TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND CARDINAL RODRIGUEZ DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001245

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND CARDINAL RODRIGUEZ DISCUSS
ELECTIONS AND TSJA

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Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and Cardinal Andrews
Rodriguez met on December 1 and discussed the current
situation in Honduras. Both agreed that the Honduran
elections had been free, fair and transparent, and that both
the Supreme elections Tribunal and the Honduran people
deserved great credit for their democratic commitment. Both
also concurred that the landslide victory of the National
Party and its leader Pepe Lobo was less about the
Nationalists and more about a stunning popular rejection of
Liberal Party and its top caudillos, Manuel Zelaya and Robert
Micheletti. The Ambassador stressed U.S. support for the
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, and our hope that Congress
restore President Zelaya on December 2. The Ambassador
stressed that the U.S. would respect the final congressional
decision on restoration, but would insist that the
deliberations be fully transparent and credible. The Cardinal
agreed to press Congress President Saavedra on this issue.
Assuming Zelaya lost the restoration vote, the Cardinal and
the Ambassador spoke of the importance of Micheletti
resigning and allowing the creation of a government of
national unity to serve in a transition role and hand power
to Pepe Lobo on January 27, 2010. Beyond the inauguration,
both agreed on the importance for Lobo to work to restore the
rule of law, ensure improved respect for human rights, and
consistent with the TSJA support the creation of a Truth
Commission. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador met with Cardinal Andres Rodriguez in
his home in Tegucigalpa on December 1. The Cardinal had just
returned to Tegucigalpa on the eve of the elections after
being nearly a month in Europe attending to Church activities
in Rome and Budapest. Both the Cardinal and the Ambassador
agreed that the elections had gone very well. Both agreed
that the Supreme Elections Tribunal had done an outstanding
job managing the entire process. They also concurred that the
Honduran people had demonstrated a strong democratic
conviction and commitment and deserved much praise.


3. (C) The Ambassador briefed the Cardinal on our efforts to
technically monitor the elections process with our Embassy
staff, our USAID technical project in support of the IFES,
NDI and Hagamos Democracia observation effort and the "quick
count". The Ambassador said that Pepe Lobo's crushing
victory over Elvin Santos and the Nationalists landslide
victory across the country was less a reflection of support
for Lobo and the Nationalists, or whether Santos was a good
or bad candidate, and more a rejection and indictment of
Liberal leadership represented by President Mel Zelaya and
regime leader Roberto Micheletti. The Ambassador noted that
the total rejection of the Liberals was highlighted by the
significance of the crossover vote by many Liberals in the
presidential, congressional and mayoral races. For example
the Nationalists had been able to win an astounding 240 of
the 298 mayoral contests, and roundly defeated dozens of
individually capable and popular Liberal incumbents. The
Cardinal noted that the Liberal Party had always been the
majority party and that nearly 60 percent of Hondurans
considered themselves as Liberals. He said this victory was
total and overwhelming and gave Lobo and the Nationalists a
unique mandate and opportunity.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that while the election was a
necessary element in restoring the democratic order to
Honduras, it was not sufficient. The Ambassador discussed at
length U.S. support for the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord
(TSJA). In this regard, he stressed the importance of the
scheduled vote in Congress on President Zelaya's restoration.
The Ambassador stressed that as the Cardinal well
understood, U.S. policy towards Honduras was a principled one
and we continued to strongly condemn the coup and call on
Congress to restore Zelaya. At the same time, we supported
the TSJA and understood that Congress would have the final
say on restoration and we would respect that decision. In
this regard he discussed the importance that the Congress
deliberate on this issue in an open and transparent manner.
For example, we would expect Congressional leaders to allow
live media coverage of the event, conduct an open and

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extensive debate of the issue, and ensure a roll call vote so
that the Honduran people and the international community
could see how the individual legislators stood on this
important matter. The Cardinal said he agreed that the
process needed to be a credible and open one or risk a very
negative international reaction, particularly since he
believed that Congress would reject Zelaya's restitution.
The Cardinal agreed to speak to Congress President Alberto
Saavedra and urge him to manage an open process including
conducting a roll call vote.


5. (C) In the event that Congress rejects Zelaya's
restoration, the Ambassador stressed that there was no need
for Robert Micheletti to return to office. Micheletti
himself had said that if Zelaya no longer had a claim he was
not interested in staying in power for a second longer than
necessary, and we needed to hold him to those statements.
The Ambassador stressed that it would be extremely negative
for the new Lobo government if Micheletti insisted on passing
the presidential sash directly to him. The fact is no
government in the world recognizes the legitimacy of the
Micheletti regime and that his insistence to stay in power
would damage the incoming Lobo government. The Ambassador
discussed the possibility that a government of national unity
be created, consistent with the TSJA, that could play a
transition role between the resignation of Micheletti and the
inauguration of Lobo. Both agreed that Lobo needed to assert
himself and make clear to Micheletti that for the good of the
country he needed to step down. The Cardinal and the
Ambassador agreed to work together in common purpose on this
issue after Congress dealt with the restitution issue.


6. (C) The Cardinal and the Ambassador discussed the future
of Honduras and the importance of restoring democratic
governance and full respect for the rule of law and human
rights. Both agreed that it was important for Lobo to
establish a strong national dialogue, create a government of
national unity, and support the creation of a Truth
Commission as outlined in the TSJA.
LLORENS