HONDURAS: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 001317 FOR S/CT: Rhonda Shore and NCTC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM KJUS EFIN SNAR PREL HO SUBJECT: HONDURAS: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: STATE 109980 ¶1. On June 28, President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was removed from office in a coup d'etat. The de facto government that took power was not recognized by the U.S. or any other country, and Honduras was suspended from the Organization of American States. Honduras's resulting international isolation, including the suspension of programs by donors and international organizations aimed at strengthening Honduras's capacity to combat economic crimes, diminished its capacity to combat such crimes, including terrorist financing. However, there were no known instances of terrorist organizations using Honduras's financial system to deposit or launder funds. Prior to the coup, Honduran cooperation with the United States on combating terrorist financing was strong. The Honduran Banking and Insurance Commission, through instruction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promptly sent freeze orders to the entire regulated financial sector every time the United States amended Executive Order lists. Financial entities, particularly the commercial banks, undertook the requested searches for accounts by terrorist entities. There were no amendments to the Executive Order lists after the coup that required notification of the Honduran government. ¶2. The Honduran government continued to implement steps in accordance with their 2007 National Security Strategy, which included counterterrorism as an objective, and stressed regional and international cooperation. For example, in November 2009, the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) and the Honduran National Police (HNP) took steps towards the creation of Joint Interagency Task Force. This joint task force should improve inter-agency intelligence cooperation and should potentially decrease illicit trafficking and minimize terrorist threats within the country. ¶3. Honduras signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing in 2001 and ratified it in 2003. On April 24, 2008, Article 335 of the penal code (which describes terrorism and its sanctions) was amended by Congress. Congress added eight amendments to Article 335 - four of which refer specifically to terrorist financing. Sanctions for terrorist financing include a 20-30 year prison sentence and a fine of 1-5 million Lempiras (approximately USD 53,000-263,000). ¶4. Organized crime and illicit trafficking continue to plague Honduras. Their organizations and networks are robust and mature and are ripe for exploitation by terrorist elements with the intent of entering and attacking the US. While there is no conclusive evidence that terrorist groups are working with illicit trafficking organizations at this time, the United States continues to assist the HOAF and HNP with their counterterrorism efforts in order to prevent the very real threat of terrorist groups exploiting illicit trafficking networks. The predominant region used and exploited by narco-traffickers is La Mosquitia (part of the Gracias a Dios department in northeastern Honduras). The region's inaccessibility to Honduran law enforcement and military, relatively small population and poverty have made it relatively easy for traffickers to establish a presence. The Honduran military lacks sufficient resources to adequately control the area and the police and judiciary are spread thin, poorly trained and susceptible to threats and corruption. In the first half of 2009 until June 28 when a coup d'etat took place, the United States continued to provide the HOAF and HNP with training, equipment and base construction-dramatically improving their ability to interdict illicit trafficking and protect the country against terrorist threats. However, in response to the coup d'etat on June 28, the USG suspended all counterterrorism training and equipage pending restoration of the democratic, constitutional order. ¶5. Following the 28 June 2009 coup d'etat that deposed Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, several dozen domestic terrorist attacks were conducted by opponents of the de facto regime. These attacks, which targeted pro-regime television and radio stations, businesses, and infrastructure, included the planting of improvised explosive devices, throwing grenades and Molotov cocktails, sabotaging electrical towers and launching rocket propelled grenades (RPG-7). In most cases, the attacks were conducted at night and were not designed to hurt anyone. The attacks diminished following the general election held on November ¶29. ¶6. There was no indication of terrorist groups using illegal immigration networks. Over the past five years, however, smuggling rings have been detected moving people from East Africa (in particular Somalia in 2009),the Middle East, and Southwest Asia to Honduras or through its territory. Nationals of countries without Honduran visa requirements, especially Ecuador and Colombia, were involved in schemes to transit Honduras, often with the United States and Europe as their final destination. Foreign nationals have successfully obtained valid Honduran identity cards and passports under their own or false identities. The Honduran government's ability to combat transnational crime was limited by sparsely populated and isolated jungle regions, limited resources, corruption, and poor control of the north coast and eastern border. While increased U.S. and Honduran government investment and training for members of the judicial branch, law enforcement entities, and the military had begun to decrease criminal activity and reduce the potential appeal of using the criminal infrastructure in these remote areas for the movement of terrorists and their resources prior to the June 28 coup d'etat, these efforts were largely suspended as a result of the coup. HENSHAW