AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT PEPE LOBO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001231 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT PEPE LOBO TEGUCIGALP 00001231 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and President-elect Lobo met on November 30. Both discussed the positive results of the elections. The Ambassador briefed Lobo on the continued U.S. approach post-election that included implementation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. They reviewed prospects for Congressional restitution of President Zelaya, the need for regime leader Micheletti to step aside, and the importance of creating a government of national unity. Lobo said he was looking forward to addressing the major socio-economic issues facing the nation and discussed some of his plans to fight corruption and be responsive to the needs of the common people. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with President-elect Pepe Lobo on November 30. Lobo agreed to meet at the Ambassador's office in the chancery. The Ambassador opened the exchange by congratulating Lobo for his strong victory over his principal rival, the Liberal Party's Elvin Santos. The Ambassador added that the elections had been well managed by the Supreme Elections Tribunal (TSE) and that the elections had been held in a climate of peace and harmony, which had been impressive. The Honduran people deserved great credit for their commitment to democracy. Both agreed that Elvin Santos' concession speech had been appropriate and helped create calm following the TSE's announcement of the TREP results showing Lobo's landslide victory. Lobo said that he believed voter turn out had been strong and predicted that the numbers would exceed the levels reached in the 2005 elections. He also predicted that he would receive more than one million votes, which would exceed President Zelaya's vote tally in 2005, which had been 900,000. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the elections results were a positive development and a necessary -- if insufficient -- condition to resolve the Honduran crisis. The Ambassador discussed the U.S. commitment to the implementation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord (TSJA). He said that Honduras,s ability to normalize its ties with the international community would hinge on decisions and actions taken in the coming days. The Ambassador cited the imminent vote on Zelaya's restitution scheduled for December 2. The Ambassador said we hoped that the vote would be favorable to restoration, but at the very least we would insist that the Congress deal with this issue in a solemn, open and transparent manner, ensuring open media coverage, debate and a roll call vote. The Ambassador suggested to Lobo that he needed to engage on this issue. Lobo expressed concern that the National Congress had scheduled the vote too soon after the elections. He added that if the vote were held on December 2, he feared that Congress would reject Zelaya's restitution. He said that it would be far better if Congress deliberated more slowly and that the vote happen later in the week or early the following week. The Ambassador suggested that Lobo encourage congressional leaders and his own congressional delegation to support a serious consideration of the issue, and added that a public expression of support for restitution might be well received internationally. ¶4. (C) Lobo discussed the possibility that Congress would vote to reject Zelaya's return. He said if this had happened it was still in his best interest for Micheletti to not return from his temporary absence. He said he had discussed this matter with Chief of Defense General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez. He said he had made his views known but had found Vasquez somewhat unsure of what to do, and still somewhat loyal to Micheletti. Both agreed that more lobbying was needed to bring key players in support of Micheletti's resignation. The Ambassador agreed to Lobo's request that international officials reach out to Micheletti and also help convince him and his close advisors to step down. Lobo suggested that we enlist Panamanian President Martinelli and said that Micheletti had great respect for Martinelli. He noted that Martinelli was scheduled to visit Honduras on December 9. Lobo and the Ambassador concurred that if Micheletti resigned and Zelaya failed to be restored, it was still critical to create a government of national unity TEGUCIGALP 00001231 002.2 OF 002 consistent with the TSJA to serve in a transition role until Lobo and his government assumed office on January 27, 2010. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador briefed Lobo on Assistant Secretary Valenzuela's interest in speaking to him possibly today. Lobo welcomed the opportunity to speak with him. The Ambassador also briefed him on his conversation with President Arias and Arias' attempts to be supportive of Honduras at the Ibero-American Summit in Portugal. Lobo said he had been trying to call Arias and had considered the possibility of visiting him in San Jose. ¶6. (C) Lobo spoke of his interest in dealing with some of the major issues confronting Honduras and outlined plans to deal with the economic crisis, his commitment to fight crime, and improve the educational and health systems. Lobo said he wanted to send a message that he would not tolerate corruption and would not hesitate on cracking down on powerful individual business and political interests that were violating the law. He also said that he greatly admired President Uribe and would hope to emulate his constant outreach to the common people, including by convening town hall meetings around the country. LLORENS