THE AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001312

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM HO
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS
POLITICAL AND POLICY MATTERS

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the Micheletti side, we would consider having U.S. officials
come to Tegucigalpa to directly deliver a very clear and
blunt message on this issue. Lobo welcomed the U.S. actions
and plans.

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Truth Commission
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4. The Ambassador stressed the importance of creating a
Truth Commission as an important element in the TSJA that
would contribute to achieving national reconciliation and
healing. The Ambassador briefed Lobo on the workings of
these Truth Commissions in several other countries (including
Chile and South Africa) and counseled that he as President
would needed to give this process guidance and direction
working closely with the international community. Both
discussed the possibility of inviting the Verification
Commission (including Secretary Solis and President Lagos) to
convene back in Tegucigalpa some time after his January 27,
2010 inauguration, and possibly contribute to the launch of
the Truth Commission.

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Presidential Appointments
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5. The Ambassador and Lobo discussed the make-up of his
government. Lobo said he had created a series of transition
working groups to assist him in forming a government. For
example, former President Ricardo Maduro would be heading the
foreign policy working group, which would be responsible for
recommending candidates for both Foreign Minister and key
ambassadorships. Lobo stressed that he wanted to appoint
young and energetic people to his foreign policy team. He
was considering several entrepreneurs for various key jobs,
including Ambassador to the U.S. Lobo said he would review
the short lists in early January and make the decisions in
close consultation with the Ambassador.


6. Lobo said that would be a chief executive with a strong
institutionalist bent who would govern in close coordination
with Congress and the judicial branch. In this regard, he
was weighing several names for consideration as President of
the National Congress. The traditional establishment
candidates included former Congress President Fito Irias,
former Congress Secretary Jose Hernandez, Antonio Rivera and
Celin Discua. Lobo noted that he was under great pressure
from the party to name one of these "insider" politicians.
However, he was considering a appointing someone with a clean
image, including a women legislator, to send a message of his
commitment to change and to diversity.

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Merida and the Fight Against International Crime
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7. Both the Ambassador and Lobo agreed that Honduras faced a
serious threat to its national security from international
crime syndicates, particularly the drug cartels. The
Ambassador gave Lobo an overview of the Merida Initiative.
He proposed resurrecting the two-country multiagency
U.S.-Honduran Merida Task Force, which represented the most
effective and holistic way for us to deal bilaterally and
regionally with the international crime threat. Lobo said
that one of his top priorities was dealing "head on" with the
grave threat spawned by international drug cartels and gangs.
He said that the Honduran people were demanding a more
concerted campaign by their government to provide security
and protect them against criminals. He said he would be very
tough on criminals, gang members and drug traffickers, and
was not sensitive to sovereignty issues when the issue of
narcotics and crime was at stake. Lobo said he planned to
appoint Oscar Alvarez as his Security Minister. He had great
confidence in Alvarez as a courageous and dynamic leader in
the fight against crime and drugs. We agreed to discuss
these issues in more detail with our respective teams in the

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future.

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Taming the Military
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8. The Ambassador said it was critically important for Lobo
to establish an effective and productive relationship with
the military, but equally to restore firm civilian control
over the officer corps. The Ambassador noted that military's
current influence permeated all senior levels of the
Micheletti regime, whose authority to a significant degree
rested on military acquiescence. The Ambassador said that
this all needed to change. As the legitimate democratically
elected president he needed to reestablish his control and
authority over the military. The Ambassador added that the
military had to return to the barracks and let the police
deal with basic security and law enforcement. He said that
even beyond the coup, the presence of large numbers of troops
on Tegucigalpa's streets was an eyesore which was resented by
most Hondurans, and had further undermined the international
reputation of the armed forces. Looking to the longer term,
the Ambassador pointed out that the Honduran government
needed to reform the legal and constitutional framework to
ensure that the military would never again be dragged into a
political crisis that resulted in a coup d'etat. The
Ambassador noted that both President Zelaya's decision to ask
the military to carry out the logistics for his planned poll
on June 28, as well as the military's own role in plotting
and executing the coup against Zelaya, was a major political
setback for Honduras. The legal reforms needed to be
urgently considered to ensure that the military would never
do this again.


9. Lobo agreed that he needed to restore military
subservience to civilian rule. He also concurred that his
government needed to consider adopting the legal and
constitutional reforms necessary to distance the military
from politics. As an institutionalist, he was considering
supporting legislation so that the nominations of the Chief
of Defense and the service commanders would be subject to
congressional approval unlike at present where it was
strictly a presidential decision. Obviously, the existing
process in which the president fully controlled the
nomination and appointment of senior military officers was
open to abuse if a president chose to appoint a friend or
individual who shared his political or ideological views.

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Human Rights
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10. The Ambassador said that since the coup there had been a
serious deterioration in the human rights situation in
Honduras. The Micheletti regime, the Honduran military,
police and the attorney general's office had all been tainted
with the brush of being systemic violators of human rights.
The Ambassador said that part of the process of restoring the
democratic order and supporting the rule of law required the
new government to be very sensitive to human rights issues.
The Ambassador suggested that Lobo consider sending a clear
public message once in office of his support for human rights
and consider involving the human rights community in the work
of the Truth Commission. Lobo said he would be open to
working with local and human rights groups to restore the
rule of law and strengthen human rights practices in the
country.

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Zelaya
--------------


11. Lobo made clear that he continued to support allowing
President Zelaya to leave the country either through a safe
conduct pass or through the granting of political asylum. If
this was not granted by Micheletti, he would authorize soon
after assuming office.

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LLORENS