TFH01: WHA PDAS KELLY'S NOVEMBER 17 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001184 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: WHA PDAS KELLY'S NOVEMBER 17 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZELAYA REF: TEGUCIGALPA 1154 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: WHA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Kelly and Ambassador Llorens met with Honduran President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya and his close advisors during a November 17-18 visit to Honduras in support of Tegucigalpa - San Jose Accord implementation. With restitution before elections no longer a possibility, Zelaya expressed a significantly more pragmatic view than a week before when he suggested that he would not accept restitution under any possibility after the election(Reftel). While some of his advisors continued to insist elections without restitution were completely illegitimate and should be boycotted, Zelaya appeared more flexible. Kelly explained the U.S. desire to continue advancing implementation of the accord, even beyond election day. He stressed the importance of allowing Hondurans the right to vote, and the irony of a democratically-elected president advocating boycott. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PDAS Kelly and the Ambassador met with President Zelaya at the Brazilian Embassy on November 17, one week after their previous meeting. Poloff served as note taker. Accompanying Zelaya in the meeting were his closest advisors: Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina, his representative on the Tegucigalpa - San Jose Accord,s Verification Commission, as well as Reina's son, Enrique Reina, First Lady Xiomara Castro, and Tegucigalpa - San Jose Accord negotiator Victor Meza. Also present was Brazilian Charge d'Affaires Francisco Catunda. ¶3. (C) Kelly sought Zelaya's reaction to the announcement by the Honduran Congress that it would review the issue of his reinstatement on December 2, the week following the general election scheduled for November 29. Kelly noted that the announcement was in accordance with the accord, emphasizing that, in the view of the U.S., the accord was not dead. Kelly encouraged Zelaya to put forward the names of two or three nominees for a unity cabinet to indicate his willingness to advance full implementation of the accord. Kelly acknowledged that in his earlier meeting with de facto regime leader Micheletti (septel),no new breakthroughs had been achieved. ¶4. (C) Zelaya said he understood restoration before elections was now impossible. He admitted that it would have been 
difficult for members of Congress to vote on such a controversial subject in the middle of their re-election campaigns, pointing out that he had been in 12 election campaigns in his own career and understood their position. Zelaya acknowledged the fact that Congress had set a date was a step forward, but continued to express concerns over the legitimacy of an election under the direction of the de facto regime. He said that citizens who opposed the coup were afraid to come out and vote, which would call into question the results. ¶5. (C) Meza stated that elections could not be legitimate while the country remained under the shadow of Micheletti. Meza said Micheletti must step aside. Zelaya noted that none of the presidential candidates waned a handover of power from Micheletti to them, bcause they knew it undermined the legitimacy of he transfer of power. Meza stated that the couphad ruptured Honduran democracy, and to have elections without repairing the rupture was incongruous to restoration of a constitutional state. He asked Kelly directly what he thought was the way out. Meza said that he believed the solution was Micheletti's resignation, because Micheletti was the symbol of the rupture. ¶6. (C) Kelly said the way out was to create an environment in which the Honduran people could freely make their will known in elections, by continued forward progress on implementing the accord, and by continuing that process beyond the elections. Kelly noted that Congress' declaration that it would consider reinstatement was an important step forward and one that was within the framework of the accord. He said Zelaya,s proposing of two or three nominations to the unity government would further build momentum behind the accord. TEGUCIGALP 00001184 002 OF 002 With regard to U.S. support of elections, Kelly noted that supporting the process did not equal an endorsement of the environment in which elections were held. The Ambassador noted there were two different issues at hand: one was the technical process of carrying out elections; the second was the political environment in which those elections take place. He said the United States had always supported the right of the people to vote, and also had denounced the environment that hindered free and fair elections. The Ambassador commented on the irony of a democratically-elected president advocating an election boycott. ¶7. (C) Comment: Zelaya was more lucid and pragmatic in his approach to the crisis than he had been for many months. In contrast with his denunciation of elections and advocating boycott in the meeting a week prior (Reftel),he showed that he understood the practical reality before him. Even his hard line advisors shifted from demanding restoration of Zelaya to resignation of Micheletti as the condition for accepting elections. Zelaya's position, if he maintains it, would allow room for implementation to continue after elections, when the Congress would have less to fear in making the difficult decision on restitution. End Comment. LLORENS