Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA15
2009-01-08 22:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

HONDURAS: SUPREME COURT SELECTION PITS CIVIL

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL SNAR HO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000015 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SNAR HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS: SUPREME COURT SELECTION PITS CIVIL
SOCIETY AGAINST ENTRENCHED ESTABLISHMENT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR HUGO LLORENS, REASON 1.4 (B & D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000015 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SNAR HO SUBJECT: HONDURAS: SUPREME COURT SELECTION PITS CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST ENTRENCHED ESTABLISHMENT Classified By: AMBASSADOR HUGO LLORENS, REASON 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Honduran Congress will select the fifteen magistrates who will constitute the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) for the next seven years on January 25, after a process that, while by no means perfect, will have been the most open, transparent selection process for high government officials in the country's history. A seven-member nominating board has been tasked with whittling down a list of over 200 nominees to 45, which they must present to Congress by January 23. Not surprisingly, the board is facing tremendous pressure from all sides, but so far has performed an exemplary job. Controversy and speculation already surround what the Congress may and will do to name the 15 magistrates, either selecting solely from the board's 45 or adding names of their own choosing. We have reached out to key political and civil society leaders and encouraged them to support a process that allows for the selection of the best qualified candidates. End summary. ¶2. (U) Honduras has adopted a highly reformist process for the selection of Supreme Court Magistrates which relies on the input of civil society and allows public scrutiny of candidates. Under the current constitution, the SCJ is made up of 15 magistrates who serve a seven-year term. The next term begins the week of January 25. Nominations for magistrate are gathered and scrutinized by a seven-member Nominating Board, comprised of: one member selected by the current SCJ magistrates; one selected by civil society organizations; the National Human Rights Commissioner; and one representative each from the College of Attorneys, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP),the faculties of the Honduran law schools, and the Confederation of Workers. Each of these groups also presents its own list of 20 nominees for consideration. The Board receives nominations from all sources, including people who nominate themselves, then removes any nominees who have clear disqualifications, e.g. criminal convictions or pending criminal or misconduct cases against them. The Board then conducts public hearings to interview the remaining candidates, asking each one four questions related to ethics, their own judicial record, their political ties, or opinions on past SCJ decisions. The Board then delibera
tes based on these public interviews and presents a list of 45 nominees to the National Congress, with a deadline of January 23. The Congress then must select the 15 magistrates by January 25. ¶3. (SBU) Historically the process has been far from open or transparent, with past courts almost completely in the service -- and often on the payroll -- of political parties and powerful individuals in the private sector. As such, the court has traditionally been the bastion of the elite's control over Honduran political, economic and social affairs, perhaps more than any other institution. But starting with the selection of the current court seven years ago, the process has been more openly, albeit still favoring party and individual interests. ¶4. (C) The 2008-2009 process has been the most transparent so far. The board has already winnowed down the list from an original 248 nominees to 97, who are now undergoing public hearings before the board. The hearings, broadcast live on radio and reported heavily in the television and print media, are captivating the public's attention Honduras. The Embassy has been paying close attention to a process that we have supported through our Administration of Justice Reform programs. In the past several weeks we have be in regular contact with key political and civil society contacts regarding the process. Coming toward the end of President Zelaya's volatile administration and in a year of presidential and congressional elections, the court selection process occurs at an important juncture in the nation's political life. ¶5. (SBU) There has been tremendous speculation by TEGUCIGALP 00000015 002 OF 002 politicians, the press and Board members themselves over possible interference in the process. Possible scenarios include: disrupting the Board's delivery of the list by the due date, thereby allowing the Congress to select whomever they choose and the Congress selecting incumbent magistrates who are not on the board's list of 45. While the Constitution allows SCJ magistrates to be re-appointed, there is debate over whether it also allows the Congress to reinstate sitting SCJ magistrates if they do not make it on the nominating board's list of 45. (Note: Only one incumbent, Estela Cardona Padilla has reached the intermediate list of 97. End note.) While some Congressional Deputies have stated that they may appoint incumbents on the basis that they underwent public scrutiny seven years ago, popular and civil society pressure is growing for Congress to honor the list of 45 in selecting magistrates. While President of Congress Roberto Micheletti publicly stated that he would ensure Congress selected from the board's list when he swore them in, speculation is that Zelaya, concerned about how an independent SCJ would treat him post-presidency, and other Liberal Party (LP) interests will not relinquish their influence completely. (Note: The two incumbents most favored by Zelaya are Marlena Dubon de Flores Lanza, wife of the Secretary of the Presidency and Carlos Gomez Moreno. Neither made the Board's list. End note.) The Embassy continues to encourage adherence to the public process in conversations with political leaders and the Board members. ¶6. (C) In a January 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Board Chairman Jorge Omar Casco explained that the Board settled their own internal debate, stating that incumbents can only remain on the court if they are on their list of 45. He added that his main concern was that one of the candidates who did not make the Board's list of 97 would file a suit that would prevent the Board from delivering their recommendations to the Congress by the January 23 deadline. He said that the Board has been under tremendous political pressure from the two parties and other traditional interests to permit the selection of candidates beholden to narrow interests. ¶7. (C) In separate conversations on January 8, the Ambassador discussed the issue with the two main party presidential candidates, Liberal Party nominee Elvin Santos and National Party nominee Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo. The Ambassador suggested that they avoid being drawn into the process by attacking either the Board or the Congress' actions in the process. Both agreed that any attempt to manipulate or tamper with the process could badly hurt their public images. ¶8. (C) Comment: The current SCJ selection process provides a more transparent means to create a more professional and able Court that is less beholden to narrow interests. The process has already been the most public in history, and while avoiding being brought in the middle of the controversy we are working in a measured way to support an outcome that results in a stronger and more independent Court. A newly-independent court will have implications beyond the politics of the day as an independent court that is more likely to support anti-corruption and anti-trafficking efforts by the GOH and USG. End comment. LLORENS

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