TFH01: THE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HONDURAN SITUATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001270 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: TFH01: THE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HONDURAN SITUATION WITH PRESIDENT ARIAS, PRESIDENT ZELAYA AND PRESIDENT-ELECT PEPE LOBO REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1244 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 1231 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 1253 ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 1264 ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 1265 ¶F. TEL CONV BETWEEN AMB LLORENS AND A/S VALENZUELA 12/8 TEGUCIGALP 00001270 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador held a series of conversations with President Arias, President Zelaya and President-elect Lobo. Arias provided a briefing on the results of Lobo's visit to San Jose. Arias stressed that he and Martinelli had a common vision -- consistent with the U.S. position. These conditions included the creation of a government of national unity, the establishment of a truth commission, political amnesty for the key players, and the resignation of the regime leader Roberto Micheletti. Arias greatly valued the call from Secretary Clinton and expressed his strong appreciation for her leadership and commitment to a resolving the crisis. The Ambassador briefed Arias on the proposed initiative of Dominican President Fernandez. Zelaya is in separate communication with Fernandez and possibly regime officials to secure safe passage out of Honduras. Zelaya says he is willing to negotiate a deal with Lobo. The Ambassador helped to facilitate contact between Lobo and Zelaya. A Lobo representative will meet with Zelaya this afternoon in the Brazilian Embassy. There is a flurry of activity involving regional and Honduran players. The intensity of communication suggests that a negotiated deal may finally be in the making. The two key elements are that Zelaya may now be willing to accept the results of the elections, and that Lobo is convinced that a deal with Zelaya is in his best interests. The role of Central America is an important aspect, particularly Arias's leadership, commitment and wisdom borne of experience. The U.S. role is indispensable although it needs to be circumspect. End Summary. PRESIDENT ARIAS -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador spoke to President Arias on two occasions (the evening of December 8 and the morning of December 9) to discuss common efforts to resolve the Honduran crisis. Arias provided a read out of the December 8 visit of President-elect Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo to San Jose, Costa Rica. Arias confirmed that Lobo had been accompanied by presidential candidates Elvin Santos (Liberal Party), Felicito Avila (Christian Democrats),and Bernard Martinez (PINU). He said that Panamanian President Martinelli had also participated in the meeting and stressed that Panama and Costa Rica shared similar objectives with regards to Honduras. Arias greatly appreciated receiving a call from Secretary Clinton on the afternoon of December 8. He said that the Secretary's message on the U.S. position was strong and clear and highlighted her words of encouragement. He said that the Secretary's constant engagement and leadership in the Honduran crisis have been of crucial importance, and noted that Costa Rica very much supported U.S. goals. ¶3. (S) Arias provided a quick brief on Lobo's visit. He said that he and Martinelli had been very frank in their discussions with the Hondurans. He noted that they had outlined the three key aspects of a solution: creation of a government of national unity, political amnesty for President Zelaya and his advisers, regime leader Micheletti and those who participated in the coup, and the military as an institution. Martinelli and Arias had also insisted that Micheletti needed to resign. They told Lobo that Honduras would have trouble restoring strong international support and recognition if these conditions were not met. At the press conference held after the meeting, Arias said that Lobo had publicly acknowledged the elements of a solution discussed and noted that Arias and Martinelli had made patently clear TEGUCIGALP 00001270 002.2 OF 003 that Micheletti needed to resign. Arias cautioned that he and Martinelli found Lobo somewhat timid and hesitant to use his power and force Micheletti to step down. