TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND CARDINAL RODRIGUEZ DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001245 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND CARDINAL RODRIGUEZ DISCUSS ELECTIONS AND TSJA TEGUCIGALP 00001245 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and Cardinal Andrews Rodriguez met on December 1 and discussed the current situation in Honduras. Both agreed that the Honduran elections had been free, fair and transparent, and that both the Supreme elections Tribunal and the Honduran people deserved great credit for their democratic commitment. Both also concurred that the landslide victory of the National Party and its leader Pepe Lobo was less about the Nationalists and more about a stunning popular rejection of Liberal Party and its top caudillos, Manuel Zelaya and Robert Micheletti. The Ambassador stressed U.S. support for the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, and our hope that Congress restore President Zelaya on December 2. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. would respect the final congressional decision on restoration, but would insist that the deliberations be fully transparent and credible. The Cardinal agreed to press Congress President Saavedra on this issue. Assuming Zelaya lost the restoration vote, the Cardinal and the Ambassador spoke of the importance of Micheletti resigning and allowing the creation of a government of national unity to serve in a transition role and hand power to Pepe Lobo on January 27, 2010. Beyond the inauguration, both agreed on the importance for Lobo to work to restore the rule of law, ensure improved respect for human rights, and consistent with the TSJA support the creation of a Truth Commission. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Cardinal Andres Rodriguez in his home in Tegucigalpa on December 1. The Cardinal had just returned to Tegucigalpa on the eve of the elections after being nearly a month in Europe attending to Church activities in Rome and Budapest. Both the Cardinal and the Ambassador agreed that the elections had gone very well. Both agreed that the Supreme Elections Tribunal had done an outstanding job managing the entire process. They also concurred that the Honduran people had demonstrated a strong democratic conviction and commitment and deserved much praise. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador briefed the Cardinal on our efforts to technically monitor the elections process with our Embassy staff, our USAID technical project in support of the IFES, NDI and Hagamos Democracia observation effort and the "quick count". The Ambassador said that Pepe Lobo's crushing victory over Elvin Santos and the Nationalists landslide victory across the country was less a reflection of support for Lobo and the Nationalists, or whether Santos was a good or bad candidate, and more a rejection and indictment of Liberal leadership represented by President Mel Zelaya and regime leader Roberto Micheletti. The Ambassador noted that the total rejection of the Liberals was highlighted by the significance of the crossover vote by many Liberals in the presidential, congressional and mayoral races. For example the Nationalists had been able to win an astounding 240 of the 298 mayoral contests, and roundly defeated dozens of individually capable and popular Liberal incumbents. The Cardinal noted that the Liberal Party had always been the majority party and that nearly 60 percent of Hondurans considered themselves as Liberals. He said this victory was total and overwhelming and gave Lobo and the Nationalists a unique mandate and opportunity. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that while the election was a necessary element in restoring the democratic order to Honduras, it was not sufficient. The Ambassador discussed at length U.S. support for the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord (TSJA). In this regard, he stressed the importance of the scheduled vote in Congress on President Zelaya's restoration. The Ambassador stressed that as the Cardinal well understood, U.S. policy towards Honduras was a principled one and we continued to strongly condemn the coup and call on Congress to restore Zelaya. At the same time, we supported the TSJA and understood that Congress would have the final say on restoration and we would respect that decision. In this regard he discussed the importance that the Congress deliberate on this issue in an open and transparent manner. For example, we would expect Congressional leaders to allow live media coverage of the event, conduct an open and TEGUCIGALP 00001245 002.2 OF 002 extensive debate of the issue, and ensure a roll call vote so that the Honduran people and the international community could see how the individual legislators stood on this important matter. The Cardinal said he agreed that the process needed to be a credible and open one or risk a very negative international reaction, particularly since he believed that Congress would reject Zelaya's restitution. The Cardinal agreed to speak to Congress President Alberto Saavedra and urge him to manage an open process including conducting a roll call vote. ¶5. (C) In the event that Congress rejects Zelaya's restoration, the Ambassador stressed that there was no need for Robert Micheletti to return to office. Micheletti himself had said that if Zelaya no longer had a claim he was not interested in staying in power for a second longer than necessary, and we needed to hold him to those statements. The Ambassador stressed that it would be extremely negative for the new Lobo government if Micheletti insisted on passing the presidential sash directly to him. The fact is no government in the world recognizes the legitimacy of the Micheletti regime and that his insistence to stay in power would damage the incoming Lobo government. The Ambassador discussed the possibility that a government of national unity be created, consistent with the TSJA, that could play a transition role between the resignation of Micheletti and the inauguration of Lobo. Both agreed that Lobo needed to assert himself and make clear to Micheletti that for the good of the country he needed to step down. The Cardinal and the Ambassador agreed to work together in common purpose on this issue after Congress dealt with the restitution issue. ¶6. (C) The Cardinal and the Ambassador discussed the future of Honduras and the importance of restoring democratic governance and full respect for the rule of law and human rights. Both agreed that it was important for Lobo to establish a strong national dialogue, create a government of national unity, and support the creation of a Truth Commission as outlined in the TSJA. LLORENS