosecution of gangs within Honduras, and would work in cooperation with regional partners and the CEINCO TAG unit. e. An interagency anti-kidnap unit is needed, but will require extensive vetting, training and equipment. f. Additional Tactical Response Teams (TRT) need to be vetted and equipped for more efficient, effective interdiction operations. ¶9. Priority B -- Border Security: a. The HNP Frontier Police are responsible for interdiction efforts along the land borders and at airports. Frontier Police currently lack even the most basic facilities at remote, but heavily-trafficked border crossing posts, and lack the means to patrol border areas away from the formal crossings. Converted containers to use as combined office/dormitory space, motorcycles, inspection equipment and K-9 inspection teams will build capacity to reduce trafficking of people and illicit goods across Honduran borders. The GOH is re-starting its own K-9 program as of 2009, and we will work to support this low-tech, but highly effective tool. Field training will also improve and strengthen their interdiction capabilities. b. Combating drug traffic by sea and air is a high priority and costly. Supporting the HOAF by providing fueling stations and fuel along their Atlantic Coast and training both HOAF and HNP units in the maintenance of infrastructure will make interdiction operations more cost-effective. c. The huge ungoverned spaces that have become a haven for the traffickers can only be effectively accessed by helicopter or small fixed-wing assets that the GOH does not have in sufficient quantities or with proper capabilities. Without these assets we cannot expect the GOH to effectively control these huge swaths of national territory. ¶10. Priority C -- Seized Asset Program: Training police, prosecutors and judges on the existing legal framework, handling and use of evidence and information-sharing can produce a self-sustaining program that will diminish the top law enforcement challenge in Honduras if successful. Building success in this area in combination with development of inter-agency vetted units will be the most effective tool to improving the justice sector overall. ¶11. Priority D -- Prisons Reform: The GOH has a long-term strategy for reforming their prisons system to reduce violence and gang influence in its prisons system. The GOH has dedicated funds to constructing high-security administrative segregation facilities for its most dangerous prisoners and low-security facilities which will be used to develop rehabilitative prisons industries/vocational training programs. The GOH is also implementing a formal classification system to ensure prisoners are placed in an appropriate level of supervision to protect prisoners, staff and the outside population. Assistance is required in training, equipment and infrastructure in order for the prisons system to implement the GOH strategy. ¶12. Priority E -- Gang Prevention and Rehabilitation: Law TEGUCIGALP 00000176 003 OF 004 enforcement must be coupled with efforts to prevent at-risk youth from joining gangs, if any anti-gang effort is to be made sustainable. Programs must provide education and alternative social structures for youth as well as economic opportunities for their communities. Under Merida, ongoing basic education and job-linked vocational education programs will target at-risk youth in vulnerable areas. When cost-effective and proven successful, rehabilitation programs should also be supported. There are a number of NGOs finding success in rehabilitation in Honduras at modest cost per individual rehabilitated. Efforts are also in place to expand a network of outreach centers for at-risk youth in high-risk areas. ¶13. Priority F -- Combating Financial- and Cyber-crime: Police, prosecutors and judges need training in how to combat money laundering and cyber-crime. The Honduran legal framework requires modernization as traffickers and criminal gangs become more sophisticated in their techniques. ¶14. Priority G -- Public Education and Outreach: The HNP needs assistance in developing a more effective public awareness campaign to educate the public about their role in fighting crime, improve communication between law enforcement authorities and the public, build public trust in law enforcement institutions, and engage civil society as allies in efforts to reduce violence. The HNP has already instituted community security roundtables, where these issues are discussed and NGOs have developed community outreach centers that reduce gang activity and membership in individual neighborhoods. Both the HNP and civil society have developed education programs on specific topics, but an overall strategy is lacking for integrating these efforts and binding together communities against crime. Such assistance could be provided in the form of a limited-term public relations advisor to the Ministry of Security. Resources to implement a strategy already exist. ¶15. Priority H -- Economic Development of Trafficking Zones: Remote areas such as La Mosquitia are in need of economic alternatives to supporting the drug trade. Community-led improvements in infrastructure, a more permanent and engaged security presence (both HOAF and HNP),and greater access to basic services are necessities. ¶16. Priority I -- Military interdiction: Maritime transportation moves the greatest amount of illicit drugs in and out of Honduras. TAT estimates approximately six high speed boat deliveries per day which translates to more than 9 tons of illicit drugs per month. In CY 2008, the HOAF seized 8 vehicles, 8 maritime vessels, 1 aircraft and over 7,000 kilograms of cocaine. SOUTHCOM has provided assistance vis-`-vis National Defense Authorization Act funding; however, those funds are restricted to selected construction, equipment and training. In order to increase the rate of interdictions, HOAF will need funding beyond the extent of current National Defense Authorization Act resources and allocations. Dedicated inter-service and interagency counter narcotic (CN) units need to be established. These additional units will need to be fully equipped and trained. The Honduran Navy has recently established such a unit, but lacks the resources to be effective. The Honduran Joint Task Force, Paz Garcia, is inadequate for interagency operations. In order to increase joint CN operations with USG and Honduran inter-service operations, Paz Garcia needs major repair and construction. -------------- III. Specific Requests from the GOH -------------- ¶17. The GOH developed a list of requests in February 2008 based on discussions held at the January 2008 SICA Conference and the GOH's own 2005 National Security Strategy. The Ministry of Security also provided NAS Honduras with a list of its revised priorities pursuant to its 2009 budget process, and these priorities have been integrated into section II above. The Ministry of Security also requested USG support in equipping a K-9 training facility in Honduras to develop units for interdiction of weapons, drugs as well as emergency search-and-rescue units. TEGUCIGALP 00000176 004 OF 004 -------------- IV. Regional Cooperation -------------- ¶18. The GOH is working in cooperation with the INL Regional Gang Advisor based in San Salvador to develop a pilot community policing precinct, based Guatemala's Villanueva project. Llorens

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