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador briefed Arias on Dominican President Leonel Fernandez's call to Assistant Secretary Valenzuela the evening of December 8 (reftel F). The Ambassador informed Arias that Fernandez had opened a line of communication with President Zelaya on a possible solution to the crisis that might involve Zelaya's safe passage out of Honduras and some political amnesty arrangement that involved Zelaya's membership in the Central American parliament, a status given to all former presidents. The Ambassador also confirmed that Lobo would be traveling to the Dominican Republic on December 10 and was scheduled to meet with Fernandez. As per A/S Valenzuela's instructions, the Ambassador suggested that Arias call Fernandez to make sure that the two presidents, as well as Presidents Funes, Colom, Martinelli and others were coordinating closely. Arias said he would call Fernandez. PRESIDENT ZELAYA -------------- ¶5. (S) The Ambassador spoke to President Zelaya the morning of December 9 to get his read on the situation. President Zelaya said that he was in touch with a number of people inside and outside of Honduras and trying to determine the best way forward. He said that he had established contacts here in Tegucigalpa (presume with regime officials) and was considering negotiating safe passage outside of Honduras, possibly to Mexico. He said that he wanted to leave the country but was concerned that his departure would be used by Micheletti as an excuse for him to not resign. However, he said if he left the country he would be willing to meet with Lobo and hold discussions to resolve the situation. Both discussed the issue of political amnesty (Zelaya was in favor),the need to create a government of national unity, and Micheletti's possible resignation. Zelaya spoke of being willing to meet with Pepe Lobo, possibly in Mexico City, and hold direct negotiations, possibly under the auspices of Mexican President Calderon. He was also willing to meet directly with Lobo in the Brazilian Embassy. Zelaya said he was hesitant to talk to Lobo on the phone because he believes that all of his phone conversations are bugged. He said he was open to accepting the results of the elections -- which he now described as a clear mandate for the National Party -- and recognize the Lobo government. PRESIDENT ELECT LOBO -------------- ¶6. (S) Later in the morning of December 9, the Ambassador met with President-elect Pepe Lobo in the Embassy. Lobo told the Ambassador that he had been extremely pleased with his trip to San Jose. He said he had been impressed with both Arias and Martinelli and their collaboration in support of Honduras. He said that he agreed on the need to create a government of national unity, supported a congressional law providing political amnesty to all the key players in the political drama, and the creation of a truth commission. He also said that Micheletti's resignation was the critical element. He said that his public announcement of the need for Micheletti to resign was aimed at pressuring Micheletti directly. He said that he had heard that Micheletti had been taken to the hospital last night suffering from a spike in his blood sugar. Lobo could not confirm whether Micheletti was a diabetic. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador mentioned the Fernandez initiative with President Zelaya. Lobo said that Fernandez had called him last night and informed him of the idea of trying to find a way for Zelaya to leave the country and to try to get both Zelaya and himself to quickly negotiate an agreement. Lobo said he believed that Fernandez was being helpful and constructive but that this was a sensitive matter and needed to be well thought out and coordinated. He appreciated the TEGUCIGALP 00001270 003.2 OF 003 fact that we had informed Arias of the Fernandez initiative, since he believed that Arias remains the key player in Central America. ¶8. (S) Lobo told the Ambassador that he had heard that Micheletti's inner circle was in direct contact with Zelaya, through a member of his inner circle, Robert Turcios. He said he understood that they were talking about Zelaya being given safe passage to travel to Mexico. The Ambassador conveyed Zelaya's message that he was keen on meeting with Lobo and negotiating directly. Lobo reiterated his position that he was open to direct talks with Zelaya and would be willing to meet with him in Mexico or anywhere in the region except Nicaragua. Lobo said he would not meet with Zelaya in the Brazilian Embassy due to security concerns, particularly related to the presence of Venezuelan and Nicaraguan security inside the compound. Lobo suggested that the Ambassador contact Zelaya directly to establish a line of communication. (Note: The Ambassador subsequently spoke to Zelaya and passed the call to Lobo. They both agreed to set up a line of communication. Lobo was clear that he was looking for an agreement that would work for all. He stressed he did not want to hurt Zelaya, sought the protection of his and his family's interests, and believed a solution could be found that would allow for genuine national reconciliation. Lobo agreed to send a close associate of his (Will Cerrato) to meet directly with Zelaya today at the Brazilian Embassy. End Note). Lobo agreed to stay in touch and said he would provide a read out of Cerrato's contact with Zelaya and his trip to the Dominican Republic. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) Comment: There is a flurry of activity involving regional and Honduran actors. The intensity of communication suggests that a negotiated deal may potentially be in the making. The two key elements are that Zelaya may now be willing to accept the results of the elections, and that Lobo is convinced that a deal with Zelaya is in his best interests. The role of Central America is an important aspect, particularly Arias's leadership, commitment and wisdom borne of experience. The U.S. role will remain indispensable although it needs to be circumspect. LLORENS