TFH01: ZELAYA'S ABORTED DEPARTURE FROM HONDURAS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001280

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: ZELAYA'S ABORTED DEPARTURE FROM HONDURAS

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1270

B. TEGUCIGALPA 1250

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Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (S) Summary: President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya told the
Ambassador late on the afternoon of December 9 that he had
obtained safe passage out of Honduras from the de facto
regime and would depart that evening on an airplane provided
by Mexican President Felipe Calderon and be given "guest of
honor" status. However, according the Mexican Charge, the de
facto regime reneged on the original agreement and, at the
last minute, insisted that Zelaya request asylum. Zelaya
worsened the situation by denouncing the request in a media
interview. The GOM was angered by its treatment by the
regime, particularly as a plane it sent to pick up Zelaya was
rerouted twice and then told to leave Honduran airspace as it
ran low on fuel. The proposed safe passage for Zelaya was
poorly managed by all involved, including the Mexicans, the
Brazilians, the regime and Zelaya. Paradoxically, Zelaya's
departure from Honduras would be advantageous on a human
level for him and his family. In addition, it would somewhat
defuse the tension that Zelaya's situation in the Brazilian
Embassy has generated since Zelaya's unexpected September 21
return to the country. Finally, it would have facilitated
dialogue between Zelaya and president-elect Porfirio "Pepe"
Lobo and possibly made it easier for the international
community to convince de facto regime leader Roberto
Micheletti to relinquish power and allow formation of a unity
government as called for by the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.
End Summary.


2. (S) President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya called the
Ambassador on December 9 around 16:00 to inform us that the
de facto regime had granted him safe passage out of Honduras.
President Zelaya said Mexican President Felipe Calderon had
offered to send an airplane to Honduras to fly him out on
December 9. President Zelaya said he wanted to make the U.S.
aware of his plan and wanted to know if the U.S. opposed it.
The Ambassador replied that the U.S. did not, and that this
was his decision to make. Zelaya also expressed concern
about his security during his planned departure. President
Zelaya told the Ambassador that he would be accompanied to
Mexico by the First Lady, Xiomara Castro Zelaya, his
daughter, Xiomara Hortensia "Pichu" Zelaya; his son, Jose
Manuel Zelaya; and his advisor, Rasel Tome. Zelaya said
President Calderon would declare him and those accompanying
him "distinguished guests of honor" and that they would be
allowed to remain in Mexico as long as they wanted.
President Zelaya told the Ambassador that he would call
President of Costa Rica Oscar Arias and President of the
Dominican Republic Leonel Fernandez and promised to call the
Ambassador if possible before his departure. Zelaya stated
that he remained committed to reaching a deal with
president-elect Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo even after his departure
from Honduras (reftel A).


3. (S) The agreement began to break down in the early evening
as news of President Zelaya's imminent departure began to
leak out. According to Mexican Charge Carlos Torres, who
spoke separately several times with the Ambassador and DCM,
de facto regime officials reneged on an agreement to allow
Zelaya safe passage, instead insisting that he request
political asylum. Torres, who was in the Honduran foreign
ministry in the late afternoon and evening, said the tone
there noticeably changed around the same time as control over
the issue was taken over by Micheletti personal advisor
Roberto Turcios, away from the MFA officials with who Torres
had been working up to that point. Torres said that Turcios
was extremely rude and arrogant. Torres said that he
understood that in return for allowing Zelaya to leave the
country, the ministry had unexpectedly asked Zelaya to sign a
document accepting the December 2 vote in Congress not to
restore him to the presidency. Zelaya then gave a press
interview denouncing the de facto regime for requiring him to
sign a document requesting political asylum.


4. (S) Torres said that the GOM was insulted by its treatment
by the de factos. Besides the fact that the de factos
reneged on their promise to the GOM to grant Zelaya safe
passage (without conditions),Torres said that the treatment
of the GOM plane, sent to pick up Zelaya, had caused anger in

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Mexico City. The plane, which was carrying Mexican SRE
Subsecretario Salvador Beltran, had been diverted from
Tegucigalpa to San Pedro Sula one hour before its scheduled
arrival and then, as it approached San Pedro Sula, "ordered"
out of Honduran airspace. He said that the plane's lack of
fuel had caused concern onboard the aircraft, which opted to
fly to San Salvador. Torres reported the morning of December
10 that the plane was returning to Mexico. He said that the
given the actions of the de facto regime, the GOM would no
longer press ("insistir") for Zelaya's departure.


5. (S) The governments of Mexico and Brazil did not inform
the USG of the discussions and plans to fly Zelaya out of
Honduras until they began to break down. They also failed to
inform Central American governments, including President of
Costa Rica Oscar Arias. Once the plan collapsed, the Mexican
and Brazilian Charge d'Affaires reached out to the U.S. to
try to cobble it back together again. The Ambassador told
Torres that the USG "was unhappy" about not being informed of
the plan beforehand and urged the GOM to continue to support
the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord; the DCM passed a similar
message to the Brazilian Charge.


6. (S) Comment: It appears that de facto hard-liners
successfully scuttled Zelaya's departure by changing the
terms that had been negotiated with the GOM and Zelaya.
Zelaya further worsened the situation with an interview
publicly blasting the regime, instead of seeking a diplomatic
way to pressure them to go back to their original agreement.
President Zelaya's departure would have been positive for
several reasons. First of all, from a human and practical
point of view, it would have improved the living conditions
of the President and his wife, who have been living around
the clock at the Brazilian Chancery and sleeping on sofas for
almost three months since his return to the country on
September 21. Zelaya and his family would have been able to
enjoy the Christmas season in a tranquil atmosphere with
freedom of movement. Zelaya's presence at the Brazilian
Embassy, located in the heart of the Honduran capital, casts
a long psychological shadow over his countrymen, both those
who oppose and fear him and those who support him. His
departure would have somewhat lessened this tension for
Hondurans as this now polarized society comes together with
their family members to celebrate Christmas and New Year. It
would also have eased bilateral tensions between Brazil and
Honduras, and potentially contributed to a more constructive
approach on Honduras by Brazil and several non-ALBA countries
in South America.


7. (S) Comment Continued: Zelaya's departure would also have
facilitated his dialogue with president-elect Porfirio "Pepe"
Lobo and the possibility that a deal could be reached between
them restoring the constitutional order before Lobo takes
office on January 27, 2009. There have been preliminary
communications between Zelaya and Lobo, but Lobo is unwilling
to meet with Zelaya in the Brazilian Embassy due to security
concerns. However, Lobo has said that he would meet with
Zelaya in any country other than Nicaragua.


8. (S) Comment Continued: Finally, Zelaya's departure might
have facilitated the relinquishment of power by de facto
regime leader Roberto Micheletti. Micheletti has repeatedly
stated that he would step down if Zelaya also did so. The
Congress voted on December 2, pursuant to the Tegucigalpa-San
Jose Accord, not to reinstate Zelaya to the office of
president (reftel B). If Zelaya were physically out of
Honduras, Micheletti would have little excuse to hang on to
power and efforts to have him step aside and permit the
creation of a national unity government, as called for by the
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, might have a greater chance of
success.
LLORENS